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Chapter 1   Introduction: Peasant irrigation in the Bolivian Andes 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In the Andean Region countries, high-altitude mountain zones are considered to be the 
territories where irrigation water is born. In Bolivia, however, this region is precisely where 
there are the greatest restrictions on agriculture, due to the adverse climatic conditions: frosts, 
droughts and a highly variable rainfall regime. Because of the agroecological conditions the 
inter-Andean valleys, which have less severe climatic restrictions, constitute the geographies 
with greater experience and tradition in water management; and they have a very marked dry 
period during which irrigation is indispensable (Cossio, 2011; Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 
2002; Gutiérrez and Gerbrandy, 1998a,b). 
 
In these irrigation regions, inhabitants have based their historical development and cultures 
importantly on agriculture and water management. This management, in turn, is grounded in 
collective work, framed within the development of locally established practices and norms to 
control water sources and flows and distribute the resource all the way to their fields. 
Historically, different from neighbouring countries, in Bolivia, the Government has intervened 
very little in this development of irrigation systems and governance practices (Achi, 2010; 
Gutiérrez, 2010; Perreault, 2008; Seemann, 2014). 
 
In Bolivian rural reality, agricultural practices to raise different types of crops and animals are 
based on the family unit. Households make decisions about what, when, how and how much 
to plant. However, these agricultural decisions are not isolated, but directly involved with 
collective water management, with the market, with government institutions and with local 
rules, regulations and customary institutions that have formed gradually on the basis of each 
locality’s own practices and experiences (Gerbrandy & Hoogendam, 1998; Saldias et al., 2012; 
Seemann, 2014, 2016). This thesis seeks to understand the interrelationship between these 
spheres, identifying collective actions expressed as strategies, and relating them with household 
practices and actions in terms of agricultural production strategies. 
 
This introductory chapter, after describing in detail the biophysical and social context of 
irrigated agriculture in Bolivia, shows its small-farmer nature and its foundations in collective 
action. Then, I argue about the need to understand the interrelationship between collective 
water control and household-level production decisions and strategies, as an indispensable 
prerequisite to understand agrarian development and the diverse manifestations of irrigated 
agriculture. 
 
In Bolivia’s irrigation development, there have been major milestones marking key socio-
political transformations, closely linked with water management and with the development of 
small farming and irrigation. These milestones are discussed, along with the irrigation sector’s 
institutional development, in the third and fourth sections of this chapter, as a basis to identify 
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the problem and research questions for this thesis. Answering this question will probe more 
deeply into interrelationships between the collective foundation of irrigation and individual 
(family) agricultural activities, both embedded in socio-political, cultural, economic and 
biophysical contexts shaping the direction that irrigated agriculture has ultimately taken in 
Bolivia. 
 
The core question of this research is: 
 
How do collective action and individual strategies entwine in peasant irrigation to foster 
diverse patterns of irrigation management and production organization in response to 
the quest for autonomous water control? 
 
The chapter describes the research method applied to answer this question and the more specific 
sub-questions, and then describes the scope of each of the following chapters. 
1.2 Context. Irrigated agriculture in the Bolivian Andes 
 
Politically, Bolivia is divided into nine departments, six of which are located almost wholly in 
the Andean Region (altiplano highlands and inter-Andean valleys) and three in the Amazon 
lowlands. The Altiplano occupies 13.5%, inter-Andean valleys and the eastern mountain range 
another 24.2% and the plains cover 62.3% (VRHyR, 2013). 
 
A characteristic feature of Bolivia is that its population is distributed over the national territory 
in inverse proportion to the country’s rainfall pattern and water availability zoning. That is, the 
altiplano and valley zones are the most populated, and have the greatest water deficit problems, 
whereas the moist lowlands have much lower demographic density. According to data from 
the National Statistics Institute (INE), for 2005, 70% of the population was concentrated in the 
western zone (altiplano and inter-Andean valleys) and the remaining 30% in the flatlands zone. 
Projections based on these statistics, and the last population census in 2012, show slight 
changes, but maintain higher population concentration in the west, with 68% of the population 
(VRHyR, 2013). 
 
Up until approximately three decades ago, irrigation and therefore production of the main food 
crops was concentrated almost exclusively in the Andean Region highland zones, with much 
less agricultural production in the lowlands. Small-scale farms founded on household 
production systems have prevailed and persisted in the Andean zone. Although the cropland 
area under irrigation is only about 11% of the total land area under cultivation (Vice Ministry 
of Water Resources and Irrigation, 2012), this figure does not represent the high importance of 
small-farm agriculture and irrigation for food production (Guevara-Gil et al., 2010; Vos, 2010; 
Vos and Boelens, 2014; Zoomers, 1998, 2010, 2013). 
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Figure 1-1. Political division and main regions in Bolivia 
(Source: Prepared by the author) 
Crops under irrigation for domestic consumption are grown in all three regions of the country, 
including tubers and vegetables such as potatoes, onions, carrots and garlic; legumes such as 
peas; cereal grains such as maize or forage that may also be irrigated, such as oats (VRHyR, 
2013). Each zone also features its own crops. For example, the altiplano or high-altitude valleys 
and top ends of valleys have crops such as fava beans, oats and alfalfa. The inter-Andean 
valleys feature the greatest diversity of crops under irrigation: fruits, varied vegetables 
including tomatoes, lettuce, beets, cabbage and other crops such as flowers. The lowlands have 
other irrigated crops with high commercial value: watermelon, tobacco, peanuts, sunflowers 
and others grown extensively by medium and large producers engaged in agroindustry and 
agro-exports (Del Callejo, 2010; Vos, 2010). 
 
Staple food crops include grains, tubers, legumes and vegetables, mainly grown in western and 
central Bolivia (in the highlands, the inter-Andean and the lower valleys), although in the past 
decade the areas planted with these crops have also increased considerably in the lowlands. 
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Most of these crops are grown by small family farms. Small farmers account for an estimated 
30% of cropland and 51% of production volumes for these crops (Del Callejo, 2010; Rocha et 
al., 2015; Vice Ministerio de Recursos Hídricos y Riego, 2012). 
 
Diverse agroecological conditions, climatic risks, marked distribution of rainfall, and cultural 
diversity have yielded different water management experiences in different regions of the 
country, as well as a wide diversity in ways of doing agriculture and managing natural 
resources. 
 
1.2.1 Water sources and biophysical conditions 
 
Rainfall increases gradually from west to east and from south to north, from regions with under 
100 mm a year at the southwestern end of Bolivia, up to 1200 to 1700 mm/year in the east and 
north (Montes de Oca, 1997). This spatial variability of rainfall does follow a pattern, 
concentrated in the summer months (December to March), above all in the west, which means 
that irrigation is indispensable in the dry season. 
 
Water sources for irrigation are also season-limited, running dry in the dry season and with 
intermittent and often erratic flow during the rainy season, especially when drawn directly from 
rivers in the altiplano and inter-Andean valleys. These valleys have a wide diversity of water 
sources and greater possibilities to tap it than in other regions of the country (Gutiérrez and 
Gerbrandy, 1998a; Saldías et al., 2012). 
 
The main source of water for irrigation is from rivers, which covers about 69% of irrigated area 
(see Figure 1.2). The total irrigated area is estimated at 303,000 hectares, approximately 26% 
of Bolivia’s croplands according to data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2014) and 
Vice-Ministerio de Recursos Hídricos y Riego (2012). 
 
 
Figure 1-2. Percentage of irrigated areas served by different water sources 
(Source: Vice-Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, 2012) 
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The headwater zones of the inter-Andean valleys have great potential for dams to regulate 
water availability, accounting for 13% of the irrigated area (Vice Ministerio de Recursos 
Hídricos y riego, 2012). In high-altitude watersheds, natural lagoons and wetlands have been 
dammed to consolidate irrigation systems with good-quality water (clear and with very little 
sediment). For example, the higher parts of the inter-Andean valleys – crucial for irrigation 
coverage in Bolivia - have dam systems as in the Central and High1 valleys of Cochabamba. 
By contrast, the mid- and lower watersheds have steep slopes, semi-arid zones and little plant 
cover, flows with heavy sediment content, so these irrigation systems have problems operating 
and maintaining their infrastructure, shortening systems’ useful lifetime. This type of 
utilization is typical in central valleys and southern Bolivia, from the so-called Southern Cone 
of Cochabamba, to the valleys of Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca and Tarija (see Figure 1.1) (Montes 
de Oca, 1992; Saldías et al., 2012; Vos, 2010). 
 
In addition to these surface sources, the inter-Andean valleys, mainly in extensive valleys as in 
the north (“Central Valley” and “High Valley” in Cochabamba), have significant underground 
water resources, accounting for 56% of the area irrigated (Vice Ministerio de Recursos 
Hídricos y Riego, 2012). Systems with underground sources decrease in both quantity and 
quality going southward. The remaining 9% of irrigated areas is covered by systems with small 
springs or recently with sewage water in peri-urban agricultural zones (VRHyR, 2013). 
 
The above shows that the main water source for irrigation is from rivers, the seasonality of 
which restricts agriculture to the rainy season. Irrigation plays a complementary role to rainfall. 
Only very few zones have year-round, “safer” water sources such as dams or underground 
water, for a full growing cycle during the dry season. These water sources are commonly tapped 
using rustic or sometimes concrete infrastructure, mainly direct intakes from rivers, with 
earthen or lined canals, dams, small reservoirs, ponds in the case of spring-based systems, or 
pumping from drilled wells (Saldías et al., 2012; Seemann, 2016; Vos, 2010; VRHyR, 2013. 
Cf. Zeitoun et al., 2016). 
 
Existing irrigation systems vary in size. The classification done by the National Irrigation 
Program (Program National de Irrigation, 2000) updated by the Vice-Ministry of Water 
Resources and Irrigation (2012) shows mostly systems under 500 hectares, accounting for 
nearly 77% of irrigated area nationwide. The remaining 23% of the area is covered by systems 
considered large on a Bolivian scale (over 500 hectares). 
 
                                                 
1 The region of Cochabamba’s valleys is divided into three major areas: The “Central Valley” where the city of 
Cochabamba is located, the “Upper Valley” where the Tiraque and Punata reservoir systems are located and, 
finally, the Lower Valley, where mainly underground water is tapped. 
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Picture 1-1.  Irrigation infrastructure: Atajados, lined canals, and combined technologies 
Photos: I. del Callejo 
 
1.2.2 Collective management and irrigation practices in small-farming systems 
The outstanding feature of irrigation by family farms in Bolivia’s Andean Region is the 
impressive organizational and water management capacity that the people have developed 
(Cossio, 2011; Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998; de Vos et al., 2006). This capacity is 
grounded in (or results from) collective action, based on practice, on day-to-day water 
management tasks, on the need to mobilize and work collectively to build, operationalize, 
rehabilitate or maintain infrastructure to catch and conduct water to their fields (e.g., 
Gerbrandy, 1998a,b; Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998; Laruta and Bustamante, 2007. Cf. 
Guevara-Gil, et al., 2010; Mabry, 1996; Ostrom, 2009, 2010). These practices and above all 
water distribution entail agreements, negotiations, and norms that have been created and 
adapted locally, in what is currently recognized as their “uses and customs”. 
 
Another important feature of irrigation systems in Bolivia is that the Government does not 
intervene directly in setting or regulating water rights or ways of collectively managing water 
within irrigation systems – even though the current government attempts to register water rights 
at higher watershed levels (see e.g. Rocha et al., 2015; Seemann, 2014, 2016). Government 
intervention tends to be indirect, through irrigation projects. These projects are discussed with 
“beneficiary” rural communities or populations, regarding the form and amount of labor they 
must invest, as the main mechanism principal to create (or adjust) water rights in these 
intervened irrigation systems (Boelens and Vos, 2014. Cf. Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 2002;). 
However, fundamental issues such as including or excluding (new) irrigation system users 
generally call for internal agreements within or among communities or user groups (Del 
Callejo, 2010). 
 
A key element in forming water user organizations (particularly irrigator organizations) has 
been collective work invested in harnessing water sources and building the infrastructure 
needed to use the water (Boelens and Vos, 2014). This is a fundamental principle in creating 
water rights in family-farming irrigation systems in the Andes for collective and individual 
players. Collectively, this means differentiating between communities or groups of families 
who claim control over a certain territory and its natural resources, versus other groups or 
communities that have no such rights (Achi, 2010; Bustamante and Gutiérrez, 1999; Gerbrandy 
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and Hoogendam, 1998; Gutiérrez, 2005). By contrast, individual rights are manifested as the 
possibilities of using water that a family acquires and exercises in an irrigation system as a 
function of the work or resources invested in operationalizing this irrigation system, according 
to collectively agreed rules (Boelens, 2015; Gerbrandy and Hoogendam 1998; Rocha et al., 
2016). 
  
Water rights are defined and water user organizations develop in their own unique contexts of 
time, space, social organization and institutions. Like the diversity of organizational 
arrangements regarding water, there is also great diversity in how water rights are expressed, 
in terms of time, water amounts or flow rates (see Boelens, 2011, 2015; Laruta and Bustamante, 
2007; Saldías et al., 2012). Their temporary or permanent nature also varies. In some cases, 
rights may be permanent, year-round, whereas others may be only seasonal, or vary with the 
river’s flow (Gerbrandy, 1998a, b; Gutiérrez, 2005, 2010; Rocha et al., 2016) The principles 
on which these rights are based also vary; as does their scope and the historical circumstances 
giving rise to them (Bustamante and Gutiérrez 1999; Gerbrandy and Hoogendam 1998; 
Gutiérrez 2005; Rocha et al., 2015). For example, there are collective and individual water 
rights that communities have claimed and practiced since prior to Spanish colonization, while 
in many other cases, they were created during the colonial period or derived from rights created 
by hacienda owners through efforts invested by their workers. Others are recent, resulting from 
government interventions through irrigation projects, or from rural families’ own investments, 
organized to tap a water source (Achi, 2010; Bustamante, 2010; Guevara-Gil et al., 2010; 
Rocha et al. 2016). 
 
In summary, water rights, organizational forms, water management agreements and practices 
for small-farm irrigation in Bolivia are not simply “ancestral indigenous rights”, that is, they 
have no single form and come from no single time in history, nor are they all based on the same 
principles. At this time, irrigation systems are the outgrowth of a complex overlapping of 
processes, rules, and agreements intermingled in different physical settings, emerging from and 
blending through different historical processes and perfused with unique cultural and socio-
political contexts (Andolina, 2012; von Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998; Boelens, 2014, 2015; 
Boelens et al., 2010; Roth et al., 2005, 2015). The Government has played a very limited role 
in the sector’s institutional configuration and regulation, much less in managing irrigation 
systems. 
 
From the individual family farm level, these systems arise within different organizational and 
institutional arrangements, in their communities and the market, to make their livelihoods 
viable (Boelens and Albó, 2007; Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998; Urteaga and Boelens, 
2006; Zoomers, 2013). Irrigation plays a fundamental role, directly expanding the possibilities 
of what, how much, what for and where they can produce. Irrigation practices, depending on 
water sources and infrastructure, on agreements to define collective and individual water rights 
or the different mechanisms granting rural families access to water, result in diversity of ways 
of managing water on each farm and using it to grow different crops (Del Callejo, 2010; 
Zoomers, 1998, 2010). 
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Some commonly observed characteristics of these practices are (e.g., Boelens, 2015; Del 
Callejo, 2010; Delgadillo, 2003a,b; Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998; Gutiérrez, 2005): 
 
• Applying large flow volumes, if water is taken directly from rivers or dams, or 
relatively small flow rates from springs or wells. 
• Irrigation intervals are fixed in some cases (for example, in permanent well or spring 
systems); in other cases, they are variable, but with the possibility of deciding when to 
irrigate (for example, dam systems); and in other cases (water sourced from non-
permanent rivers) intervals are random or uncertain. 
• Water may be applied by furrows, by wider melga canals, by flooding, and recently 
sprinkling is expanding. The way these practices are done will depend on farmers’ 
experience with and knowledge about water management, the availability of labor, the 
crops planted, and other factors of how their farm is organized. 
• In practice, basic modes of irrigation norms, rules, rights and practices, become highly 
complex and diverse because of the variety of physical conditions, such as different soil 
types, variable slopes and often very rugged terrain, soil depth and field size. 
 
    
Picture 1-2. Irrigation practices: conveying and applying water 
Photos: I. del Callejo 
 
1.2.3 Historical development of irrigation in Bolivia 
 
Irrigation development in Bolivia shows major changes in the role played by peasant societal 
organizations in organizing water control. The latter have grown progressively, passing through 
stages of empowerment to interact with the government, with development agencies and with 
different sectors of the population, thereby developing new water management experiences and 
practices under adverse conditions. Over time, the Government’s role has also shifted, from 
almost total absence, to attempts to regulate the sector by formalizing customary water 
management practices in small-farm irrigation (Bustamante, 1995, 2010; Rocha et al., 2015, 
2016; Seemann, 2014, 2016). These milestones marking major periods of changes, are outlined 
below, discussing their salient characteristics as a basis for understanding present-day irrigation 
governance in Bolivia. 
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Several authors highlight the importance of irrigation and water management as one of the 
mainstays around which societies have formed since before Spanish colonization in the Andes 
(e.g., Boelens, 2015; Gelles 1986, 1994, 2000; Mitchell and Guillet 1994; Sherbondy 1994, 
1998; Trawick 2001; Zuidema, 1986). These authors show the diverse ways of organizing and 
distributing water and the norms regulating water uses, whether under unified (community) 
organizational structures, or others with no set institutional structure, or yet others combining 
these options (Trawick 2001). 
 
During Spanish colonization, one key aim of the colonial government was to organize and 
control resources exploitation, especially through labour control and taxation of the indigenous 
people. During this period, there was a direct relationship between people’s control, population 
movement policies and agrarian and mining policies -- such as in one of Latin America’s key 
mining regions, Potosí. This made the valleys, and particularly Cochabamba, the main food 
production zones for the country’s mining centers, in addition to assuring ongoing labor 
provision for mining. To this end, the colonial government deployed different mechanisms: 
population movements to concentrate indigenous people around (or near) Spanish towns, using 
local institutions (practices and norms or rules) to wield power and control over indigenous 
people, and creating a power structure using local leaders (caciques) and their own practices 
(Larson 1988a). 
 
During that time, water was defined as a privately allocated resource, linked to land ownership; 
in practice, the water was allocated largely to Spanish landlords. However, as Gerbrandy & 
Hoogendam (1998) mention, partially, water management has maintained its 
collective/community nature. At the one hand, this happened in areas where the so-called 
“Pueblos de Indios” (Indian villages) were formed by the colonial powers. Indian villages were 
concentrations of indigenous population, organized by the colonial government supposedly to 
maintain and respect their existence. In practice, however, these population concentrations 
were the colonial government’s most effective mechanism to collect indigenous tributes and 
control and coerce their inhabitants (Cf. Albó, 1987a; Baud, 2010; Boelens, 2015; Gelles, 2000; 
Larson, 1988a). At the other hand, in regions such as the Upper Valley of Cochabamba, large 
haciendas were established and managed under the "pongueaje" system. Here, peasant families 
were forced to work and produce for the landowner. Each family was also assigned a small plot 
(“pegujal”) to grow their own family’s food in their “free time”, and collective water 
management practices partially continued if the landlord would allow for this – generally 
whenever it would mainly benefit the hacienda’s productive interests (Larson, 2000; Mayer, 
2002). 
 
During the early republican period and up to 1952, this situation continued in practice, 
consolidating the haciendas’ water and land control, though there were ongoing confrontations 
between hacienda owners and indigenous communities or with “free peasants” living around 
the haciendas. Another legal measure accentuated the private nature of water rights: the Law 
of “exvinculación”, which granted land as private property to communities and to hacienda 
owners, recognizing also the individual allocation of water to residents (Bustamante, 1995). 
But with the 1953 agrarian reform, the hacienda system was dismantled in most of western 
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Bolivia, and these large haciendas were parceled out among their workers, the pegujaleros. 
This meant that former workers from more densely populated haciendas received smaller plots 
than those from the larger or less densely populated ones (Dandler, 1984). 
 
Since before the agrarian reform, as part of the buildup to the so-called “National Revolution” 
in 1952, pegujaleros from each hacienda formed agrarian unions, as rural partners (peasant 
unions) of the labor movement in cities (labor unions). These unions were designed for political 
support and social mobilization during the revolution. Agrarian unions, after the agrarian 
reform, gradually came to be known as rural communities (Dandler, 1984). Under this new 
scenario, water management changed hands, from the hacienda owners to the agrarian unions 
(rural or peasant communities). They commonly adjusted water distribution according to the 
(spatial) distribution used during the hacienda period (Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998). This 
consolidated collective rights and individual rights to water, despite attempts by the State to 
regain control over both through constitutional amendments. For example, the 1978 
constitutional amendment (re)establishes the “original right of the State” over land, water and 
other natural resources. In practice, this normative framework (starting with the Law of 
exvinculación mentioned above) facilitated inheritance and therefore land subdivision as well 
as land and associated water rights purchase/sale transactions (Bustamante, 1995). 
 
Currently, although most irrigation systems in Bolivia have water rights linked to community 
land, each community assigns rights to persons, that is families. Often, water rights can 
therefore be redistributed (purchased, transferred or traded) separately. In some cases, an owner 
of land with water may transfer the water to someone else (via different mechanisms), and in 
others only the land without water, or both together. However, notwithstanding the individual 
nature of land tenure and water access in many parts of the country, communities regulate to 
some degree to whom land and water are sold or transferred to: preferably (but not exclusively) 
to community members, relatives or acquaintances from neighboring communities rather than 
to strangers. This is a mechanism that communities use to maintain certain (collective) control 
over water and land, although in the last few years this rule is becoming increasingly flexible 
(Bustamante and Gutiérrez, 1999; Gutierrez, 2010). 
 
The basic organizational unit in rural zones are rural communities or agrarian unions 
(“sindicatos”). Similarly, or as a counterpart to state administration levels, these organizations 
aggregate at higher levels: unions are organized at the district level into “Peasant Sub-
Centrales”, then at the provincial levels as “Peasant Centrales”, at the departmental level into 
Federations and nationally into the Single Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia 
(CSUTCB, Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia). 
 
Since agrarian reform up to the present, the organizational situation regarding water has 
become increasingly complex. The formal rural organizational structure, described above, does 
not necessarily correspond to water-user organizations, of which there is a great diversity of 
organizational forms. In many cases, irrigators’ organizations comprise only groups of families 
without belonging to any community; in others, they are part of one or more communities or 
sometimes the irrigators’ organization is the same as the community organization. They group 
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around a water source, forming autonomously managed irrigation systems with their own 
norms for operation. All this socio-organizational complexity and diversity regarding water 
may become even more complex, such as in the valleys of Cochabamba and in other regions 
of Bolivia, where several of these irrigation systems overlap in a single geographical space 
(e.g., Gutiérrez and Gerbrandy, 1998a; Hendriks, 2006; Saldías et al., 2012). This institutional 
development and current (irrigation) water-governance implications in Bolivia are discussed 
in greater detail below. 
 
1.2.4 The institutional framework of irrigation. Two different starting-points that finally 
rejoin. 
 
This section discusses the direction that the State has taken in its attempts to construct an 
irrigation-sector institutional structure, versus small farmers’ organizational dynamics and 
current water-management practices under irrigators’ organizations. It will also discuss where 
these two processes match up and where they clash, as they ultimately provide the form and 
contents of present-day irrigation-sector water governance. 
 
The implications of this scenario provide the background and the subject of this research, in 
terms of the water control knowledge gaps that this research aims to fill: it concentrates on the 
inter-relationship between (the different dimensions of) collective water control and the 
strategies small farmers pursue as families / small farm systems. 
 
In Bolivia, starting in the 1960s and more harshly during the following decade, the State, with 
direct support from international cooperation, turned its attention toward the Andean Region. 
This was because of the region’s importance in food production for domestic food supply and 
also because it concentrates most of the country’s population. Since then, it is possible to 
distinguish three periods of major institutional, political and state-policy changes regarding 
irrigation: 
 
The first period began in the early 1960s until the early 80s. In this period governed by military 
regimes, agricultural policies were strongly influenced by the so-called “Green Revolution” 
developed in Europe and North America and spread worldwide. This period created several 
experimental stations and research programs, promoting agricultural modernization by 
introducing technology packages including improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and 
irrigation as an important factor (Del Callejo, 2010). 
 
The State made a major effort to develop irrigation, with international cooperation support to 
construct infrastructure (mainly dams and large-scale works) to modernize existing systems. 
Several of these systems have been operating since before agrarian reform under the hacienda 
system and then rural organizations took them over. Some of these interventions, implemented 
through irrigation programs and projects, worked with the country’s experimental stations in 
different regions. The results reported during this period are discouraging because of the little 
or no “adoption” of the technologies proposed, with agricultural extension programs that would 
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only focus on “technology transfer” without considering local needs, knowledge, context and 
history (Gandarillas et al., 1993). 
 
In terms of water control, this period consolidated water rights and farmer management 
arrangements, governed by customary norms, locally established and supported by collective 
practice and action. However, this top-down and largely imported, a-historical modernist 
technology focus also meant progressive change toward individual land ownership and the 
individualization of water rights; particularly in Bolivia’s valleys and some zones of the 
altiplano. Other regions of the Altiplano systems have preserved collective / community land 
and water management systems (Bustamante and Gutiérrez, 1999). 
 
The second period runs from the early 1980s up to 2005 and featured many changes. It began 
with military governments, and ended with democratic governments. In this period the so-
called “Structural Adjustment Plans”, promoted globally by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, were gradually imposed. Part of these belt-tightening measures 
for public spending took the first steps toward liberalizing the economy, by reducing state 
intervention (and investment) in economic activities. This period closed down most 
experimental stations and agricultural extension and research programs, promoting private-
sector involvement, through NGOs, foundations and consulting firms to support agricultural 
development, including irrigation project design and implementation. Toward the end of that 
period, the neoliberal measures increased, closing all state agencies providing direct assistance 
to agriculture, so the Ministry of Agriculture would play only the role of planning, regulating 
and engaging (private) services for technical assistance and research (Del Callejo, 2010). 
 
Together with this general (neo-)liberalizing trend in public policies, this period also 
implemented norms and policies entailing major changes in interactions between the State and 
organized society, particularly in rural areas with peasant communities and with irrigators’ 
organizations. These changes included: an array of norms re-structuring the State, such as the 
Law on Popular Participation and the Law on Administrative Decentralization of the State (in 
1995), and implementing the National Irrigation Program (PRONAR) as of 1995, as a 
structured attempt by the State to regulate the irrigation sector and plan investment. 
 
The first measures re-structured the central State toward decentralized local levels, 
implementing decentralization (allocation) of public funds to urban and rural municipalities on 
the basis of demographic population criteria. As part of their implementation, mechanisms for 
citizen participation were installed, in planning, decision-making and societal oversight of 
municipal (rural and urban) governments through legally recognized (formalized) local 
organizations, called “Territorial Grassroots Organizations” (OTBs) (Muñoz, 2000). In rural 
areas, these organizations became significant political and institutional resources for rural 
communities and agrarian unions, or even for water-users’ organizations (mainly irrigators), to 
get them recognition and visibility vis-à-vis the Government (Ströbele-Gregor, 1999). 
 
This was a transcendental step for municipalities and societal organizations in rural zones, to 
access state resources (public funds), enabling grassroots organizations to play a decisive, 
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increasing role in defining their own priorities as part of implementing policies, plans and 
projects or their own “Development Plans”2 (Nijenhuis, 2002). For the irrigation sector, this 
also meant a crucial step toward identifying and responding to historical demands and 
complaints by remote communities where the State had no presence. These demands 
commonly were (and still are) strongly related to increased involvement by rural organizations 
in the irrigation project interventions. 
  
This period also implemented the National Irrigation Program (PRONAR)3, as an attempt to 
structure Bolivia’s irrigation policy. This promoted pre-investment (irrigation-system studies 
and designs), investment (building new systems or improving existing systems), training and 
the State’s early attempts to organize the legal framework for water and particularly irrigation. 
Investments in irrigation concentrated mainly on improving infrastructure in micro-irrigation4 
systems, improving canals, river intakes and some small dams. 
 
The main characteristics of State administration and relations with rural organizations during 
this period were: 
- Decentralizing public administration toward regional and municipal governments, 
although regulatory and financial norms and administrative and financial procedures, 
access to public funding and international cooperation remained under central-
government agency control; 
- Interventions implemented by private agents (NGOs, consulting firms and 
construction companies) under contract with decentralized governments (especially 
municipalities); 
- Strengthened participation, involvement and even control of municipal governments 
in rural areas by peasant leaders and organizations. Since then, it has been common 
for mayors and municipal authorities, council members and other key positions to 
come from these organizations. 
 
Some implications of these institutional changes in the irrigation sector were (Del Callejo, 
2010): 
- Weakening the central Government's relations with rural areas; 
- Decentralizing and therefore delegating central-government functions to municipal 
governments were not accompanied by other financial support or public governance 
assistance for municipalities’ technical capacities. In general, this overloaded 
municipal governments’ responsibilities, often exceeding their financial 
                                                 
2 One of the instruments of state decentralization at the municipal level are the Municipal Development Plans 
(PDMs), prepared every five years in each municipality and implemented through annual operating plans (POAs). 
3 The National Irrigation Program (1996-2005) was implemented as a decentralized program of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The program consisted of four components: Water resource management, institution-building, 
investments in infrastructure for (micro-) irrigation, and training. The first three components were financed by the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the last by German cooperation (former GTZ).  
4 Micro-irrigation systems were considered by PRONAR and then by the whole public investment system, as 
those covering under 100 hectares.  
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implementation capacity and leading to community complaints and conflicts over 
unmet demands;   
- Empowering rural organizations and the emerging of new local leaders. 
 
In this context, relations between government (municipal, regional and central) with irrigation 
organizations were limited to the former’s funding to construct infrastructure in response to 
demands by the latter. This period had no direct State intervention in water or irrigation-system 
management. Even though the Law on Municipalities and the Law on Public Participation 
would grant municipalities the responsibilities to manage, maintain and improve irrigation 
systems within their jurisdiction, in practice this never happened5. 
 
During this period, two major events resulted in important water-norm discussions and actions 
and a new scenario of water-sector power relationships: the so-called “Water War” in 2000 in 
Cochabamba, and next, the formulation of the “Irrigation Law” (Law 2878 of 2004). 
Discussion about water norms, particularly for irrigation water, had already begun in the late 
1990s. This was partly motivated by conditions imposed by financing entities, to invest in the 
sectors of irrigation, water supply and sanitation. A condition to continue investing was to 
update the institutional and normative framework, particularly the Water Law, which dated 
back to 1906 (Gutiérrez, 2009).  
 
The year 2000 conflict in Cochabamba consisted of a series of mobilizations nationwide, it 
established a multi-scale organization to defend their rights from other user sectors and against 
privatizing interests promoted by neoliberal policies. Cochabamba’s evolving “Water War” 
showed water users’ organizational power, the possibilities of establishing alliances among 
different sectors of society (urban and peri-urban residents, irrigators, rural communities, 
drinking-water users’ organizations and others) around water and the social, political and 
cultural value of locally embedded water governance norms and practices. For several years, 
there had already been conflicts between the Cochabamba water-supply company (SEMAPA) 
and communities or collective water systems where SEMAPA extracted underground water to 
supply the city. These conflicts, as a preamble to the “water war”, had already shown societal 
organizations’ clear decision and mobilization capacity to defend “their rights to water”, 
expressed increasingly as a defense of their “uses and customs” (Assies, 2003). The major 
mobilization and conflict in the year 2000 was triggered by the threat to raise water-supply 
service rates in Cochabamba city, based on a concession contract with a transnational company, 
Aguas del Tunari. A law was enacted (Water Supply and Basic Sanitation Law, no. 2029) 
ratifying the contract with the concessionaire, and directly threatening the autonomous 
management of collective (community) water systems in Cochabamba’s urban and peri-urban 
zones. After several days of violent confrontations between police / army and the mobilized 
masses, the contract with Aguas del Tunari was rescinded and the Water Supply and Basic 
                                                 
5 For example, the Public Participation Law states that: “Municipal governments are granted competent 
jurisdiction and increased resources and transferred infrastructure for education, health care, sports, rural 
roadways and micro irrigation, with the obligation to manage them, maintain them and renew them...” (Article 
2, Chapter 2, Title I, paragraph b).  
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Sanitation Law was amended (Boelens, Bustamante, & Perreault, 2010; Perreault, 2005; 
Perreault, 2006).  
 
A new Water Law was also discussed (Seemann, 2014). In view of the diverging interests of 
different user sectors, mainly irrigators, miners, industry and urban users, discussion of a 
general Law got watered down. This drove irrigators, led by the Cochabamba Federation of 
Irrigators (FEDECOR), to promote a sectoral Irrigation Law. It coincided with forming the 
National Association of Irrigators and Community Water-Supply and Sanitation Systems 
(ANARESCAPYS) in 2003 and enactment in October 2004, of Law No. 2878 to Promote and 
Support the Irrigation Sector (Seeman, 2014). Socio-political conditions were favorable for this 
Law, because a year before the country had been rocked by further social conflicts about natural 
resource management. This led to a profound crisis and conflicts that ended up getting 
President Sánchez de Lozada to resign and establish a transition government. This conflict 
significantly shifted Bolivia’s power relationships. Different societal sectors who felt their 
basic rights and livelihoods were being trampled, called for greater management autonomy and 
political participation, reacting and demanding to be heard (Perreault, 2006). 
 
The third period covers from 2006 to 2015, distinguished mainly by establishing a new 
institutional framework for irrigation and progressively implementing it, along with other 
public-policy actions. 2006 was a landmark year for Bolivia and particularly for the irrigation 
sector. Evo Morales, a leader of coca workers, became President of Bolivia, strongly supported 
by both the powerful coca and the irrigators federations.  
 
The transition government prior to Evo Morales’ election already set up a new water-sector 
institutional structure, strengthening it by creating a Ministry of Water and three Vice 
Ministries, one of which was for irrigation. During Evo Morales’ administration, the Ministry 
has been reorganized several times, ending up as the Ministry of Environment and Water, with 
a Vice-Ministry for Drinking Water and Sanitation, a Vice-Ministry of Environment, 
Biodiversity, Climate Change and Forestry Management and Development, and the Vice-
Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MMAyA, 2014).6 
 
The Irrigation Law and its regulations formally recognized “uses and customs” as a foundation 
for organization, for water management and for water-use practices in small-farmer irrigation 
systems. In addition to this explicit, formal recognition, this granted decision-making rights to 
communities where water sources are located or used. This Law and its regulations also 
established the sector’s institutional framework, based on participation by representatives of 
irrigators at the departmental and national level in Departmental Irrigation Services (SEDERI) 
and the National Irrigation Service (SENARI), respectively. Both entities are responsible for 
administering “registrations” for water sources actually being used by rural organizations 
(irrigators), and granting authorizations to other non-peasant users. Their functions also include 
providing support for training, establishing penalties, and helping conflict resolution, in 
addition to proposing plans, policies and programs to develop the sector (Seeman, 2014). 
                                                 
6 Source:  www. http://www.mmaya.gob.bo/ (Accessed 12/2015). 
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Chapter 3 discusses the status of implementation and the challenges posed by this new 
irrigation-sector institutional structure. 
 
As this institutional framework was implemented by the Ministry of Environment and Water, 
various other programs were created for public investment to support this sector.7 As in 
previous stages, these programs have inherited technocratic traditions and a focus on building 
infrastructure, with little or no action regarding irrigation-system water management, much 
less to support agricultural production or farm-level irrigation practices. Irrigation systems are 
completely managed by irrigators’ organizations, and agricultural production and farm-level 
irrigation by rural families’ own decisions and strategies. Although the programs propose 
support for management capacities and improved water-use efficiency, there is no direct State 
assistance. 
 
In summary, where countries such as Peru and Ecuador have a longstanding background of 
state intervention in irrigation, with heavy state influence in setting norms, rules, and rights 
(Boelens, 2015; Vos, 2010), in Bolivia, attempts by the State to construct an institutional 
structure have failed repeatedly throughout history (Perreault, 2005, 2008; Seemann, 2014). 
What has had a meaningful impact has been recognizing customary practices, local institutions 
and organizations, and their higher federations, which have gradually mixed with public 
institutions to reach the top levels of State administration. 
 
Implementing neoliberal policies has often weakened societal grassroots organizations 
(Colque, Urioste and Eyzaguirre, 2015; Muñoz, 2000;), and certainly this was the case for 
specific sectors of society, such as workers’, miners’ or even rural grassroots organizations 
(agrarian unions or their federations at higher levels). However, simultaneously, as examined 
in greater depth in Chapter 3, water control organizations, especially irrigators’ organizations, 
are still active and have proven that they can coordinate other initiatives or societal movements, 
even challenging and – in some cases – reversing policies that have been implemented and 
jeopardize their water security. The model of decentralization and public participation 
implemented in Bolivia seems to have strengthened grassroots water control organizations’ 
capacities, ironically taking them in the opposite direction from decentralization. This means 
that grassroots water-sector organizations (especially irrigators) began grouping and upscaling 
their capacities for mobilizing and accessing positions of power, from local to national levels. 
Perreault (2005) calls this the “institutionalization of local-level water governance”. The 
opposite seems to have happened with State institutions, which have lost their possibilities of 
directly regulating irrigation at the local level. 
 
                                                 
7 This include PRONAREC since 2009 (National Irrigation Program with a Watershed Approach), SIRIC (Sub-
program of Investments in Inter-community Irrigation, since 2005); “My Water” Programs I, II and III (“More 
investment for water” Program, since 2011); “My Irrigation” Program (“More investment for irrigation” since 
2014) and others. In general, these programs are implemented by a centralized financial body, the Productive 
Social Investment Fund (FPS) through initiatives or demands resulting in commitments made by municipal and 
departmental governments. 
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Irrigation policies have focused to date on resolving physical control of water by improving 
major infrastructure such as dams, river intakes or main canals. Such measures seem to be 
purely technical and neutral in irrigation-institution development, but their importance in recent 
years has proven crucial, since constructing irrigation infrastructure is one of the most 
important mechanisms to create water rights and “hydraulic property” (Boelens and Vos, 2014; 
Coward, 1986) in new systems, or when consolidating and expanding them in existing systems 
in the Andes (Boelens, 2015; Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998; Gutiérrez, 2005). This means 
that, while State institutions tried and failed to intervene or regulate water rights through formal 
rules or institutional structures, irrigation infrastructure projects significantly impacted societal 
organizations, reorganizing and in many cases reinforcing local institutions, and consolidating 
water rights in small-farm irrigation systems. Irrigation interventions both created distortions 
and conflicts and at the same time they have contributed to rural organizations’ mobilization 
capacity, empowerment and progressive involvement in decision-making at different levels of 
government. In other words, interventions in irrigation were the (tangible) vehicle, along with 
rural communities’ own dynamics, recreating and reshaping old “uses and customs”. This has 
created new socio-political scenarios in water governance. 
1.3 Defining the problem and research questions 
 
Both when implementing public policies or in professional practice regarding irrigation, water 
policy in Bolivia has given priority to focus on eminently technical or physical elements: 
infrastructure, as presumably the most important means to ensure water availability and 
develop irrigated agriculture. In Bolivia there is a major gap between what the State has 
attempted through irrigation infrastructure and legal regulation projects, and what rural families 
with local practices grounded in collective action and strategies have achieved. 
 
In Bolivia’s irrigation development, a recurring problem has been how irrigated agriculture is 
conceived of: It is assumed that interventions in irrigation, focused on designing and 
constructing infrastructure to catch and conduct more water to irrigation zones, will directly 
and unilaterally improve agriculture. This initial technician’s assumption ignores or 
underestimates the importance of water management and all tasks and principles comprising 
and underpinning it. It underestimates the importance of collective action, and how local 
management is materialized concretely in water access and availability for rural families. 
 
There is a huge knowledge gap, both in the implementation of public policies to support this 
sector, and in overall professional practice. The idea is that water will, by itself, generate 
substantial, direct, unwavering changes in agricultural practices. This problem is rooted in 
biased technocratic concepts about small-scale farming and its irrigation practices and 
technologies, comparing them with “modern agriculture” and therefore cataloging them as 
backward, static, inefficient or “poor in technology” (Boelens, 2015; Del Callejo, 2010; 
Gutiérrez, 2005; van der Ploeg, 2003, 2008; Sanchis-Ibor et al., 2017; Seemann, 2014. Cf. 
Long, 2001a,b). 
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This ignoring or underestimating small-farm irrigation has focused State attention and 
prioritized State actions on modernizing irrigation by implementing irrigation technology. 
Although grounded in the argument of creating better conditions for production and thereby 
impacting rural families’ income, productivity and livelihoods, this has often resulted in 
simplistic and de-contextualized infrastructure projects. These fail to meet their purpose of 
ensuring water availability, much less generating the expected changes in agriculture. Or, in 
production terms, projects disregard the logic, determining conditions and contexts of peasant 
agriculture and peasants’ market relations, including their collective action that upholds their 
water control and access (Rocha et al., 2015; Saldías et al., 2012; Seemann, 2014, 2016; Vos, 
2010). 
 
This problem in Bolivia’s rural reality has meant that the same kind of irrigation and 
agricultural development intervention projects have been planned and implemented for decades 
(Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998, 2002; Roa-García, 2014; Rocha et al., 2015; de Vos et al., 
2006). This continues the promotion of infrastructure with operational problems, social 
conflicts surrounding these interventions, increasing inequality in access to water, and 
difficulties in materializing technological changes that could improve rural families’ 
production conditions (Guevara-Gil et al., 2010; Gutiérrez, 2009; Perrault, 2014; Salazar et al., 
2010). 
 
Rural communities’ dynamics have proven to provide the foundation for operating and 
managing local irrigation systems, above all in view of the State’s historical absence. For 
production systems, these dynamics unfold agroproductive diversity and ways of comprising 
rural livelihoods. The problems described above have led this research to pose the following 
question: 
 
How do collective action and individual strategies entwine in peasant irrigation to foster 
diverse patterns of irrigation management and production organization in response to the 
quest for autonomous water control? 
 
This question has been answered through three sub-questions helping to organize field research 
and analyze empirical evidence: 
 
Sub-questions: 
The first sub-question seeks to understand the institutional development of irrigation in Bolivia, 
which has been, in the State’s absence, based strongly on local water-management practices 
and norms, the practices currently expressed as “uses and customs”.  
 
How have irrigation institutions developed from local practices, how do they conflict with 
official views and policies concerning irrigated agriculture; and how these mismatches in turn 
influence water control? 
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The second sub-question focuses on collective action, to more deeply explore its implications 
or inter-relationships with water control: 
 
How do the various forms of collective action in peasant irrigation systems become manifest 
and how do they inter-relate with the different dimensions of water control? 
 
Finally, the third sub-question focuses on rural families’ production strategies, to understand 
their inter-relations with collective water control and with control over their own production 
processes. This last aspect is addressed in this research in terms of the quest for self-reliance, 
as a characteristic feature of small-farmer agriculture and irrigation. 
 
How do different peasant families’ farming strategies relate to water control and control over 
production? 
 
1.4 Methodological approach 
 
1.4.1 Study focus 
 
The thesis focuses on “peasant dynamics” in irrigation systems. Beccar et al. (2001:23) propose 
to understand an irrigation system as “… a complex water management system combining and 
inter-relating physical elements (water sources, water flows, the places where water is used, 
and the catchment, conduction, and distribution infrastructure); normative elements (water 
access rights and obligations); organizational elements (social organization and the array of 
rules to make the system work); and agroproductive elements (land, seeds, labor force, 
irrigation skills and practices, and capital)”. These elements combine and interact, interwoven 
with specific institutional, political and cultural contexts. 
 
On the basis of this definition, the “engine” making a peasant irrigation system work is human 
action, tasks, physical and organizational work, social and production relations, and their 
interaction with larger-scale socio-economic and political contexts. In this thesis, this is 
conceptualized as socio-environmentally grounded “peasant dynamics”.8 Peasant dynamics, 
for this research’s analytical purposes, has been differentiated in, on the one hand, the collective 
or organizational settings and arrangements and, on the other, the individual rural families’ 
farm units’ strategies and actions. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that these two levels are 
actually inseparable and mutually dependent in an irrigation system’s operation. 
 
Conceptually, speaking of “small farmers” or peasant agriculture and irrigation refers to the 
way they produce, the way they farm (small-farm agriculture), but also to a condition and 
lifestyle in the countryside, or what Van der Ploeg (1990, 1994, 2008) describes as the “peasant 
                                                 
8 To define the concept of “dynamics”, this document begins with a basic definition regarding “forces and 
movement of a system”, or in this case, to understand social changes or processes in time and space, identifying 
factors or forces generating those changes. This is expressed by Eggink and Ubels (1984) in terms of “social 
force”.  
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condition” (cf. Mayer, 2002). This differs from the conditions and ways in which agri-business 
or entrepreneurial agriculture are undertaken. For Bolivia, a strong, important cultural 
dimension, relating to social identity, must be added to this concept. Albó (1987a) mentions 
this as a key feature of social dynamics in Andean cultures, where notions of ethnicity, class 
and locality blend together, into the concept of “peasant” or “campesino” (see also Bebbington, 
1999; Kearney, 1996; Mayer, 2002; van der Ploeg, 1985, 1998, 2006; Roseberry, 1995; 
Zoomers, 1998, 2013). 
 
The contextual reason to discuss and concentrate on “peasant life”, is that irrigation systems in 
Bolivia, unlike other Andean Region countries, are all managed by user organizations which 
are mostly peasant organizations. This means that irrigation in Bolivia's Andean Region is 
basically small-farm peasant irrigation. 
 
In summary, this study focuses on the dynamics generated by collective action and rural 
families’ actions and strategies to control water and other factors conditioning (enabling or 
restricting) reproduction of their production systems and livelihoods, which are ultimately 
manifested as localized expressions of campesino life in the countryside. This research has 
focused, therefore, on case studies in three irrigation systems in the Valleys of Cochabamba. 
 
1.4.2 The cases studied 
 
The cases studied were selected on the basis of contrasting characteristics regarding water 
availability, agroecological conditions and, above all, people’s experience generated during 
history regarding water management. These cases help illustrate and analyze – not 
comparatively but complementarily with each other – the different elements of collective action 
and family strategies that explain different dimensions of water control. These systems are: 
irrigation systems in Punata, located in the Upper Valley of Cochabamba Department; the 
Chiyara Khochi irrigation system in the locality of Sacabamba; and the systems of “atajados” 
(individual reservoirs) in the community of Rumi Cancha, in the Department’s southwestern 
area. The three cases are at different altitudes and also differ in their connection with towns 
and major markets in the region. 
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Figure 1-3. Geographical location of studied cases 
Source: Prepared by the author 
 
Case 1: Irrigation systems in Punata. 
 
Punata is 45 Km from Cochabamba, at an average altitude of 2720 meters above sea level. It 
is a relatively flat valley, formed by deposits of sediments from the Pucara River. Soils range 
from moderately deep to quite deep (north-to-south) and from silt-loam to clay. This means 
that in the northern zone, at the valley’s headwaters, irrigation must be more frequent, and in 
the southern zone soils have greater storage capacity, but may have drainage issues. The climate 
is semi-arid, with average precipitation of 388 mm/year, 70% of that concentrated from 
December to March. The average annual temperature is 14.7°C, with periods of frost from 
April to August (Servicio Nacional de Meteorología e Hidrología, 2014). 
 
The population of Punata (2001 census data), was around 26,000, with 57% urban and 43% 
rural. The total population did not increase significantly between 2001 and 2012, but in 2012 
the census reported a population of 28,800, with 68% urban and 32% rural (Instituto National 
de Estadística, 2013). Agriculture is the main occupation of the population in Punata and this 
generates other activities: trade in agricultural products, tractor services, day laborers and 
others. However, for family economic strategies, such non-agricultural activities as informal 
trade, selling their labor force, agro-crafts, migration, public transport service, and others, are 
also significant. 
 
The study zone includes 65 rural communities. Average land tenure in Punata up to 1995 
ranged from 1 to 1.3 hectares per family (Gutiérrez and Claure 1995). There are no more recent 
data on land tenure in the zone, but these average values will have decreased as intra- or inter-
family transfers or inheritances divide properties into smaller plots. The result is that a family 
commonly has several small plots distributed among different communities. 
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Punata is one of Cochabamba’s most important centers for agricultural produce exchange and 
trade. Farmers and traders currently come to Punata's weekly market fair from all over the 
Upper Valley, Central Valley, and Lower Valley of Cochabamba, from the high-altitude and 
tropical zones. Livestock is bought and sold (cattle, sheep, swine and small animals), as well 
as agricultural produce from the tropics, mainly fruits and coca; potatoes and other produce 
from the high altitudes, and vegetables and corn from the valleys. 
 
Punata uses various water sources, forming self-managed irrigation systems covering different 
communities, overlapping in some zones and therefore resulting in differentiated access to 
water. This has also led to developing different production “vocations”. Two zones are readily 
apparent: the northern zone, with more water available for irrigation, to grow vegetables, 
flowers, potatoes, fava beans and corn; and the southern zone, with less water available, 
emphasizing livestock; the main crops are corn and alfalfa (Rocha & Mayta, 2007; Saldías et 
al., 2013). There are three types of water sources for irrigation: river water (direct runoff from 
rainfall, thawing of the upper basin, and a few springs); water from dams; and underground 
water. 
 
Figure 1-4. Punata's irrigated area and water sources  
(Source: Prepared by the author) 
Water from the Pucara River (Jatun Pucara Mayu). This source feeds several geographically 
“overlapping” (and often simultaneously operating) irrigation water distribution systems: 
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Pilayaku, Mitha and Rol. Each of these systems begins providing water as the river's flow 
volume increases progressively during the rainy season. The Pilayaku system is used by only 
one community (at the top, near the main intake for Punata Valley) and uses the river’s basic 
flow rate, that means, up to 50 l/s (Saravia, 1998; Vega 1996). Mitha water is clear and runs 
through the Pucara River from the upper basin (Tiraque) when flow rates are higher and enable 
communities to take this “extra water”, from 50 to 300 l/s. This is depending on the time of 
year and the rainfall distribution, which is quite variable in and between years. This system was 
used prior to agrarian reform by several haciendas and a number of farmer groups who 
purchased land from the hacienda owners. With agrarian reform, when land was distributed, 
Mitha water rights were also distributed among each hacienda’s workers and among “free” 
farmers (piqueros) (Del Callejo, 1999). This system would appear to lack any formal 
organization, but any conflict will reveal water authorities (jueces de aguas) in each 
community, who resolve conflicts (Del Callejo, 1999; Delgadillo & Lazarte, 2007a). The “Rol” 
system is relatively recent (after agrarian reform), and also uses the water of Jatun Pucara Mayu 
River. It is currently managed by the “Central Campesina de Punata” (Punata’s peasant union 
organization). This system mostly benefits communities that have no right to Mitha and 
Pilayaku. It is used only in the rainy season, when flow rate at the intake is over 300l/s, and 
goes as high as 2000 l/s (Del Callejo, 1999; Delgadillo & Lazarte, 2007a). 
 
 
Figure 1-5. Area of influence of reservoirs and river waters in Punata 
(Source: Prepared by the author) 
 
Water from dams. The Punata zone has three dams (located in the higher zones of the region), 
which are connected but also operating autonomously: Laguna Robada, Llusk’a Khocha and 
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Totora Khocha (see Figure 1-4 and Figure 1-5). Laguna Robada is a reservoir in the Corani 
basin. Before agrarian reform, in the 1920s, it was rehabilitated by some hacienda owners to 
take water to Punata. During rehabilitation, the hacienda resident laborers did the work, so they 
demanded their rights after agrarian reform. Several rehabilitation projects in the 1980s through 
the Altiplano Valleys Irrigation Project (PRAV) increased the reservoir volume to 2.2 Hm3, 
currently benefitting 10 communities in Punata. The system operates in periodic “largada” 
releases, ranging from 10 to 14 times a year. In recent years, communities from Aguirre 
(Municipality of Colomi), where the dam is located, have claimed a “territorial right” to this 
source, and have kept the water from flowing on to Punata several times. Llusk’a Khocha-
Muyu Loma is an interconnected system of lagoons located in the Municipality of Tiraque. Its 
construction began in 1968 with the support of the National Community Development Service 
(SNDC), beginning to operate in 1970. The Altiplano Valleys Irrigation Program completed 
the rehabilitation after interruptions, and resumed operation since 1988. This system currently 
benefits 10 communities in Punata (570 members), different from the ones served by Laguna 
Robada, in addition to two communities in Tiraque. This reservoir has a capacity of 2.0 Hm3 
and on average provides 6 to 8 largada releases per year, with flow rates from 100 to 250 l/s 
(Delgadillo and Lazarte, 2007a). Totora Khocha is the system with the largest capacity and 
coverage, and the most recent. The dam was built in the late 1980s as part of the Inter-Valleys 
Irrigation Program (PRIV), on a lagoon that was tapped by communities in Tiraque (the 
Ovejería Khocha lake). The idea behind this system was part of a major project to irrigate 
Punata. This project was planned in several phases, including expanding other dams in the area, 
constructing the catchment and distribution infrastructure in the Punata irrigation area, finally 
constructing the Totora Khocha dam, all this within an integrated management plan for water 
from Tiraque mountain range to irrigate Punata Valley and part of Tiraque. After several 
confrontations, conflicts and negotiations, an agreement was reached among communities from 
Tiraque and Punata to share use of and responsibility for system management, in a proportion 
of 40% for Tiraque and 60% for Punata. The reservoir has a capacity of 22 million cubic meters, 
although it is currently storing barely one third of its capacity, benefitting 65 communities in 
Punata and 35 in Tiraque. This system is managed by committees of the same name, in the two 
localities. The system is also operated through “largada” releases, dividing the flow volume 
reaching Punata into 8 flows or “irrigation groups” that all irrigate at once and distribute the 
water among the communities comprising the group, according to the time they are entitled to. 
The water from this reservoir used to be available two or three times a year for Punata, although 
in the last few years they have been able to do only one annual irrigation. 
 
The dams’ three irrigation committees comprise the Punata Irrigation and Services Association 
(ARSP) which, among other things, perform the function of coordinating and facilitating the 
three dams’ operation. ARSP also helps irrigation committees to prepare each “largada’s” 
irrigation turns, facilitating transport for the persons responsible for opening and closing the 
dams and the “tomero” watchmen to oversee water flow all the way from the source. 
 
Underground water. Underground water is tapped in Punata Valley using semi-deep drilled 
wells and hand-dug wells. In general, most drilled wells are in the northern zone of Punata 
Valley and comprise systems managed by groups or communities. Hand-dug wells are family 
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wells, mostly located in the south and southwest. In 1977, the project began to drill wells for 
the Upper and Central Cochabamba Valley, managed by what was then the Ministry of Rural 
and Agricultural Affairs (MACA), the Cochabamba Development Corporation (CORDECO) 
and the FAO. For some time, the project managed the pumps, providing fuel for their operation, 
but then they were replaced by electrical pumps and since then have been managed by the users 
themselves. Now, all initiatives to drill new wells and manage them are completely handled by 
small farmers. In most cases, farmers invested in drilling new wells, engaging private drilling 
companies. In other cases, they get help from some cooperation agency or apply for funding 
from the Municipality of Punata’s “Public Participation” funds, or recently through 
governmental programs: “MI AGUA” and “MI RIEGO”. According to the lastest inventories in 
the zone, the number of wells tripled from 2000 to 2012. There are currently between 100 and 
300 wells, covering over 50 communities. This fact, and the increasing pressure on the basin’s 
water, has influenced the flow rates that can be tapped, which have dwindled from 12 - 25 l/s 
in the 1990s to 5 - 10l/s at present (Ortiz, 2015). 
 
Case 2: The Chiyara Khochi irrigation system in Sacabamba 
 
The Municipality of Sacabamba is in the south of Cochabamba Department, at a distance of 85 
Km from the city of Cochabamba and an altitude from 3000 to 3200 meters above sea level. 
The climate is cold and dry most of the year, making the zone arid. The average temperature is 
11°C, with an average high of 20.4°C and low of 2.4°C. Relative humidity ranges from 25 to 
60%, with moderate to strong winds (3 to 6 m/s) and average precipitation of 600 mm: 75% 
concentrated from December to March (Vega & Iriarte, 2003; Servicio Nacional de 
Meteorología e Hidrología, 2014). There are eight dry months (from April to November) when 
irrigation is indispensable for any agricultural activity. Even during the rainy season, the 
intensity, short duration and irregularity of rainfall may require complementary irrigation. 
 
Another important physical characteristic of the region is fragile soils. These soils are shallow, 
with low organic-matter content, scanty plant coverage and with wavy terrain, which favors 
erosion, forming gullies (Pellens, 2006). Further, there are frequent problems such as droughts, 
hailstorms and killing frosts. The case study covers five communities in the Municipality of 
Sacabamba, namely: Ch’allaque Alto, Ch’allaque Bajo, Villa San Isisdro, Chimpa Rancho, and 
Pata Huerta. The first four communities are under the rural sub-central union of Ch’allaque and 
the last to the Sacabamba sub-central. 
 
The main water source is runoff from the Chiyara Khochi and León Mayu Rivers, which then 
form the Ch’allaque River (see Figure 1.6). They are seasonal rivers, with heavy sediment load 
in the rainy season. This water is currently regulated at the Ch’allaque Dam, comprising the 
Chiyara Khochi irrigation system. Before agrarian reform, as in other regions in the valleys, 
land and water were under control and use by the haciendas. With agrarian reform, haciendas’ 
territory was distributed among their workers and just a few peasants began using river water 
for complementary irrigation and to irrigate small fields of potatoes, corn and onions along this 
river or other rivers (Kobbi, 1995). There are also small springs that add up to a flow of about 
2.5 l/s. 
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Figure 1-6. Chiyara Khochi irrigation system, Sacabamba  
(Source: Prepared by the author, based on Vega and Iriarte, 2003 
 
In the 1980s severe droughts forced communities to emigrate to urban centers, or to the tropical 
region of Cochabamba (Chapare). At the same time, the communities, coordinated by their 
main organization, the Ch’allaque Sub-central Union, demanded for the government to meet 
their water needs. These demands were also backed by CIPCA (Center for Peasant Research 
and Promotion), an NGO that began working in the zone in 1987 (Cossio, 2004). These actions 
consolidated ideas to implement an irrigation project to satisfy communities’ water demands 
in the zone. So, in 1992, with technical support from the Inter-Valleys Irrigation Project 
(PRIV), they explored the zone and identified a feasible alternative to implement an irrigation 
project. The proposal, which was later partially undertaken by the National Irrigation Program 
(PRONAR), consisted of damming the Ch’allaque River and improving conduction 
infrastructure. 
 
Chila and Delgadillo (2010), Cossío (2004) and Vega and Iriarte (2003) describe the 
intervention process, and the strategy pursued by the NGO, communities and municipality to 
make this project a reality. They subdivided the project into several phases, in order to 
implement works gradually as state agencies or other funding sources gradually provided the 
wherewithal. Later chapters will discuss a number of issues resulting from these successive 
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interventions and communities’ increasing empowerment. These interventions have granted 
five communities access to regulated irrigation water from May to November, for four or five 
(largadas) releases per growing season to irrigate around 400 hectares with flow rates between 
5 to 10l/s. The system is managed by the Ch’allque Irrigation and Agricultural Services 
Association (ARSAC), formed during system implementation. 
 
 
Picture 1-3. Developing potato irrigation experiences 
Photo: G. Chila 
 
Case 3: Water harvesting systems. Atajados in the community of Rumi Cancha, Aiquile 
 
Rumi Cancha is a community in the southeastern part of Cochabamba Department, 14 km from 
the locality of Aiquile (Aiquile municipality, Campero province) and 180 Km from the city of 
Cochabamba, on the main highway joining the towns of Mizque and Aiquile. It is one of the 
Department’s most arid zones, receiving its heavy rains during a very short period (December 
to March). These conditions enable mostly rainfed agriculture and raising cattle and goats that 
browse on the bushy vegetation. Rumi Cancha is at an altitude of approximately 2200 m.s.n.m., 
with average annual precipitation of 550mm, an average temperature of 19°C, an average high 
of 27° and an average low of 10° (Servicio Nacional de Meteorología e Hidrología, 2014). 
 
Rumi Cancha, is a community representative of the region, in terms of agrarian history and 
patterns. Their ethnic group is unknown. Calvo et al. (1994) assume the Chuwis were the 
region’s original dwellers, although they were displaced by conflicts with residents from the 
lowlands or by population reordering and the exploitation system imposed during the Spanish 
colonial period. By the end of that period and beginning of the Republic, this zone was peopled 
by migrants from different regions, who were absorbed or relocated by the hacienda system, 
leaving little or no vestiges of the original residents. During this period, haciendas and the 
Church controlled land and water in the region, as a strategic center for evangelization and 
administering church affairs, and as a commercial and political link between higher and lower 
areas.  
 
Haciendas were established mainly in the region’s valleys, so they controlled river water and 
the most fertile soils. They grew mainly to supply mining centers in Potosí or elsewhere in the 
 28 
 
region, such crops as corn, wheat, cotton, and sugar cane, plus meat, honey and other products. 
An important characteristic noted by Calvo et al. (1994) is this region’s strategic mid-position 
as the “entranceway” to tropical land in the east. Although the region is bounded on the west 
by the Andes (Eastern Range), strong business and exchange relations were established with 
highlands (mining centers) and other valleys in Cochabamba. 
 
Water resources are scarce in the Aiquile region, and under 10% of arable land is estimated to 
have continual access to irrigation (Cáceres, 2009). The water deficit or imbalance also 
increased after agrarian reform, because land was distributed among workers as water turns or 
“mithas”. This did not leave enough water to distribute among many families congregated in 
communities along rivers. 
 
The community of Rumi Cancha comes from a former hacienda near the Tipajara River, which 
is seasonal and dries up completely during the dry season. The community had only a few small 
springs to supply drinking water for a few families and small reservoirs (Khochas) created in 
gullies to store water during the rainy season to water livestock or for domestic use. When 
agrarian reform distributed land, the new agrarian union or community divided land among its 
members in the lower part of the valley and in the hills. Rumi Cancha comprises 70 families. 
As a result of land distribution, families have an average of around 2.5 hectares (CORACA, 
1993) although there is also community land in the highlands and transition zones to tropical 
areas (hills with thorny vegetation), where each family can raise their cattle during part of the 
year. 
 
The zone’s vulnerability to changes or lack of rainfall is evident. The agricultural calendar is 
strictly subject to rainfall, which means that most agriculture is rainfed. Crops such as corn, 
beans, wheat, peanuts and potatoes can hardly be grown if the rain is late or stops in November. 
This forces families to apply different strategies, including staggered planting in November 
and December; migration to tropical zones or to cities during dry months; keeping livestock 
(cattle, goats and sheep) on community land, if possible combined with very small areas under 
irrigation. 
 
In the 1960s, severe droughts forced residents of the region to migrate elsewhere, mainly to 
Cochabamba’s tropical zones. Since then, migratory flows have been definitive and, more 
generally, seasonal to those areas. Further, most rural families and even whole communities 
from the region (including Rumi Cancha), have established properties (chacos) and belong to 
agrarian unions in the tropical part of Cochabamba as a major part of their livelihood strategies 
(Cáceres, 2009; CERES, 1983; Rodríguez, 1997). Migration has been viewed by the State as a 
serious problem to be resolved, due to the marginal living conditions of migrant populations in 
peri-urban zones and the cycle of poverty generated around them or in tropical zones linked 
with coca and cocaine production. Therefore, since the 1980s in the “Southern Cone” region 
(mainly the provinces of Mizque, Campero and Carrasco) the State and international 
cooperation have implemented development programs called “Alternative Development”. The 
basic purpose of these programs was to reduce migratory flows to tropical zones, by improving 
production conditions and availability of water to reduce or create an “alternative” to growing 
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coca. Part of these programs implemented projects to construct infrastructure for drinking water 
supply and irrigation, with other programs to support agricultural production (Calvo et al., 
1994; Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo, 1992) 
 
The programs most widespread in the zone included building micro-irrigation systems, 
consisting basically in implementing small catchment works for under-surface flow in rivers 
(filtering galleries) and multi-family or individual reservoirs to catch or “harvest” rainwater in 
gullies or on hillsides. These reservoirs have been called systems of ponds for rainwater 
harvesting or, more commonly, “atajados”. At present, very few multi-family atajado systems 
are operating. However, many single-family systems have been built: the volume stored is less 
than 1500 m3 per atajado, which on average will provide irrigation to complement rainfall for 
small vegetable plots, no more than 0.25 hectares per family. In 2000, Rumi Cancha built 28 
family atajados. This intervention was part of the Program to Support Earthquake Victims 
(PADT) funded by the German Government. The Program implemented projects to support 
production to mitigate the severe effects of drought in 1997 and 1998, in addition to disasters 
caused by the 1998 earthquake in the region (Tammes et al., 2001). 
 
 
Figure 1-7.  Atajados systems in Rumi Cancha community 
(Source: Prepared by the author) 
For some families involved in this project, it was the first time that they had irrigation water, 
others had experience or knowledge with crops under irrigation using small springs, and others 
because of working temporarily or having relatives in neighboring communities. Atajados are 
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currently used for supplementary irrigation, guaranteeing first “seasonal production” (during 
the rainy season) and then production under irrigation (early planting or “mishkas”) although 
on small plots, 1000 to 2500 m2 (Cáceres, 2009; Maita and Verweij, 1996). Preliminary results 
show that the zone has developed a new culture and technology of “rainwater harvesting”, 
enabling rural families to have small-scale agriculture and livestock, but relatively more 
securely, and to meet their basic water and food needs (Cáceres. 2009; Lukat, 2012). 
 
1.4.3 Methods 
 
The research is based on the three irrigation systems cases, very different in size, agroecological 
characteristics, and above all in their experience and organizational capacities regarding water 
management. These three cases have not been studied comparatively. Rather, the three zones 
studied yield empirical evidence to help understand different principles underlying collective 
water management action, diverse results from water control, and particularly the outcomes 
from rural strategies for agricultural production and livelihoods. 
 
Information was gathered and then processed by a combination of methods: reviewing and 
systematically summarizing studies, projects and publications on the study zones and systems, 
but also semi-structured and structured interviews with key stakeholders, and attending 
community and irrigation organizations’ assemblies or meetings, as well as meetings between 
these organizations with financial and technical entities, including both governmental and non-
governmental support agencies. 
 
Of the three cases studied, the irrigation systems in Punata were the most researched, as part of 
the working zones since 1991, when PERIAV9 and subsequently the Centro AGUA (to date) 
based their research on small-farmer irrigation in the Andes. Different research projects 
conducted in this zone by the author significantly informed this thesis. All that information, 
generated for several years, was complemented and updated by direct interviews with local 
leaders and technicians with organizations working in the zone. Interviews were mostly done 
from 2008 to 2013, complementing or updating information regarding irrigators’ organizations 
throughout the years 2014 - 2018. In Rumi Cancha and Sacabamba, the author conducted basic 
research twice: first in 2000 and 2004. Then, this research was complemented from 2008 to 
2013, by collaborative projects by the Centro AGUA under the Concertación Program.10  
 
Two or three cases of rural production strategies under irrigation, basically strategies by family 
farmers, were studied in each zone. Case studies in all zones were initially based on semi-
                                                 
9 PEIRAV was the Teaching and Research Program for Andean and Valley Irrigation. It was implemented by the 
San Simón Major University with funding support from Nuffic from The Netherlands and collaboration by 
Wageningen University. In its third phase, PEIRAV became the Centro AGUA, a research center on water 
management in the Andean region. 
10 The Concertación Program consisted of collaboration among research centers and institutional platforms from 
the Andean countries (Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador) and The Netherlands. It was coordinated by the Irrigation and 
Water Engineering Group of Wageningen University (IWE, now WRM). One knowledge project was on Peasant 
Irrigation in the Andes. This enriched the analysis of smallholder irrigation from a perspective of water control 
and security. 
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structured interviews with family members. Initial access was generally with men or parents, 
but then it was possible to have interviews or less-planned or structured talks with different 
family members. These interviews first probed how small-farm production systems were 
organized, families’ different activities to produce crops and livestock or transform their 
products, and the technical details of these different activities, including irrigated or dryland 
farming of different crops. To delve deeper into aspects of the logic underlying actions or 
decisions taken by family members or families as a whole, some of their activities were tracked 
in greater detail, such as planting, harvesting, some agricultural processing or artisanal 
activities, watering of their plots, families’ participation in community work, and others. 
Different methodologies were used, such as participant observation, informal discussions, 
documentation by photographs, conversations about life testimonies, and others. 
 
Especially in Sacabamba and Rumi Cancha, several interviews were done by research 
assistants who collaborated expressly in the field work; in all cases there were short research 
efforts with undergraduate or master’s students. The research combined methods and therefore 
both qualitative and quantitative data and information. In collective irrigation systems, most 
analysis focused on qualitative analysis of interviewees’ opinions, perceptions, stories or life 
experiences, as well as secondary information sources. However, to understand the technical 
operation of the systems, particular field work activities were directed at measuring or 
quantifying flow rates, irrigation volumes and times, efficiencies, water losses and others, 
helping in turn interpret the different dimensions of water control. 
 
For family production systems research, quantitative analysis focused mainly on understanding 
how families organize their work and the different factors and production inputs, as well as 
production volumes, yields, prices and the profitability of production. This quantified the 
family’s own labor, machinery or draft animals and inputs (“internal” resources or those 
acquired through non-monetary mechanisms or reciprocity) and those acquired using monetary 
resources (purchased on the market). This detail made it possible to analyze the logic of non-
commodity operation, of market integration, or the combination of market and non-market 
relations in production processes. This analysis, combined with farmers’ own (subjective) 
criteria as to how they would characterize their own production process, made it possible to 
identify and analyze different “production styles” present in each locality, also analyzing the 
role of irrigation in these styles. Each subsection in the empirical chapters (Chapters 3 to 5) 
took information either from a single case, from stories or information on all three cases, or 
just from two of them.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis and description of its chapters 
After this introductory chapter, which establishes the context, problem and research question, 
and the methodological approach, Chapter two develops the conceptual framework, in 
particular, the theoretical perspective to analyze “peasant dynamics” for collective and family 
systems, and their inter-relatedness. The main purpose is to systematically organize and 
summarize an array of concepts and analytical elements that enable analyzing irrigation from 
a broader perspective, i.e. a sociotechnical approach. This is to go beyond disciplinary 
representations of irrigation practice, solely from the agroproductive standpoint (e.g. water 
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productivity), solely regarding irrigation infrastructure or technology (canals, intakes or other 
artifacts used in irrigation) or prioritizing solely a mechanical description of water 
management, disconnected from political, institutional, cultural, socio-economic, historical 
and biophysical contexts. This enables breaking away from the routine mechanical practice of 
Bolivian irrigation professionalism and the country’s scholarly water development studies that 
focus on engineers’ practices and how they prepare irrigation projects or participate in peasant 
irrigation system interventions. Usually these approaches concentrate solely on the formalistic 
purpose of such interventions – generally on building the infrastructure to increase “water 
availability” –, ignoring the existing complexity of small farming under irrigation, where 
collective and individual interests and practices merge. 
 
Only by more thoroughly understanding inter-relationships among artifacts, the different 
elements of collective water management, interwoven with culture and politics, institutions and 
the biophysical context, can the actions or strategies be understood that rural families pursue 
to access water and other production factors. Similarly, this is crucial for understanding how 
work is organized on their property, and the support that rural organizations and families 
require to manage their resources sustainably, particularly water. As part of this analytical 
framework, I discuss and later operationalize two central concepts: the concept of water control 
as the basis for analyzing water management’s multiple dimensions, and the concept of peasant 
strategies to understand the logic underlying agroproduction and constructing their livelihoods. 
 
The chapter is organized around three themes: collective water management in irrigation 
systems, agroproductive strategies of households, and concepts to analyze the framework and 
institutional and political development of irrigation in Bolivia. These three themes are the basis 
for organizing the empirical evidence analyzed in the remaining chapters. 
 
Chapters 3 to 5 contain the empirical material from this research in different analytical 
domains. Chapter 3 examines the local institutional context and its inter-relationship with 
“formal” state institutions. Chapter 4 addresses collective water management analyzed from 
the different dimensions of water control and expressed through different collective strategies. 
Chapter 5 then focuses on families and their strategies for production and for water access and 
management: 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the context and institutional and political development of irrigation in 
Bolivia. After a brief historical review of how institutional arrangements for water and 
particularly irrigation have evolved, the starting-point is an analysis of the diverse expressions 
of the so-called “uses and customs”. This concretely manifests water-management practices 
and consequently expressions of water control’s different dimensions. It highlights the 
importance of concrete practices and problems underpinning such uses and customs. This 
shows the need to understand these practices in their current context and the risks or difficulties 
entailed in attempting to formalize these customary norms in official State normative 
frameworks. 
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This contextualization and analysis of institutional development helps Chapter 4 understand 
how collective water management practices and actions are expressed in the different case 
studies. This chapter discusses in greater detail this diversity of actions expressed as collective 
strategies. These make the small-farmer sector visible vis-à-vis the State, and equally are a 
response to the uncertainties basic to accessing and managing their resources. This chapter 
shows that there can be different thrusts for coordination or motivations promoting collective 
action, which in turn shows that there are different peasant “principles” for managing their 
resources. One of the resulting principles is the quest for autonomy in managing key resources 
and livelihoods.  
 
Chapter 5 concentrates on peasants’ property and production system, the small farm. This 
focuses on how family labor is organized, on resource control, and on production and 
reproduction of the family farm. I will examine family’s interaction in markets (for inputs and 
products) and non-market settings (their own rural organizations at different levels and in 
various forms, whether community organizations, water-user organizations, or other types of 
local institutions). The chapter discusses certain principles explaining the logic of peasant 
production, which in many cases reflects the quest for autonomy vis-a-vis the market, to enable 
or obtain sufficient control over their own production and thereby over the reproduction of their 
livelihoods. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing these discussions. Addressing the micro / family-
strategy level, the collective level, and Bolivia’s institutional and political development of 
irrigation. This summary shows the inter-relations between public policies and the “new” 
directions that small-scale agriculture is taking, vis-à-vis public policies themselves and global 
trends in the development of agriculture. It concludes with several public-policy challenges, 
suggesting that they be discussed in different circles, both academic and among policy-makers, 
considering above all the still preponderant role of smallholder agriculture in Bolivia. 
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Chapter 2 . Conceptual framework 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Academic irrigation literature features different types of studies, focusing on particular 
problems of irrigated agriculture. In the Andes, besides the large body of studies describing 
technical and physical aspects of water management, two central themes and academic streams 
concerning “peasant irrigation” prevail. 
 
The first, approached from different perspectives and disciplines, emphasizes collective water 
management and water rights repertoires in irrigation systems, mostly in relation to State 
bureaucracies and modernist (market-based) policies and legislation. The diversity of 
organizational forms, local institutional arrangements that enable water systems’ operation, 
water rights in their different dimensions, the cultural and historical basis of local water 
management, and the socio-economic and political implications are some examples of the 
topics studied (e.g., Boelens, 1998b, 2008, 2015; Gelles, 1994, 2000; Guillet, 1995; Gerbrandy 
and Hoogendam, 1998, 2002; Lynch, 2012; Trawick, 2001). 
 
The second group of studies and approaches tackles different themes regarding peasant 
agriculture. They strive to understand how peasant production and economies are organized, 
peasant households’ livelihood strategies and their relation to the local, national and globalizing 
market (e.g., Gonzales de Olarte, 1990; Golte, 1980; Golte and de la Cadena, 1983; Mayer, 
2002; Van der Ploeg, 2006, 2008; Zoomers, 1998, 2010, 2013). Other studies in this group, by 
development agencies, also analyze irrigation's effects on crop diversification or specialization 
and on family incomes, and how water management practices and technological innovation 
develop at farm and field level (Delgadillo, 2003a, 2003b; Pellens, 2006; Salazar et al., 2010; 
Vos, 2010). 
 
Although not exclusively, these two currents tend to concentrate their attention on two different 
domains: the former as primarily collective (inter-family and inter-community) water control 
and the latter concentrating more on the domain of production units, i.e. peasant households. 
Few research documents and technical studies (e.g. Mayer, 2002; Van der Ploeg, 2006, 2008) 
have analyzed the relationship between these two domains in peasant irrigation. The reasons 
for this gap may be the two domains’ inherent complexity and heterogeneous conditions, or 
the lack of theoretical and methodological instruments to integrate them. This constitutes one 
of the academic reasons motivating this thesis. 
 
This chapter discusses a generic approach to analytically integrate these two domains by 
combining, adapting and complementing different perspectives toward studying peasant 
irrigation. This integration entails first breaking through the imposed disciplinary barriers that 
tend to separate the different elements of irrigation, into “technical components” from others 
of a more “social character” (see, e.g., Eggink and Ubels, 1984; Mollinga, 1998; Sanchis-Ibor 
et al., 2017; Zwarteveen and Boelens, 2014). 
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First, this study argues the need to understand irrigation as a sociotechnical process and 
therefore the relevance of not “compartmentalizing” its analysis. This is an important starting 
point, given the tendency, in professional and academic circles, to speak of irrigation as 
something merely technical or a matter for engineers with some “social aspects” to be dealt 
with. This tendency results, in some cases, from unintended disregard and, in others, from 
disciplinary or professional bias that neglects the complexity of peasant irrigated agriculture 
and the need to integrate knowledge, concepts and analytical frameworks to better understand 
rural realities. Next, the chapter discusses collective action as the basis for water management, 
including the different forms and expressions of collective action that are manifested in 
Bolivian practice, and some of the principles that motivate it. Following this discussion, the 
third section will address water control as one of the key explanatory concepts related to 
collective action. Conceptual elements proposed by various authors will be addressed, 
identifying the different dimensions of water control in the collective but also in the 
individual11 (household) domain. It also considers how these are immersed in particular 
socioeconomic, political and environmental contexts and how they are influenced by different 
types of relations with the state and the market. The fourth part of the chapter addresses 
concepts to analyze these interrelationships, first from an institutional perspective and then 
from the notions of organizational and collective action. Finally, the fifth section discusses 
further aspects of peasant economies, including their strategies of production, reproduction, 
livelihoods and the conceptual elements utilized to analyze their relationship with the 
collective, with institutions and the market. 
2.2 Irrigation as a sociotechnical process 
Irrigation is a complex process. To understand this complexity, there is the need to recognize 
that beyond the “physical component” of irrigation there is a “social component” in constant 
interaction: these dimensions are inseparable (Beccar, Boelens, and Hoogendam, 2001; 
Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998; Gutiérrez, 2005). Irrigation practices do not simply mean 
opening the tap or gate to bring water to an agricultural plot. They also involve organizational 
activities, starting from constructing or rehabilitating infrastructure, agreements to allocate or 
access water, to distribute it among users, maintain the system and manage conflicts (Eggink 
and Ubels 1984 based on Coward 1980). The two next sections identify elements more 
commonly understood to be technical, followed by the social aspects or elements in order to 
finally demonstrate their inseparability. 
 
 
2.2.1 The “technical” as the privileged focal point of irrigation studies 
 
Focusing only on the "technical" elements of irrigation, we see that engineering has focused 
on three main areas. First, the physical infrastructure, secondly technical operations and 
tangible results arising from managing (manipulating) these physical elements, and relatively 
recently, considering interaction between these operations and the larger physical environment. 
                                                 
11 In speaking of “the individual” throughout the text, reference is made to actions of individual peasant families 
as basic units that make up a community or social group, except when specifically referring to individual actors.  
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The focus on these three physical/technical components has generally conducted analysis 
toward unidirectional causal relationships (see the discussion by Boelens and Vos, 2012; 
Gutiérrez, 2005; Mollinga, 1998; Roth et al., 2005; 2015; Veldwisch et al., 2009; Venot et al., 
2017). Technical operations of irrigation systems or family plots have generally focused on 
physical or tangible elements such as flow rates, delivery schedules, operation of infrastructure, 
and irrigation practices on the plot (irrigation methods and devices used), as well as the results 
of all these physical processes in the soil and the crop growth response. Ultimately, the focus 
is on meeting plants’ water requirements and especially trying to attain greater control over the 
results of irrigation: yields in response to water and water productivity12 (Eggink and Ubels, 
1984; Molden, 1997; Molden et al., 2007; Sharma, et al., 2015). 
 
Progressively, in the attempt to control nature and water to maximize profits in agriculture, 
different branches of engineering have also emphasized designing all components of an 
"irrigation system" at its different levels (Gutiérrez, 2005). Parallel to designing irrigation 
infrastructure and technical operations, irrigation interventions (as in new institutional 
economics) have elaborated on the interest of “optimizing” these operations, from creation and 
design, and evaluating organizational structures, to operating irrigation systems. Under these 
perspectives, although the major concern is with institutional issues (related to the 
administration, norms and policies), the main goal remains unchanged. It concentrates on 
technical performance and its economic outcomes (Boelens and Vos, 2012; Small and 
Svendsen 1990; Saleth 2004). 
 
For the relationship between technical operations in irrigation systems and local ecologies, 
other studies focus on irrigation’s environmental impact, especially on physical aspects such 
as erosion, soil salinization or groundwater contamination (e.g., Fernandez Gomez, 2004; Lana, 
2007; Meireles, et al., 2003; Pannel and Ewing, 2006). These studies, rather than deepening 
‘interdiscipinarity’, tend to be based on an ‘adding on’ of technical and ecological/agronomic 
discipines and studies.  
 
2.2.2 The "social" 
 
From the same engineering perspective, "social issues" have been discussed superficially, such 
as identifying cultural diversity and (poor) education of rural populations as "obstacles" to the 
technical system’s full operation. This vision goes according to established protocols, designed 
beforehand by engineers. In some cases, "the social" is also considered as something related 
only to demographically- or occupationally-related indicators. Often so-called “integrated” 
approaches (e.g., Integrated Water Resources Management) tend to add a “participatory image” 
to what is basically a technocratic perspective; instrumentalizing “participation” and 
                                                 
12 Technical concerns regarding water use, water efficiency and ultimately water productivity have changed their 
emphasis. They started with concerns about irrigation management performance (linked to transferring irrigation 
management from the state to users), followed by issues of public investments and interventions; recently, a major 
concern is food security due to climate changes and variability and also due to the unexpected increase in irrigation 
water demand and the consequent water deficits and conflicts. 
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“inclusion” to the needs of project implementation as foreseen by the technical staff and 
development agencies.  
 
From the social sciences, however, other irrigation-related subject fields have been studied, 
such as organizational activities and political effects linked to issues that in principle could be 
understood as essentially technical, such as conceptualizing, designing, building, operating and 
maintaining the infrastructure envisioned and developed by engineers (Eggink and Ubels, 
1984; Jansen and Vellema, 2011). In this field, as discussed by Boelens (2008, 2015), Eggink 
and Ubels (1984) and Mollinga (1998), other issues also have been addressed, originally from 
the professional literature on irrigation management but later from more academic and inter-
/trans-disciplinary studies: 
 
• The internal rules governing system operation: basically, the social arrangements of the 
group using the water. This is central to defining, expressing, functioning and 
reproducing water rights (individual rights) (e.g., Achi, 2010; Beccar et al., 2001; 
Boelens, 2015; Boelens and Vos, 2014; Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998; Roth et al., 
2005; Seemann, 2014; de Vos et al., 2006) 
• The rules and agreements governing the user group's relationship with third parties 
(individuals or other groups) (collective rights) (e.g., Bebbington, 1997, 1999; Boelens, 
2008a, 2015; Hendriks, 2002; Mena-Vásconez et al., 2016, 2017; Rocha et al., 2016; 
Roth et al., 2005, 2015; Saldías et al., 2012; Seemann, 2014, 2016) 
• The agrarian structure and social relations of production on- and off-farm. These are 
also related to water and irrigation activities (e.g., Boelens 1998, 2015; Guillet, 1995; 
Mayer, 2002; van der Ploeg 2008; Veldwisch et al., 2009) 
• The system’s relationship with broader contexts of the state, market and institutions 
(e.g., Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998; Hidalgo et al., 2017; Hoogesteger, 2012, 
2013a, b, c; Lynch, 2012; Mollinga, 1998; Perreault et al., 1998) 
• Power relations, culture, norms and social dimensions that are intertwined or interlaced 
around technology and irrigation infrastructure (e.g., Andolina, 2012; Boelens, 2008a, 
2015; Boelens et al., 2016, 2018; Gelles, 2000; Guevara-Gil et al., 2010; Hommes and 
Boelens, 2017; Hoogesteger and Verzijl, 2015; Meehan, 2013; Perreault, 2014; 
Pfaffenberger, 1988; Sanchis-Ibor et al., 2017; ) 
 
Irrigation technical actions always take place in the context of social relations, making the 
separation between "technical" and "social” artificial. Pinch and Bijker (1989) analyze the 
sociology of science and technology, and technological innovation studies, arguing that 
"technological artifacts" do not develop linearly. On the contrary, they are influenced and 
shaped by different meanings that "relevant social groups" give to these artifacts, according to 
the problems they face in their particular circumstances or according to their own interests. 
Technology, artifacts and science itself are conceived as social constructions. From this 
perspective, Latour (1992, 1994) and others, argue that technology and artifacts are no longer 
neutral elements; instead, human actors and nonhuman "actants" shape sociotechnical networks 
that ultimately define and are structured by people’s modes of action. Boelens (2008, 2014), 
 39 
 
Pfaffenberger (1988) and Winner (1986), also argue that technology seeks to create "a social 
and political order", i.e. defining "normative meanings" and "political behavior", although in 
everyday life the defining-character of artifacts tends to be hidden and assigned a neutral value 
(Boelens, 2008a:251; Meehan, 2013; Pfaffenberger, 1988; Winner, 1978). 
2.3 Implications for this study to adopt a sociotechnical perspective 
 
Recognizing the complexity of irrigation and its sociotechnical character requires taking a 
broad view; it requires combining conceptual elements from different fields of natural and 
social sciences. Therefore, this thesis has used different concepts and analytical tools from the 
fields of agricultural engineering, economics, sociology and political economy.  
 
2.3.1 Organizing the conceptual framework and empirical data 
 
For analytical purposes, the complexities found in irrigation activities and their 
interrelationships will be divided here into several components. The first part will analyze 
collective action in irrigation systems, as the basis of shared water control activities that relate 
primarily (but not exclusively) to managing water in its different dimensions (regulatory, 
organizational, political, technical/operational). It is this collective action that structures and 
mobilizes the local irrigation institutional environment and animates the system’s relationship 
with the state and other institutions. The second part of the analysis will focus more on 
households (individual family activities) as production and reproduction units, i.e. the peasant 
farm, since this is the “engine” where farming originates and in which the need for irrigation 
activities are created. These activities, related to farming and labor organization, are closely 
interlinked and are part of various livelihood strategies pursued by peasant families. 
 
A main reason for collective action regarding water is to control it, not as a goal in itself, but 
to meet farms’ water requirements in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness. It has close 
implications for water delivery and management, from the source to the field and, ultimately, 
implications for agricultural production and family life (Beccar et al., 2001). The subject of 
this study is to examine and understand how these “peasant dynamics”, in both the community 
/ group domain and the household domain, express collective and individual strategies to 
control water, and to control agricultural production and reproduction. Investigating these 
dynamics aims to scrutinize the various factors affecting water management and agricultural 
production, and in the end, peasants’ livelihoods.  In turn, these strategies manifest in different 
"directions" or, in other words, in a high degree of heterogeneity in agricultural practices and, 
therefore, in diverse “styles” of local development (van der Ploeg, 1985, 1990, 1994; Remmers 
1998). Figure 2.1. helps to visualize some conceptual elements, which are further developed in 
this chapter but also illustrates the hypothesis and research questions that will be answered in 
the next three chapters. 
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Figure 2-1. The study focus or study object 
(Source:  Prepared by the author) 
2.4 Collective action and social organization around water in peasant irrigation 
systems 
 
This section discusses some of the concepts and principles that underpin collective action and 
social organization, viewed from different perspectives. Then, after a brief discussion of 
academic literature analyzing situations of collective action in water management, especially 
irrigation, the concept adopted in the present study is summarized. 
 
2.4.1 The rationale for collective action and organization13 
 
Among the different approaches that address natural resource management, the influential 
group of perspectives labeled as “new institutional economics” associates collective action with 
economic rationality that is attributed to any individual using a resource. This rationality, 
manifested through cooperation, is understood as "transactions" between individuals within an 
organization. These "transactions" are usually explained as the quest to reduce risks or 
difficulties imposed by the environment and especially the difficulties of managing a common 
resource. Ultimately, this rationality entails reducing uncertainties and thus “transaction costs” 
involved in complying with norms (formalized if possible) governing the collective (water) 
resource management. Within this approach, organizations are conceived as "groups of 
                                                 
13 Throughout the text, the concepts of "collective action" and "organization" are used jointly and not as 
synonymous. It is considered, in principle, that tasks or activities carried out by an organization are supported by 
collective action, but not necessarily does all collective action involve the presence of (formal or structured) 
organizations. 
 41 
 
individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives" (Ellis, 2000:38). Compared to 
state management, local organizations are seen as an attractive alternative, exactly because of 
the prospect of reducing these transaction costs (Ostrom, 1990, 2009). 
 
Cleaver (2000: 363), Duarte-Abadía and Boelens (2016) and Roth et al. (2005), among others, 
argue against this approach of individual water control rationality motivated purely by 
economic objectives, suggesting rather different types of "incentives" or motivations that lead 
people to act collectively, while recognizing the predominance of this "pervasive 
functionalism" of neo-institutionalism, seeking direct causal explanations between motivation, 
behavior and resource management. An example of this causal explanation is the "rationality 
based on the logic of subsistence" attributed to rural people. Moreover, Beccar et al. (2001), 
Boelens (2008, 2015) and  Suhardiman et al. (2017) suggest that collective action is based more 
on the need to work cooperatively to manage and control a resource such as water, whereby 
this need arises in various types of relationships of "interdependence" (economic, cultural, 
psychological, political, technological) between individuals or families and the organization 
(see also Boelens and Hoogesteger, 2017; Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998; Verzijl et al., 
2017). Families could not survive alone, reproducing their agrarian production cycles without 
establishing cooperative ties with other families or under the umbrella of a collective 
management of resources. On the other hand, community management "would cease to 
function without property relations that unite and motivate families to monitor and maintain 
their collective resources" (Guillet, 1995:3). Interdependence is understood, then, as a mutual 
need to cooperate. 
 
Beccar et al. (2001) posed the following tasks or activities in which this relationship of 
interdependence is concretely manifested in an irrigation system’s daily tasks: 
a) Regulation and authorization. Grounded in creating water rights (expressed collectively and 
individually) and formulating, discussing and sanctioning rules and agreements. 
b) Performance of operational tasks. That implies implementing and monitoring water 
distribution tasks, operating and maintaining infrastructure. 
c) Internal organization. Mainly related to discussing the organization’s functions, its 
objectives and coordination and planning of activities to be done, decision-making, and conflict 
resolution. 
d) Reconstruction or readjustment of infrastructure. 
e) Mobilizing available resources or those that the organization can access, including financial 
resources, products, equipment, infrastructure, internal or external resources, but also its own 
labor force and information. 
f) Upkeep of social networks outside of the organization, to interact with the state, institutions, 
and development agencies or to represent and defend collective interests. 
 
These tasks lead to two important aspects. The first is about the embeddedness of the communal 
and collective action in most irrigation activities or tasks. That is, it is impossible to conceive 
irrigation (in the Andes and elsewhere) as an individual activity. The second aspect is that all 
these collective irrigation activities are strongly linked to social relations established between 
members of the organization, starting by constructing infrastructure as the main mechanism to 
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create water rights, expressed both individually and collectively (Boelens and Vos, 2014; 
Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998; Gutiérrez, 2005). These tasks also reflect the diverse 
expressions of collective action to control different aspects of water management. Water 
control is just one of the central motivations for collective action. Moreover, these tasks also 
demonstrate organizational principles (see Boelens, 2015: 55), rooted in historical processes 
and the culture, specific to every particular (local) context and therefore expressed in very 
diverse forms of water management (Gelles, 2000; Guillet 1995; Lynch, 2012; Trawick 2001). 
 
2.4.2 Collective action, social cohesion and identity 
 
Interdependence relationships, as described above, seem to better explain the logic behind 
organization and collective action to manage a common resource, beyond just economic 
“incentives" or "utilitarian rationality" based on maximizing profits, by individuals within an 
organization. It would also be simplistic to assume that collective action and organization 
around water are grounded only on the needs or risks (physical or imagined) that are imposed 
on a region’s inhabitants (Mosse, 2006). Without romanticizing collective action around a 
resource, Mayer (2002, quoting De la Cadena, 1989) suggests that many tasks that are 
performed collectively are organized, institutionalized and ritualized in order to create a sense 
of belonging to a social group; or of identity and "social identification" as discussed by 
Zwarteveen et al. (2005). This identity, as suggested by Montaña (2007), is not a given or 
essentialist attribute of a group, but is closely linked to the group’s shared, dynamic history 
(Montaña 2007; Zwarteveen and Boelens, 2014). 
 
There are different means, symbols, meanings or facts that contribute to "socially and 
historically constructing" these identities, which have a reciprocal relationship with collective 
action. This means that people act collectively to reaffirm identity, but that identity in turn 
motivates and energizes collective action. This is very visible and can be clearly verified in 
most irrigation systems. For example, constructing infrastructure represents a way to create 
water rights (property rights) and the constructed works, the effort and facts (and stories) of 
implementation will mark important traits of this collective identity or "sense of collectivity". 
It is therefore that irrigation necesarilly builds, and builds on, social and normative 
relationships. As Boelens and Vos (2014: 59) state: “Individual and collective water property 
rights are embedded (concretely) in infrastructure; therefore irrigation artefacts’ social contents 
comprise operation and distribution mechanisms. Conversely, contributions to constructing 
and maintaining this infrastructure shape organizational and property relationships among 
these actors, a socio-natural and socio-technical process basic to constituting ‘hydraulic 
identities’ and ‘hydraulic cultures’.” 
 
Other tasks or actions that are performed collectively, not necessarily related to irrigation, must 
be added, which often reinforce this sense of identity and organizational cohesion. An example 
is the community’s work to build a school, a communal path or other "community duties": 
(non)compliance of these commonly have direct repercusions for membership and water rights 
and allocation practices within the collective irrigation system (Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998; 
Boelens and Hoogesteger, 2017; Gerbrandy and Hoogendam 1998). 
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2.4.3 Collective action as strategies of social recognition and empowerment 
 
Collective action both sustains and is sustained by present-day practices in Bolivian irrigation 
systems and peasant communities, and is often also motivated by different symbols and 
memories relating to specific historical struggles over water and other natural resources. Past 
injustices, or claiming ownership and defending collective interests against potential or present 
threats, may constitute an important source. These forms of collective action can take the form 
of water-based protests or demonstrations, marches and blockades in the streets, in the media, 
or shared action in different water governance decision-making arenas (see Bebbington et al., 
2010; Hoogesteger, 2012, 1013a,b; Romano, 2016, 2017; Suhardiman, 2017; Verzijl et al., 
2017). 
 
Some collective action has been shaped over very long historical evolution, while others can 
be fleeting. These organizational mechanisms may or may not have a visible structure or 
organizational form (see Baud, 2010; Bebbinngton, 1997; Boelens, 2015). Collective action 
can manifest itself as happened in Bolivia during the "water war" and "gas war": in both 
processes, besides social protests, alliances were built with different sectors of society, with 
subsequent policy and political implications, reinforcing empowerment of previously 
marginalized sectors (Assies, 2003; Crespo, 2006; Perreault, 2006). Part of the strategic claims 
that were manifested in Bolivia from 2000 to 2003, besides recognition and defense of water 
access and management “uses and customs”, sought to create a "history-based but new creative 
identity" for rural and indigenous presence in Bolivian society. That is, “uses and customs” and 
their vindication, were, among others, major symbols or icons that were used for that purpose 
(Andolina, 2012; Crespo, 2006; Perreault, 2005) and which constituted an important element 
of social integration (Bebbington et al., 2010; Escobar, 1995; Vos et al., 2006). 
 
2.4.4 Collective action and organization as a source of autonomy 
 
Collective action, cooperation and organization can be considered as a way for the group to 
gain autonomy, also for the families and individuals that make up the community (Guillet, 
1995; Lagos, 1997; Mayer, 2002; van der Ploeg, 2008). Autonomy can be understood from 
different perspectives and expressed at different levels. These different perspectives, however, 
coincide in defining autonomy as the "desire for freedom" or to reduce (or remove) dependence 
on different factors, while trying to control them (Lagos, 1997; van der Ploeg, 2008). In the 
specific case of irrigation, this is directly related to control over water. 
 
A basic understanding of the autonomy that an organization provides to its members in the 
Andean region is described by Lehmann (1982c) and Mayer (2002) in terms of cooperation 
interactions that are built from kinship (actual or ritual) within a community or between 
communities. Some authors discuss these relations, as supported by rituals and local 
institutions, as forms of domination and dependence. Lagos (1997), however, explains that this 
search for autonomy coexists as living together with relations of (inter-)dependence regarding 
resources such as land or water. This may involve peasant resistance to state control, thus 
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giving, according to Mayer (2002), greater freedom to take on different tasks or risks. Long 
(2001a) expresses this, in terms of “room for maneuvre” that organizations and local 
institutions aim to obtain and proliferate. Bolivian peasant communities, and the families that 
constitute them, know that continued community existence - influenced by globalizing 
economy and multi-scalar politics - involves defending and expanding as much as possible this 
room for maneuvre. It is grounded in a collective identity, shared norms, and territorial control 
mechanisms, with physical-organizational boundaries (Boelens, 2015). 
 
From the point of view of established irrigation organizations, the previous paragraphs argue 
for interdependence as one of the foundations around which collective action and the need for 
cooperation revolve. That "interdependence" is understood not in the sense of restricting 
freedoms for those involved, but rather as an opportunity, under certain conditions, to act 
together to regulate, manage and use water under principles and social codes that are known 
to, and to some extent can be "controlled" by the organization and its members (Guillet,  1995). 
This does not mean that (peasant) irrigation organizations do not experience uncontrolled 
situations, contingencies, dependence or injustices between different actors with different 
power. Rather, the search for autonomy, generated by the individual (family) and channeled 
into the collective, results in a number of strategies such as: 
- The search for representation mechanisms (by different organized sectors of society) in 
political areas of the state to occupy new spaces of power and obtain management autonomy 
and social recognition (Albó, 2004; Bebbington et al., 2010; Crespo, 2006); 
- Building partnerships with government organizations and development agencies to obtain 
direct benefits from "development projects" (improving infrastructure in the case of peasant 
irrigation systems) (Beccar et al., 2001; Hoogesteger, 2013a,b; Verzijl et al., 2017); 
- Using (and organizing) the group’s collective work (labor and knowledge) as the basis for 
"self-managing" their irrigation systems (Beccar et al., 2001; Boelens and Vos, 2014; 
Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998; Suhardiman, 2017). 
 
2.5 Water control in the collective domain in irrigation systems 
 
Assuming that one of the most important objectives of collective action and organization in 
irrigation systems is to control water, at this point it is necessary to discuss this study’s 
perspective regarding this concept. Irrigation water control in the Andean region involves more 
than solidarity—it is based on “obligatory reciprocity” (Boelens, 2015). Family units by 
themselves are unable to provide all of the social and material infrastructure required for water 
control. For this purpose, it is crucial that the community sets clear, shared limits and rules 
about belonging to, operating, and sustaining the system. Here, like any collective, irrigator 
collectives contain a diversity of families and individuals, who sometimes come into conflict 
with one another. As Boelens (2015) elaborates, they are however united by their intense 
mutual dependence to develop, use, and manage their shared resources. Thereby, the rights, 
norms, and rules that govern irrigation affairs are more than the sum of individuals’ economic 
interests, rationally calculated, weighing up the costs and benefits of collective actions. 
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Understanding collective and individual water control and use rights involves debunking the 
often dogmatic myths on which romantic, rationalistic, or economicist approaches are based. 
 
In this study, water control is analyzed from the two domains discussed above: the collective14 
or organizational domain, and the family or peasant production units. This intends to 
continually integrate or interrelate the different dimensions that may be present in water control 
activities, to analyze particular, contextrual situations. Different analytical elements to discuss 
water control as the core of collective action in an irrigation system relate to key activities such 
as water allocation and distribution, operation, maintenance, conflict management and 
constructing and rehabilitating the system -- all according to the rules (formal and informal) 
that water users have developed (Eggink and Ubels 1984). Mollinga (1998) argues for the need 
to distinguish analytically among the dimensions of technical, organizational and socio-
economic/political water control. Boelens (2008, 2015) adds to this the notion of the dynamic, 
continuous interplay of these technical, organizational and normative dimensions of water 
control, the ways these are linked by power relations, and the need to address them as 
intertwined and mutually constituting each other.   
 
After combining these analytical elements and water-management activities and tasks as 
discussed in Section 2.2 (see also Beccar et al. 2001), this study identifies and discusses the 
three dimensions of water control. These three dimensions are defined by grouping technical 
or operational tasks, organizational roles and tasks, and regulatory or normative roles and tasks. 
This grouping is only an abstraction, an analytical exercise used in this research to understand 
the complexity of water control in irrigation systems, in both the collective and in the individual 
(household) domains. 
 
2.5.1 The technical dimension of water control 
 
The technical dimension of water control can be identified, starting from infrastructure design, 
construction, to the subsequent set of operational tasks that are implemented around (collective) 
water management and overall system functioning. For example, infrastructure operation 
(opening/closing gates at intakes and reservoirs), water distribution in the system (flow 
distribution), infrastructure maintenance and sometimes rehabilitating and constructing 
hydraulic works are some of the key operational tasks (Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998; 
Gutierrez, 2005; Mollinga, 1998). Individual farms/fields’ technical tasks consist of conveying 
or “accompanying” water from the diversion structure to the plot, and the array of ways to 
apply water to the soil. The technical/physical outcome of these practices materializes when a 
certain amount of water is applied to the field. These tasks have the role of "controlling" water 
                                                 
14 In this study, the "collective domain" and "family domain" are distinguished for analytical purposes, as separate 
spaces or social settings. The former refers to the elements discussed about collective action and organization 
(interdependence and cooperation, identity, social recognition and empowerment) and the latter is the area in 
which kinship and affective relationships (actual or symbolic) prevail, and the unit where agroproductive work is 
organized: the peasant farm. These “domains” are distinguished and adopted here, in order to avoid using terms 
such as "levels" or "scales", which base their definition on structuralist concepts, which often make it difficult to 
define clear boundaries between them or that sometimes are associated with geographical scales or social or 
institutional structures that are not always well defined. 
 46 
 
through technical operations, resulting in physical aspects, such as flow rates from the source 
to the plot, irrigation times and frequencies. That is the physical expression of water supply, 
water infrastructure control at the system’s different operational levels, and the result of this 
water supply (also in physical terms) as water available to the field/farm. 
 
Besides the apparently purely technical (physical) criteria, actions and outcomes resulting from 
these tasks, from their design to field level water control, various authors highlight the need to 
also scrutinize the normative (e.g., prescriptive, often disciplinary) and political implications 
of such outcomes. They hint at the norms and prescriptions to control human behavior 
(Boelens, 2008a; Gutiérrez, 2005; Mollinga, 1998). 
Figure 2-2. Technical dimension of water control  
(Source: Prepared by the author) 
 
Therefore, it is clear that, from a sociotechnical perspective, this technical dimension and the 
tasks involved are closely linked to the set of organizational tasks and to that of the regulatory 
(normative) elements of the system. All these elements or dimensions, in turn, are embedded 
in and influenced by culture, by the physical environment and by societal institutions and 
political relationships.  
 
2.5.2 The organizational dimension of water control 
 
Organizational tasks are expressed in different ways in irrigation systems.  Some of these are 
linked, for example, to the group’s internal organization, mainly its levels of coordination, 
planning and definition of its purposes, and its decision-making mechanisms (Beccar et al. 
2001; Suhardiman, 2017). Other organizational tasks involve mobilizing the different types of 
resources that the organization has access to and can influence to achieve its goals. In addition 
to an organization’s financial and capital resources, it is important to also consider its capacity 
to mobilize its “labor force”. When speaking of labor, this is more than the physical effort 
required to perform tasks (e.g. infrastructure maintenance or construction). This study 
understands labor force as something inseparable from knowledge and skills, manifested as 
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human capacities of different kinds (Bebbington, 1999) but also, collectively, as an expression 
of a "social force" (Eggink and Ubels, 1984). This social force is a key factor in the 
organizational dimension of water control, and can also be very significant for political 
negotiations. That is, the capacity to mobilize as an organization, will be a resource to negotiate 
(internally or externally) different aspects in tension, or explicitly and convincingly to show 
the organization’s "strength" as an attempt to achieve different demands or manifest 
expressions of protest. Another group of organizational tasks involve water distribution or 
allocation. This plans and coordinates (organizes) water rights implementation in practice and 
is expressed in concrete water distribution tasks. Finally, irrigation organizations play a key 
role in managing water conflicts, either within or outside of the system. These different types 
of organizational tasks are ultimately attempts at "the regulation and control of human 
behavior, particularly in relation to forms of cooperation necessary to make irrigation systems 
work" (Mollinga, 1998:36). 
 
 
Figure 2-3. Organizational dimension of water control  
(Source: prepared by the author) 
 
Organizational tasks or roles can also be found in the family domain. These will be discussed 
in Section 7.3. under the concept of "organizing labor on peasant farms". 
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2.5.3 Regulatory and political dimensions of water control 
 
As water is a resource in constant dispute, water control becomes a matter of struggle, balances 
and imbalances of economic and political power. This not only occurs among members of an 
irrigation system, but also between different users or groups of systems disputing the same 
water source or demanding recognition or other concessions from the state. In this sense, water 
control involves "controlling people and their work" and controlling or regulating "social (and 
technical) processes" (Mollinga, 1998). 
 
Boelens (2015), Roth et al. (2015) and Zwarteveen et al. (2005) suggest that water rights are a 
central element in regulating people and social relationships in an irrigation system. These 
rights are understood as "authoritative claims about the beneficial flow of a water source..." 
(Gerbrandy and Hoogendam 1998:113) that, based on social relationships, define who can and 
who cannot use water. They also further define irrigation infrastructure use and participation 
in management and decision-making, obligations and sanctions and defining criteria to resolve 
disputes about the scope and enforcement of those rights and obligations. These water rights 
may be grounded in different legal systems, formal and informal (Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 
1998). 
 
Water rights in an irrigation system, and their relationship with organizational tasks and 
techniques, help analyze the political and normative dimensions of water control (Beccar et al., 
2001). That is, these norms, rules and agreements seek to control people’s behavior to organize 
collective work, how they comply with obligations and access the "benefits" of that work, 
penalties for not fulfilling these tasks, and how the infrastructure will be operated and 
maintained. This shows political and normative elements’ close link and relevance to other 
operational (technical) and organizational elements of water control. 
 
In Bolivian irrigation systems, these rules may or may not be formalized in the state’s legal and 
institutional framework. They might be legitimized only within the user group or between them 
and third parties. However, these water rights and constitutional norms are not static or 
interpreted by everyone in the same way. Boelens (2008) and Zwarteveen and Boelens (2014), 
in this context, argue that to understand the dynamics of (collective) water management and its 
relation to water rights, a distinction should be made between:  
• Formal rules, expressed as referential water rights;  
• the way in which these rules and norms are supposed to be implemented, what they call 
“activated rights” (or “rights in action”), and  
• the rules as they occur in practice (“materialized rights”).  
 
Considering these different expressions of water rights, and how they are being shaped, 
interpreted and materialized, helps understand the relationships between organizational and 
operational tasks, and formal and informal rules. It also enables understanding the influence of 
power relations and culture on how collective water management is put into practice and 
continually recreated. 
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Figure 2-4. Regulatory and political dimension of water control 
(Source: prepared by the author) 
 
From the discussion in the last three sections, the concept of water control can be summarized 
as follows (see Figure 2-5): 
 
Collective water management implies various activities and tasks in which water organizations 
play different roles. These tasks, which for analytical purposes can be classified or grouped 
into technical, organizational and regulatory, are considered closely interrelated and therefore 
should be treated simultaneously. These different tasks and roles are influenced by the context 
– civil society institutions, the state, the market, culture and the agro-ecological and physical-
technological environment – and are being continuously modified and readapted according to 
contextual changes and power relations. Peasant irrigation systems in Bolivia are managed 
independently by users’ organizations, with their own rules and regulations; however, these 
rules and regulations may change according to environmental changes, state interventions 
through infrastructural projects, changing relationships and agreements between irrigation 
systems that share the same source, new agreements within the system by modifying the water 
rights framework, or new water demands for agro-production. This in turn may provoke 
changes in infrastructure operation, maintenance requirements, water flows, distribution rules, 
etc. 
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Figure 2-5. The multidimensional character of water control in irrigation systems  
(Source:  Prepared by the author) 
As a result of these tasks, activities and relationships, the different dimensions involved in 
water control can be identified and expressed, for example: 
• In physical terms, as available water at the farm level, as a result of materializing water rights 
and water supply and infrastructure characteristics. 
• As control of labor and collective action, defining the time, space, intensity or rhythms and 
forms of collective work. 
• As a relationship with work organization by peasant farms and outside of them. This influence 
will occur not only because collective work demands (or competes with) individual or family 
labor, but also because of the direct effect on the availability of water, which defines the 
"degrees of freedom" or production conditions in which a family runs its farming system. 
 
2.6 Water institutions and institutional processes 
 
This section discusses some concepts that will help understand institutional development of 
irrigation in Bolivia (Chapter 3) and its interface with water control and peasant community 
dynamics.  
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2.6.1 Perspectives and approaches for institutional analysis 
 
Following up on the discussion on “collective action”in 2.4.1., four main groups of studies or 
approaches are scrutinized that are common to find in water control studies that analyze 
institutional development: new institutionalism, an approach on common-resource 
management (common-pool resource management), an empowerment approach and finally an 
approach called “post institutionalism” by Cleaver (2000) and Mehta, Leach, and Scoones 
(2001). 
 
New institutional economics (new institutionalism) is an approach that has its theoretical 
foundations mainly in neo-classical economics. It assumes that human behavior is grounded in 
individuals’ “economic rationality”, and that they seek to maximize profitability (costs and 
benefits) in all actions or choices they make (Seemann, 2014). It considers that natural resource 
use and management can be improved and therefore made more “efficient” by creating 
incentives through markets and institutions, minimizing or controlling any kind of 
“externalities” (unforeseen factors and outcomes). A key element is formalizing or legally 
incorporating water rights into the normative and administrative system and creating 
mechanisms to “facilitate market-based water allocation…” (Saleth and Dinar, 1999: 30; 
Duarte-Abadía and Boelens, 2016). 
 
This makes it essential to create and formalize institutions that define the "rules of the game" 
and “reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure for human interaction" (Ellis, 2000: 
38 quoting North 1990:6). Institutions are then understood, as "the formal rules, conventions 
and informal codes that comprise restrictions on human interactions…"(Ellis, 2000: 38). They 
are designed as "…entities defined by a configuration of legal, policy, and organizational rules, 
conventions, and practices that are structurally linked and operationally embedded within a 
well-specified environment" (Saleth, 2004:3). That is, institutions structure organizations and 
their socio-economic, political, cultural and environmental contexts (Saleth and Dinar, 1999). 
As economic criteria are the core of this approach, cost recovery, accountability, and financial 
autonomy are leading concepts (Roth et al., 2015; Seemann, 2014). 
 
Common Property Resource Management (CPRM). Although often largely based on the 
previous approach, CPRM emphasizes local institutions’ potential to efficiently manage 
common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1990, 1992) and therefore the importance of local forms of 
regulation, cooperative behavior, and collective action. It is assumed that regulatory 
mechanisms and cooperative behavior can be designed in collective resource-management 
systems. A central concept within this approach is “property”, recognized as social relations 
between people who have “the right” to use and get benefits from using a resource or goods, 
versus those who do not have that right (Seemann, 2014). From this perspective, managing 
common resources implies rights to use the resource but also obligations or responsibilities and 
procedures regarding its management (Boelens et al., 2010). An important argument to sustain 
this approach and promote it as a model for a sustainable (water) resource management is that, 
since local people depend on natural resources for their livelihood survival, there is a strong 
incentive to conserve the resource (Seemann, 2014). 
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As part of this approach or model, it is common to see that some “design principles” are 
proposed, assuming that "robust institutions” are established with "clear rules", based on "well-
defined" property rights, on "well-established" boundaries and roles for the organization, with 
effective sanction mechanisms that prevent abuse of the resource or non-compliance with 
norms, and create financial mechanisms that are assumed to ensure efficiency and 
accountability (Ostrom 1992). The most widespread expression of this global approach, as a 
recipe for the water sector, has been to form water-user associations that are considered as 
"appropriate instruments (policy instruments) ..." and "...an innovative institutional 
arrangement” to implement water reforms (Bromley et al., 1980:381). 
 
This approach and especially its design-oriented focus, has been questioned by several authors 
(Mayer, 2002; Mollinga, 1998; Roth et al., 2015; Zwarteveen and Boelens, 2014), arguing that 
it may not be applicable in many cases due to the complexities of collective action to manage 
a common resource; communities’ non-homogeneity and non-unity (in terms of interests, 
socioeconomic differentiation, culture etc.); excessive focus on locality, neglecting local-
regional-national-international relationships and influences; and overlooked power relations 
(Cleaver, 2000; Duarte-Abadía and Boelens, 2016; Roth et al., 2005; Seemann 2014; Steins et 
al., 2000). 
 
The empowerment approach emerges as a direct reaction to the "new institutionalism" 
approach, suggesting that the latter neglects injustices, inequities, favoritism, etc., which are 
present in any form of management and access to natural resources. This approach considers 
institutions, seen as rules and regulations, as dynamic processes in which different interest 
groups meet, confront and negotiate to include their ideas and interests in a system’s 
organizational, technical and normative design (Boelens, 2015; Gelles, 1994). For irrigation, 
although interest groups can be part of the same user group, it is necessary to identify the 
explicit and implicit interests of "external" parties that intervene in irrigation design. Basically, 
empowerment through participation must come "from within", manifested as self-mobilization 
and creation of autonomy (Boelens, 2015; Suhardiman, 2017; Verzijl et al., 2017). 
 
This analytical approach focuses, among others, on two angles: (1) the regulatory complexity 
of governing access to resources, reflected primarily in culturally and politically embedded 
property rights, and (2) power relations, expressed at both the individual and collective level. 
Different from neoinstitutionalism conceptual frameworks, where law is seen as an overarching 
key issue because of its supposedly mandatory nature as a safeguard for social relationships, 
determining most interaction among people, natural resources and state, on the contrary, 
empowerment approaches consider the law not as something that is “absolute and 
unequivocal”. Law is part of a broader regulatory complex, as a "social resource" (Roth et al., 
2005). Law is hybrid and is subject to the different interests, options, limits, dilemmas and 
choices that are played out in societal arenas. It is deployed as a part of the strategies that people 
develop to achieve their goals. It is this normative complex that shapes so-called "legal 
pluralism". Under the perspective of legal pluralism, law is not recognized as the exclusive 
prerogative of the State. Rather, it is recognized as social practices that shape local and national 
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standards forming a group of co-existing and mutually interacting regulatory frameworks 
(Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998). 
 
Regarding (water) institutions’ power relations, Roth et al. (2005) argue for the importance of 
examining these relationships in policy decision-making but also in actual control over water 
and other associated facilities in the field. Unlike the neo-institutional approach, which 
considers relevant financial mechanisms as the basis to create "accountability", the 
empowerment focus highlights the political mechanisms that are generated. 
 
The post institutionalism approach focuses on social behavior dynamics and the way 
institutions are constantly shaped and readapted by collective action. Therefore, forming 
institutions is re-conceptualized as a socially-integrated process, rather than a deliberate, 
transparent administrative activity (Cleaver and Franks 2005). Such a vision requires different 
levels of analysis, starting from family or group-level institutional arrangements or agreements 
up to agreements within irrigation systems or within municipalities and the river basin. A key 
concept in this approach is "institutional bricolage" (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015). The 
approach conceives institutions not as static or "robust" structures in which it is assumed that 
human behavior is rather rigidly defined. Rather, institutions are conceived as an overlay 
(bricolage) of different rules, social norms and power relations formed by continuous collective 
action and resulting in a variety of agreements at different levels. This argument refutes the 
possibility of "designing institutions from outside" and especially making institutions that are 
expected to be "permanent and stable", as proposed by Ostrom (1990, 1992). 
 
Based on the concepts introduced by Boelens (2015), Cleaver (2000) and Mehta et al. (2001), 
and contrasting them with the ways in which institutions have been shaped in Bolivia and 
especially around water, it is important to consider the following elements of analysis: 
 
- The dynamic (not static or fixed-structure) character of institutions, because they are 
immersed in sociopolitical processes. 
- The importance of considering confrontation and negotiation of ideas and interests, 
mediated by power relations, in shaping institutions. 
- The importance of historical processes and diversity of cultural repertoires, of meanings, 
rules and identities that come into play. 
- The multipurpose nature of institutions. 
 
Finally, by considering that institutions are neither fixed nor developed in static socio-political 
and environmental contexts, but rather uncertain, requires us to consider uncertainty as another 
important element for institutional analysis (see also Cleaver, 2018). Uncertainty, in turn, 
motivates people to develop collaborative strategies and/or use different institutional 
repertoires (legal and institutional shopping, as suggested by Zwarteveen et al. 2005). 
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2.7 The agro-productive domain in peasant irrigation systems 
 
This section focuses on the domain of peasant farms or household agro-productive units. It 
discusses analytical elements that can be utilized to discuss peasant dynamics in houshold 
resource management, how this is linked with the collective domain, the significance of water 
control and its relationship with localized expressions of agrarian systems. 
 
2.7.1 Peasants and peasant agriculture 
 
Peasant agriculture has been studied from different theories and approaches. Most tend to 
separate it or differentiate it from entrepreneurial agriculture, based on some key features, 
typical to both, or sometimes based on what they are supposed to be. Some of these approaches, 
on the contrary, tend to define what peasant agriculture is not or cannot achieve in comparison 
with modern entrepreneurial agriculture, as if the latter were the only ultimate goal to attain. 
 
There have been two main groups of approaches. Within the first, Marxist currents analyze 
peasant economy as part of a larger economic system, linked to broader social processes and 
regulated by "social relations of production." These approaches concentrate on politically 
analyzing these relationships in terms of labor-force exploitation and transference of surplus to 
a ruling class. The second group, neoclassical approaches, analyze peasant agriculture from an 
individual level, from the economic rationality of maximizing returns by maximizing 
productivity and reducing costs (Lehmann 1982a,  1980; Ellis 1998,  2000). 
 
These theoretical discussions reveal a "scale" or "continuum" of conceptions and judgments 
about peasant agriculture. At one end are those who consider it excluded from the global 
economy or in some respects subordinate to the capitalist system (and to capitalist ruling 
groups) and therefore doomed to disappear (Kay, 2006). These approaches often say that these 
farms are operated "… almost devoid of capital and technology" (SOS FAIM, 2004:2). 
Approaches at the other end of the "scale" claim they survive and reproduce, because of their 
non-capitalist production relationships. Others take a more “transitionalist” approach, arguing 
that they are in a sort of transition from "primitive" to "modern" forms of production, 
progressively constructed on market relations (Lehmann, 1982b; Mayer, 2002). 
 
These and similar approaches have also been adapted for the Andean region, influenced also 
by currents of economic anthropology, and others that could be called indigenist or  
"Andeanist” approaches. The latter describe peasant agriculture as a core activity of life in the 
Andes, expressing this notion (often in romanticized ways) as "Andean agrocentrism" (Grillo, 
1993; PRATEC, 1996; Valldolid, 1994). Some authors explain this agrocentrism and "Andean 
cosmovision" by the close relationship of the Andean human community with the natural 
environment and its intangible world of deities. This relationship is manifested concretely in 
the "peasant field” (la chacra campesina), which is the center of life in the Andes. One of the 
principles that this approach proposes is the reciprocal interplay between these three domains 
(humans, deities and Nature) and diversity and heterogeneity as predominant features 
(Valladolid, 1994).  
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In this section, peasant agriculture is approached with several analytical elements considered 
central to understanding what was identified as the focus of this study: "peasant dynamics". 
The unit of analysis will be discussed, including its key features (Section 2.7.2). Section 2.7.3 
introduces the concepts of peasant strategies and styles of farming, as analytical categories to 
understand peasant agriculture, its dynamics, and its expressions as localized patterns of 
agrarian landscapes. 
 
The unit of analysis in peasant agriculture. Production decisions – about what, when, how 
and what for – in peasant agriculture are made within the family production unit. Different 
approaches raise different theoretical elements of how to conceive this production unit (see 
Ellis, 1998; Golte, 1980; Lehmann, 1982b; Mayer, 2002) and the analytical possibilities of 
linking peasant agricultural production with the national economy, or to attempt to explain this 
unit’s functioning or internal coherence. 
  
For instance, approaches based on "hard" systemic models conceive the peasant production 
unit as a "black box" converting inputs into outputs, looking how to value the economic 
implications of that process. Others focus more on individual behavior, looking to attribute or 
assess this unit’s economic rationale for optimizing resource use to maximize profits and cash 
flow.15 From these neoclassical economic approaches, (peasant) families are conceived as 
purely economic units, void of any socio-cultural or political link with the broader context. 
Under this perspective, production functions (equations) are perceived as a faithful 
representation of production and technological processes, however, issues such as family labor 
and consumption within households are unresolved aspects. These however, paradoxically, 
constitute the essence of peasant farming units (van der Ploeg, 2008). Other studies focus on 
cultural and social elements embedded in production processes, for example on kinship and 
authority governing those processes (Mayer, 2002; Sanchez, in Lehman, 1982). 
 
This study summarizes the following elements and arguments to define the "peasant family 
production unit" as the crucial unit of analysis: 
 
• It is a unit based primarily, but not exclusively, on blood or ritual kinship. According to the 
context of the cases analyzed, this defines some flexibility between the "nuclear family" and 
the "extended family". According to their own dynamics, sometimes families move between 
these limits, without an absolute division (Mayer, 2002). 
• Access to land is defined by various mechanisms that may coexist simultaneously. These 
may be based on collective agreements and communal norms, or on individual property 
regimes, which may or may not be officially recognized by the state. These property rights, 
or other forms of access to land are attributed to an individual (usually the man or "head of 
household"), sometimes to various family members (e.g. through hereditary succession to 
                                                 
15 Mayer (2002) discusses the weakness of neoclassical approaches in sustaining the logic of individual economic 
rationality to analyze peasant agriculture, for example in understanding flows of goods and services based on 
commercial and non-commercial relations and also analyzing energy flows in various productive areas. 
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the wife and husband), or to the entire family unit. Despite access or tenure mechanisms, 
land constitutes a key factor (not only a quantifiable asset) to mobilize labor, water, 
knowledge and other interlinked resources around peasant agriculture (Zoomers, 2001). 
• It is the household production unit where production decisions are made about what, how, 
when, where and what for. Besides, this is not only a production unit but also a consumption 
unit, where products themselves have both a monetary exchange value and an important use 
value (Boelens, 1998). 
 
Therefore, contrary to a capitalist entrepreneur, Andean peasants see their household as a 
production unit that is strongly related to their home and consumption unit: the market logic of 
decreasing marginal benefits cannot be applied as in a commercial enterprise, because peasants 
face the need to satisfy household necessities. In times of crisis, (low prices, low rewards to 
labor), the peasant family increases its labor efforts instead of decreasing them as would the 
capitalist enterprise. It also means that peasant irrigation systems always try to find a balance 
between production for self-consumption and for the market, and that the user organization 
cannot and should not be structured in a similar way to purely mercantile organizations. The 
often made distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘productive activities’ generally blurs, since 
they combine and overlap, and boundaries tend to be very fluid or not even existent. Contrary 
to static presentations, Andean peasant households and communities are not relatively closed, 
corporative units of consumption and production, but highly dynamic, transcultural and even 
transnational migrant entities. In other words, reference to the peasant family as the unit of 
analysis does not intend to isolate it from the larger context in which it operates, but rather, to 
understand its dynamics and relationships with the communal context, socio-cultural 
repertories, and the broader economic context. 
 
Indeed, the Andean peasant household (and peasant economy) expresses itself in relation to 
specific interactions and relations of exploitation between peasants and social groups in the 
wider society. It is characterized by a variety of mechanisms of unequal exchange. Andean 
peasant households are neither autarchic nor self-sufficient, but interwoven in the 
commoditized/mercantile and community/non-mercantile spheres of production, reproduction 
and consumption (Boelens, 1998; Boelens and Hoogesteger, 2017; Golte and De la Cadena, 
1983; Zoomers, 2013).  
 
 
2.7.2 Multiple dimensions and key elements in the analysis of peasant agriculture 
 
Based on this study’s focus and unit of analysis, as discussed in Section 3.1 and in this section, 
"peasants" and “peasant agriculture” are defined by the interplay of three dimensions that are 
merged into this concept: the peasant as a sociocultural identity; the peasant as a condition and 
way of life; the peasant as a way to produce, or do agriculture. Understanding these three 
dimensions simultaneously helps to explain rural logic and life, beyond economic or only 
cultural concepts. 
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Figure 2-6. Peasant as a multidimensional concept 
Source: Prepared by the author 
 
It is necessary to argue that these multiple dimensions are usually intermixed and expressed, 
some more strongly than others, in different areas of Bolivia, according to the historical process 
and the socio-political context. This forces us to take them simultaneously when analyzing 
rural dynamics and changes. 
 
The peasant as a sociocultural identity  
When we speak of the peasant as a sociocultural identity in Bolivia, it is important to highlight 
the historical process constructing this notion. Several authors agree in identifying the 
formation of this identity from claims and struggles for liberation from forced labor to which 
(primarily) mestizos and indigenous people were subjected through the hacienda regime 
(during and after the Spanish colonial period), and also from claims for access to land (Albó, 
1987a; Dandler, 1984; Larson, 2000). During the colonial period and even the first century of 
the republic, a "peasant identity" was almost nonexistent, as there was a marked separation that 
segregated rural inhabitants, natives and mestizos from the rest of society as "Indians" (indios) 
(Albo, 1987a).  
 
Only from the 1930s up to the national revolution in 1952, such social claims were gradually 
accentuated, strengthening peasant-class identity. So in 1953 land reform was popularized 
under the slogan of "Land to the Workers". This new identity was consolidated collectively as 
agrarian unions or peasant communities, based on its initial cell, the peasant family. At the 
same time, this social identity was reinforced by cultural elements such as language, 
physiognomy, and customs in different regions of the country. When land reform was 
implemented, farmers became visible as an important rural social sector, concentrated mainly 
in the west of the country, in the Andean region (Dandler, 1984). That was different in other 
rural communities, such as indigenous groups from eastern Bolivia’s lowlands (which were 
distinguished more for their ethnicity).  
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The peasant condition as a way of life  
When speaking of peasants or of "the peasant" in the Bolivian context, this study also refers to 
a way of life in the countryside (e.g., Zoomers, 1998, 2010). This way of life is often 
characterized, from an urban perspective or modernity, as a limited life context of "dependence, 
marginalization and deprivation" (van der Ploeg 2008:23). The condition of peasant life 
features several aspects: 
 
The lifestyle is based on meeting basic needs, where comfort, urban models or lifestyle may or 
may not be present. Communication facilities such as cell phones, television and radio are 
becoming increasingly common. However, other welfare standards and comforts such as 
“adequate” housing, provision and use of basic services (potable water, sanitary toilets, 
showers, health services, etc..) depend on the culture, facilities and public policies to access to 
these services, the family’s available resources, their life cycle, access to information and 
contact with other realities (Le Grand, 2014). In short, we can say that it is a “modest” lifestyle, 
where the priorities are food, maintenance, and reproducing activities in the household and on 
the farm (Mayer, 2002). 
 
Van der Ploeg (2008) proposed as a central element of the peasant condition (and lifestyle), a 
constant struggle for autonomy. In the case of Bolivia, before agrarian reform, in addition to 
the struggle for social recognition, a key demand was to access land and abolish tributes to 
landowners. This was an important step, an initial emblem to achieve autonomy, to have control 
over land and over their own work. Lagos (1997:182) however mentions the peasantry’s 
vulnerability "…against new forms of domination and exploitation". This is increasingly 
addressed through alliances and political struggles to upscale and reach new “spaces of power” 
during different government regimes.  
 
The quest for autonomy is evident in the agro-productive domain and daily life, through the 
different strategies used to control or access inputs or production factors or other family needs, 
employing practices of reciprocity, ritual relationships, share-cropping, borrowing money, 
temporary migration and others. These strategies however, in an apparent paradox, are seen by 
other authors as "relations of dependence" to achieve autonomy (Lagos, 1997; Mayer, 2002). 
At the same time, striving for autonomy also means reducing dependence on different factors 
restricting rural possibilities to produce and reproduce life. One of these factors, as discussed 
by van der Ploeg (2008), is markets. Relationships in practice are dynamic and constantly 
changing and establish various types of exchanges. In some commercial relations prevail, in 
other cases they are based on social relations not mediated by money. 
 
The relation of the rural inhabitants with the land and with nature is another important 
feature of the peasant condition and peasant life. This obviously is basic to in agricultural 
activities (agriculture, livestock, forestry, processing products, crafts), accessing and managing 
natural resources and organizing production, mechanisms which in turn build social 
relationships and cultural expressions. All this is presented by van der Ploeg (2008) as 
expressions of “co-production”. Important feature here is, in many cases, the interconnetion of 
humans and huge biodiversity. For instance, an outstanding feature of rural life in many 
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Andean communities is “verticality”, managing diverse ecological tiers where different 
resources are accessed and managed. Hereby, social relations are established and cultural 
expressions, knowledge, information flows, services and supplies are re-created through agro-
productive strategies (Boelens, 1998; Lehmann, 1982; Mayer, 2002). 
 
The resource base available to families is another important element defining the condition of 
peasant life. These resources are based on family labor, land, water, seeds and plant materials, 
animals, tools and machinery, money and other items. These resources are generally limited, 
change along a family’s life cycle (Le Grand, 2014; Zoomers 1998, 2010, 2013), and are 
combined in the labor process in different ways and in different combinations and types of 
exchange with the external environment (e.g. the market), defining thus different "farming 
styles", as proposed by van der Ploeg (2008), or “pathways” as framed by Le Grand (2014). 
The resource base, under different circumstances, can be used directly in production, can be 
stored for future use, or be traded or eventually sold or exchanged. This means that families’ 
resource bases "are not only converted into a range of goods and services, but they themselves 
are reproduced as resources" (van der Ploeg, 2008). This constitutes an important difference 
between peasant farming systems and agro-business enterprises. In the latter, there is a clear 
division or distinction between inputs or production factors and products. The former are 
generally acquired from the market and the latter are produced in order to then be sold through 
the market. This range of farming resources simultaneously enters into productive and 
reproductive spheres, an essential feature of this form of production, which will be discussed 
later. 
 
Cooperation and collective action, as already discussed in Section 2.4.1, is another important 
attribute, characteristic of the peasant condition and lifestyle, particularly in the Andes. There 
are various reasons for this type of action, whether as a way to cope with “hostile” natural or 
social environments, or as a condition for mobilizing "social force" to manage a particular 
resource. They are also important strategies to access otherwise nonexistent or limited family-
based resources (labor, land, water, etc.) or finally as a set of actions based on kinship ties or 
cultural identity, which in turn reinforce peasant identity. The clearest manifestation of these 
forms of cooperation and collective action is present in various forms of rural organizations: in 
Cochabamba’s valleys’ agrarian unions, peasant communities and irrigation systems. While 
the peasant organization is where social relations happen (cooperation and sometimes conflict), 
it also constitutes the framework, which sets certain standards of conduct and actions for the 
community, on which families base their actions. In short, collective action, as discussed above, 
may constitute the area in which they develop cooperative relations and interdependence, it 
represents an area of social cohesion and identity, it constitutes an important mechanism of 
social recognition and empowerment vis-à-vis the rest of society and the state, and it can also 
be an important source of autonomy. 
 
Finally, another crucial feature shaping the peasant condition is pluriactivity. Farmers are 
involved in different types of activities, such as wage labor (agricultural or non-agricultural, 
rural or urban) and providing services such as transport, handicrafts, trade, and others (Le 
Grand, 2014). These activities may change over time and also have a spatial dimension. These 
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different activities tend to supplement family income to meet their needs, but also enable 
investments in agricultural production activities (Ellis, 2000; Mayer, 2002; van der Ploeg, 
2008). Several authors discuss the results and implications of pluriactivity in different ways. 
Some argue that combining agriculture with other farm activities can lead to 
"depeasantization", i.e. progressive disappearance of the peasantry, especially for small 
farmers (Colque et al., 2015; Kay, 2006). Others argue that, due to the mechanism of income 
diversification, peasants will always exist (Figueroa, 1981). According to this view, more 
emphasis should be put on peasants’ resilience under different circumstances, and on their 
farming strategies’ great flexibility, including the use of new opportunities to enhance their 
livelihoods and farming (Bebbington, 1999; Le Grand, 2014; Zoomers, 1998). 
 
Peasant agriculture as a form of production  
Peasant agriculture, closely interwoven with the peasant condition, as explained before, has 
some characteristics that differentiate it from other forms of agricultural production, such as 
entrepreneurial agriculture. Van der Ploeg (2008), discusses several of these features: 
 
One of the most important features is the centrality of (family) labor on the farm. Family 
work involves not only labor (physical force) as such, but also entails knowledge behind every 
action in the labor process (van der Ploeg, 2008). Family work includes spatial and temporal 
organization of the different activities that family members perform in an agricultural cycle, 
possibly combined with hired (paid) labor which can be done through various social relations 
of production or reciprocity such as share-cropping, the "ayni" and "minka" (reciprocity 
practices), and others (Lehmann, 1982). Labor organization implies therefore control over the 
labor force and the work rhythms or cycles, and over knowledge and skills. 
 
The centrality of work on the farm also demonstrates yet another important feature of peasant 
production: labor-intensity in agricultural production. It is recognized in general that 
peasant production practices tend to use large amounts of labor, especially in the work of 
planting and harvesting. Mayer (2002) discusses various expressions of peasant labor-intensity. 
In principle, the difference between the intensity of land use and inputs according to the output 
destination, show a relationship (though not exclusively) of higher-intensity products primarily 
for market and less-intensity products for self-consumption. Anyway, regardless of products’ 
destination and land-use intensity, peasants use large amounts of labor, family or hired labor, 
which may change in quantity and quality according to crops, from one year or cultivation 
cycle to another, or according to production systems’ complexity as a whole. In turn, this 
intensity of field work is highlighted by several authors as part of a peasant rationality of 
maximizing return or the value added to work (Le Grand, 2014; Zoomers, 1998). 
 
The fact that productive and reproductive domains are mediated by market and nonmarket 
relationships is one of peasant production modes’ salient features. Peasant agriculture is 
immersed in two inseparable areas: production processes as such, but also reproducing family 
work and resource base. Van der Ploeg (2008) suggests this relationship between the 
productive and reproductive domains across three fundamental processes of agriculture: 
mobilizing resources, converting resources into finished products (production itself), and sale 
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or reuse of products (van der Ploeg, 2008:28). He emphasizes that market relations increasingly 
mediate these processes, though it is possible that each has a different relationship with the 
market, being an important feature of variability over time. This link with the market (through 
monetary exchanges or links to local institutions that generally prevail in trade and flows of 
goods and non-monetary services) can be visualized in various activities and with respect to 
each of the resources and inputs involved in production. For example, work inputs such as 
seeds, fertilizers, manure, or final products or derivatives from animal husbandry or crop 
harvesting come in different ways and in different proportions in circulation in market and non-
market spheres (Bradby, 1982; Mayer, 2002). Different forms of integration with the market 
or community or local institutions, in turn constitute a strategy to control their resources and 
therefore achieve autonomy (Golte and De la Cadena, 1983; van der Ploeg, 2008). 
 
Diversification in agricultural production. Finally, another feature of peasant agricultural 
production, demonstrating the peasant pluriactivity but this time expressed in farming, is 
diversification. In general, it can be said that peasant agriculture tends to diversify production 
by planting different crops, breeds or by processing products from these crops or livestock. As 
discussed below, this feature can be understood in turn as an answer, or risk coping strategy 
against different and/or insecure biophysical factors, or factors related to reproduction and 
family needs or in response to the market. Fundamentally, peasants seek to be employed in a 
variety of productive activities since it is impossible within subsistence agriculture to guarantee 
survival when engaging in only a few activities of marginal output. Diversification is sought 
both within farming itself (e.g., agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, market and domestic 
consumption, irrigated and non-irrigated crops, crops at several ecological altitudinal zones, 
associated crops, paid labor in the hacienda’s irrigation and non-paid labor in the community’s 
system) and in non-farming activities (marketing, handicrafts, temporary migration, etc.). In 
the domestic unit the available work force is divided among the diverse activities. Furthermore, 
diversification also relates to space and time: the household activities are not necessarily carried 
out in the same space (this is, the peasant holding), nor at the same time (because of the strategic 
distribution over the agricultural season and its migration periods). 
 
2.7.3 Peasant strategies and farming styles as analytical categories for understanding 
peasant dynamics 
 
Being aware of the multiple dimensions of the concept of “peasant”, it is necessary to discuss 
the implications and content of such dimensions expressed in peasant life dynamics. 
To define the dynamics of peasant irrigation, this study investigates two central elements:  
peasant actions in the collective domain and in the domain of peasant households. It examines 
the outcomes of such actions in terms of local agrarian development.  
 
Two concepts or analytical categories have been used in this research to analyze each element: 
the concept of “peasant strategies” as suggested by Zoomers (2001); and the concept of 
“farming styles” as proposed by van der Ploeg (1994). 
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Peasant strategies can be understood in general as peasants’ livelihood strategies, comprising 
different kinds of activities, both agricultural and non-agricultural. Zoomers (1998) suggests 
four factors that may be related to changes in peasant households’ short-term dynamics, and 
consequently their immediate strategies:  
 
The life cycle: a factor directly influencing availability and quality of labor for agro-productive 
activities (including skills/knowledge) but also people’s expectations as individuals and as a 
production unit. Young families with or without children have different strategies, or those 
with small or elder children can be distinguished, even from those families that are being 
“dismantled” for different reasons. Life cycle is also an important factor in resource base 
availability and capabilities to mobilize resources (Zoomers, 1998).  
 
Access to information and social networks refers to the fact that change or innovation are 
closely linked to information flow and access, and to facilities or conditions that can be 
imposed/developed through social networks.  
 
Interconnected activities (complementarity and competence) refer to the fact that, in 
general, peasant families in their daily lives perform many activities. Some of these activities 
may complement each other but others may compete for limited factors. It is important to 
identify them because they explain the dynamics of farmers’ strategies and therefore their 
decisions regarding agricultural production.  
 
Access to reserves and/or re-distributive mechanisms: the degree to which peasants can 
access and use these mechanisms may represent “degrees of freedom” to react against hazards 
or external changes. Some of these mechanisms are, for instance: food storage, monetary 
savings, animal husbandry, transformation products, etc., which in some cases can be converted 
into new assets or into cash. Social relations among households within a community may also 
be considered part of these mechanisms. 
 
Although the concept proposed by Zoomers (1998) is applied to analyze households’ livelihood 
strategies, it can also be adapted to broaden its applicability to also analyze collective peasant 
strategies (see also Le Grand, 2014). For that purpose, the concept adopted here has been 
adjusted as follows: A peasant strategy is the way in which households or peasant 
organizations respond to opportunities and limitations imposed by the external context 
(agroecological conditions, market, state institutions, infrastructure), based on priorities and 
needs defined in advance, organizing their available resources and assets, and resulting in a 
certain combination and sequences of interrelated practices or actions (adapted from Zoomers, 
1998). 
 
Three important remarks or clarifications should be made regarding this concept:  
• Peasant strategies do not necessarily mean a conscious, anticipated, systematic planning 
process, or as Zoomers states: “it does not imply a freedom of choice but an adaptation 
to internal and external circumstances that change constantly”. In this sense, a peasant 
strategy should be understood as a practice rather than solely as conscious planning of 
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future activities; or as Richards (1993) argues: in terms of “performance” and farmers’ 
“improvisational capabilities” in front of different productive and living circumstances. 
• The second remark regards resources mobilized by peasants. Academic and 
professional discussions prevailing on “rural livelihoods approaches”, analyze peasant 
strategies by focusing on the assets available and mobilized by households, expressed 
as five types of capitals: natural, physical, human, financial and social capitals 
(Bebbington, 1999; Ellis, 2000). Regarding the suitability of these concepts to 
development processes (as discussed by de Haan & Zoomers, 2005; Scoones & 
Wolmer, 2003; Toner & Franks, 2006), in this study the concept of “resources” was 
kept as an ample notion of material and non-material assets. They “are not simply 
resources that people use in building livelihoods: they are assets that give them the 
capability to be and to act”. “…(they) should not be understood only as things that 
enable survival, adaptation and poverty alleviation: they are also the basis of agents’ 
power to act and to reproduce, challenge or change the rules that govern control, use 
and transformation of resources” (Bebbington, 1999: 2022). 
• A third consideration is the contextual and contingent nature of peasant strategies. 
Households’ and organization’s priorities and needs are flexible and may change in 
time, and so do living conditions and contextual factors. In this sense, peasant strategies 
are not constant and may or may not be repeated in time. This denotes the very dynamic 
character of peasant strategies.  
 
As explained before, peasant strategies are conceived as individual or collective actions. 
Therefore, attached to the concept of peasant strategies is the concept of “human agency”, as 
proposed by Long (2001), which “attributes to the actors (individual or social groups) the 
capacity to process social experience and to devise ways of coping with problematic 
situations”. Agency is “composed of social relations and can only become effective through 
them…” Finally, “effective agency, then, requires the generation/manipulation of a network of 
social relations and the channeling of specific items (such as claims, orders, information, 
technologies and goods” (Long, 2001a: 182). 
 
Styles of farming: The concept of farming styles has been used in this research to explore the 
different responses that farmers (production and reproduction units) assume and how these are 
locally expressed in a diversity of agricultural and development patterns. Farming styles 
involve a certain way of organizing labor at the farm level (labor process), implying a certain 
degree of interaction or “maneuvering room” between technology and markets, and express an 
important element of identity of “the peasant way of farming”. Van der Ploeg (1994:17) defines 
farming styles as follows: "a complex but integrated set of notions, norms, knowledge elements, 
experiences, etc. held by a group of farmers in specific region, that describes the way farming 
praxis should be carried out”(…); farming styles represent a specific unity of farming 
discourse and practice, a specific unity of mental and manual labor (…); farming styles entail 
specific structuration of the labor process, of the organization of time and space as concrete 
dimensions and processes of production (...) and in particular structuration of the development 
process at farm (enterprise) level”. Consequently, styles of farming might be defined in terms 
of their scale, and level of intensity; the implied interrelations between capital and labor and 
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the specificity of particular technical-productive aspects and relations. “... farming styles 
represent specific connections among economic, social, political, ecological and technological 
dimensions” (van der Ploeg 1994: 18).   
 
Long and van der Ploeg (1994:4-5) suggest that “ … the presence of differentiated development 
patterns may reflect the different influence of external and internal forces, but it is impossible 
to adscribe this wide range of patterns to one dominant set of ‘driving forces’ located in 
markets, agrarian policy and technology development”. (...) "The dynamics of agrarian 
development, then, implies a careful analysis of the social relations of production as located 
in town-country relations, in the intersections of agriculture with local, regional, national, 
international economies, in historically-produced landscapes, in local culture, etc. As Long 
and van der Ploeg (1994: 5) argue, the social relations of production do not only shape the way 
farming is connected to markets, policy and technology, but they also imply a constant 
negotiation, mediation and transformation of the goals, instruments, and logic that are 
embedded in these market policy and technological forces. They result then in differentiated 
development trends and the reproduction of heterogeneity. 
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Chapter 3 . Institutional development of the irrigation sector in Bolivia. 
From local practices to state restructuring 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses institutional development of the irrigation sector in Bolivia. Important 
milestones show the encounter between local forms of water management based on customary 
norms and practices, and the various attempts by the state to control and regulate these practices 
are also identified.  
 
On the basis of concrete examples from the field, the study identifies the different expressions 
of “uses and customs” and how they shape the different dimensions of water control. According 
to specific biophysical, socio-political, cultural and historical contexts, these uses and customs 
may materialize as physical control mechanisms to guide water flows; in other cases, they may 
manifest as more organizational elements; while in others, they may emphasize in particular 
the normative aspects, or clearly denote the political dimension of water control. These 
different expressions of customary practices show how dynamic they are, how they are 
continually re-created and re-adapted: far from being “traditional norms” or “historical rules 
from the past”, obsolete and static.  
 
The second part of this chapter discusses the most impactful attempt implemented by Bolivia’s 
state: institution-building in the sector, explicitly recognizing uses and customs as the main 
foundation for water management in Bolivia’s peasant irrigation. This recognition 
“formalized” customary rights and therefore collective and individual water rights, by 
including this concept in the official state legislation (2004 Irrigation Law). Normative and 
decision-making bodies are also established, with predominant participation by irrigators’ 
representatives.  
 
Finally, this chapter discusses the challenges posed by the new institutional structure, its current 
operational possibilities, and the consequences of this process for local water management and 
governance. 
 
The chapter’s analysis focuses on the following research question: 
 
How have irrigation institutions developed from local practices, how do they conflict with 
official views and policies concerning irrigated agriculture; and how do these mismatches in 
turn influence water control? 
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3.2 The new institutional framework for irrigation.  Reconfiguring local 
institutions and empowerment. 
 
This section discusses two aspects of the new institutional framework of Bolivia’s irrigation 
sector. First is the configuration of formalized irrigation institutions and its implication in 
practice. The second aspect is the new balance (or imbalance) in terms of power relations 
between different actors and between the various levels of the new irrigation institutional 
structure.  
 
3.2.1 Configuration of the new formalized institutional setup 
 
Since the so-called "water war" in 2000, social mobilizations and empowerment of peasants, 
associated with different sectors, predominantly of rural and indigenous origin, were of great 
political relevance when conforming the state’s new structure, particularly in irrigation sector 
institutions. During this process, the irrigation law was installed. This law and its regulations 
were meant not only for general recognition of the usos y costumbres as the foundation of 
peasant organizations involving water, water management and water-use practices. This norm 
also granted (at least on paper) decision-making rights to communities where water sources are 
located (territory-based water rights) and the right to participate through local and regional 
representatives in the Departmental (SEDERIs) and the National Irrigation Service (SENARI), 
respectively. Both instances, besides formally granting (or revoking) water use rights through 
“registrations” and “authorizations”16, also have a planning function in terms of implementing 
policies, coordinating with various agencies, administrative functions, and executing programs 
and current projects (Cossio, 2009; Seemann, 2014). 
 
Crespo (2006:9) discusses critical issues and questions that are relevant for the implementation 
of the law and the new institutional framework for irrigation. The law was enacted as a means 
to prevent the sale of water sources and to protect (collective) water rights of small farmers "... 
challenged by other sectors and users, particularly private users, industry and consumption by 
cities." At the same time, the norm seeks to assure the water-users’ participation in the "the 
sector’s development, by exercising collective water rights, expressed in the so-called usos y 
costumbres..." based on participation by irrigation-sector representatives at different levels or 
planning spaces. However, some sensitive issues are also present in the law. For instance, that 
"... the law does not guarantee equitable access to and use of water resources, particularly by 
the poorest sectors (peasants and indigenous without irrigation) ...", and by concentrating 
decisions in the sector that already has water. Another aspect stressed by Crespo is that the law 
is mostly concerned with the public and non-mercantilist character of water and water-use 
rights, however, "... there is no mechanism to prevent the creation of devices (formal and 
informal) for the commercialization of water and monopolies, as is already happening in some 
parts of the country ... ". By contrast, implicitly, the law restricts direct intervention by the state 
as to regulate water access and use in more equitable ways (Crespo, 2006:9). 
                                                 
16 Registrations and authorizations are the administrative instruments provided for in the law to formalize 
collective water rights (formalizing “usos y costumbres”). 
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The new institutional framework poses new interrelationships between different actors of the 
state and social organizations. It formalizes participation by (peasant) irrigation sector 
representatives within Departmental and National Irrigation Services, with a majority of 
representatives: seven representatives of irrigators and water committees (ANARESCAPYS), 
one of the national peasant organization (CSUTCB), one representative from the agricultural 
sector and four from government. A similar structure is defined for the departmental service 
(Consejo de Ministros, 2006; Honorable Congreso Nacional, 2004). Currently, after several 
years of uncertainties in implementing the institutional setup, and growing conflicts between 
groups of irrigators, most of the Departmental Services and the National Irrigation Service are 
established, although in most cases with many limitations (technical, administrative and 
financial) to fully execute their functions. SENARI at Central level has been in charge of 
formalizing collective rights by awarding “registrations” to collective (peasant) users, however, 
in almost ten years since the law was enacted, less than 10% of the irrigation systems have 
formalized their registry (Seemann, 2014). 
 
State institutions to implement this institutional framework and enforce the Irrigation Law are 
evidently weak, for example, regarding technical and administrative capacities to implement 
water-rights registration, or enforcement capacities and power, and the legitimacy to act if 
conflicts arise. In such cases, they would have to defend one sector of irrigators against another, 
because of disputes about water sources. In practice, however, no concrete results are seen 
regarding water security, which this norm was supposed to strengthen by recognizing usos y 
costumbres. The study by Seeman (2014), for example, shows that actual access to water, and 
rules for distributing water, have not been changed. Defense of usos y costumbres versus water 
rights held by other user sectors has not improved, either. On the contrary, it seems that the 
possibility of registering user rights has been interpreted by irrigators’ organizations as a 
chance to recognize “ownership rights” to water sources, exacerbating other neighboring 
organizations’ suspicions within a given watershed, and creating new conflicts and disputes 
over water sources, based on territorial claims (Perreault, 2008; Seemann, 2014, 2016). 
 
In terms of irrigation relationships and institutions, substantial changes have included gradual 
empowerment of user organizations and their leaders engaging with different decision-making 
spaces, from local to national. By contrast, apparently the state is weakening in regulating the 
water sector and especially the irrigation sector (Rocha et al., 2015, 2016). Although water-
management practices in peasant irrigation systems are consolidated (self-management, or 
intra-system management), the emergence of leaders and representatives from the irrigation 
sector appears not to be accompanied by legitimate representation and accountability 
mechanisms downward (Perreault, 2008; Seemann, 2014). In the medium term this may pose 
a threat and destabilize their own irrigation institutions, especially concerning the 
representation required at intermediate levels (regional, watershed) and above (to the national 
level). This happens in a context of growing hydrological constraints, especially in upstream 
areas and valleys of Bolivia, making water sources scarce, if not non-existent, that can be 
tapped for new irrigation systems. Further, growing financial constraints and technological 
difficulties in many cases are increasing water conflicts during new irrigation project 
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formulation and implementation; there are recurring tensions between upstream and 
downstream users in river basins; and ongoing re-negotiation of agreements, which in general 
tend to favor headwaters communities. This potentially threatens local levels, which cannot 
currently be resolved by central government agencies, by local governments, or even by the 
irrigation organizations themselves. 
 
3.3 Local institutional expressions of water control as usos y costumbres 
 
In recent years, and even more since the water war in Cochabamba in 2000, the above-
introduced term "usos y costumbres" entered into circulation in different socio-political 
spheres, especially among rural sectors, in public policy discussions, in natural resource 
regulation, and its inclusion in the new Bolivian Constitution in 2009 (Perreault, 2008, 2014; 
Rocha et al., 2015, 2016; Seemann, 2014, 2016). In the irrigation sector, it is also one of the 
central foci, currently embodied in the new irrigation law (2004) and its regulations (2006). 
This section discusses the three cases and other relevant illustrations of what irrigators 
themselves call their usos y costumbres in the irrigation institutional setup: the different 
meanings, values and connotations that are implicit or explicitly claimed through this concept. 
Finally, we discuss policy or norm implications in Bolivia, including their significance for 
water control in irrigation systems. Usos y costumbres in irrigation systems in Bolivia can be 
understood as concrete, local expressions of water rights. They are a "set of rules, principles 
and procedures governing access to water" (Urteaga, 2006:130). They have divergent practical 
connotations (such as operational rules related to irrigated crops) within the communities or 
groups of irrigators who defined them. At the same time, they represent the body of customary 
law that legitimizes collective (i.e. communal) rights to water and its sources, or even as 
"property rights" over those water sources, vis-a-vis the state, other institutions and other 
sectors of society (Perreault, 2008; Urteaga, 2006).  
 
To explore and discuss uses and customs, and their direct link to water control, two cases are 
used as empirical evidence: Punata, where different irrigation systems with different water 
sources overlap (river flow, reservoirs and groundwater) and the rain-harvesting (atajados) 
systems in Rumi Cancha (see detailed introductory descriptions in Chapter 1). 
 
3.3.1 Usos y costumbres – more than only “traditional” water distribution systems 
 
Rivers’ waters can be considered as the most representative of the Andean irrigation tradition 
which was then combined with Spanish rules established during colonial times, conforming 
thus the first water distribution systems based on costumary norms and practices. Despite its 
"traditional" or "ancestral" origin, its contemporary and dynamic character is evident 
(Bustamante and Gutiérrez, 1999). 
 
In case of Punata, three autonomous but interrelated irrigation systems run using the source of 
water as the flow increases in the river during the rainy season. The Pilayaku system distributes 
the basic flow upto 20l/s, the Mitha system distributes the river flow if it reaches between 20 
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to 300 l/s and the Rol system when the flow exceeds 300l/s (see detailed description in Section 
1.4.2). The Mitha system extends not only in areas of former haciendas like Punata, but also in 
communities from the highlands, or in areas known in the colony as "Pueblo de Indios” (Indian 
villages) (Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998). 
 
The Mitha system in Punata means a complex system of water allocation based on turns with 
established dates and times for distributing the entire river flow (monoflux). The definition or 
specification of these turns is not set in writing but has instead been transmitted orally from 
generation to generation. Some users or “mitheros” have regular turns every 21 days, while 
others in multiples of that interval. Some others can use water during fixed dates only once or 
a few times a year. Every user of Mitha knows the timing and the duration of the turn for the 
community and within this, his/her own turn (individual timing and duration). While the dates 
and duration of turns do not change along the year, the amount of water (the physical dimension 
of water control) is changing (decreasing). For some users, this water right is becoming 
insignificant and others have abandoned this right. Other users on the contrary, maintain this 
water right “latent” for some emergent situation, as part of family strategies to access other 
benefits either from another system or in terms of trade (exchange) for other resources. Water 
control in the organizational and operational dimensions of this system seems to be diluted 
over time, or at least is not present with equal force and visibility in all communities in Punata. 
In terms of physical (technical) water control, this system represents a lot of uncertainty for 
water users who rely only on the river flow. 
 
Geographically overlapping in the Punata area, in the “Pilayaku” framework of rights (see 
Section 1.4.2) the usos y costumbres represent "old" rights. They were created since the 
hacienda regime or even before.  After the agrarian reform, these rights were claimed and 
controlled by former hacienda workers (colonos) in the community at the head of the Punata 
valley (Pucara community). Flow in this system was more or less constant throughout the year. 
Being a basic flow of the river, and based on the “tradition” that this system had a permanent 
flow, water users claim a permanent and if possible fixed flow even while reservoir systems 
are operating. (Reservoris (dams) are located in the same river). This makes water distribution 
at the main intake difficult and conflictive, where all the suface irrigation systems share the 
same infrastructure.  
 
A typical situation is when Pilayaku and reservoir systems overlap their operation schedule. 
Before a reservoir starts its operation (largada), the flow of Pilayaku system may be less than 
20 l/s and this will be the flow that is distributed. However, when water from a reservoir reaches 
the water intake, Pucara community demands the return of their basic (traditional) flow of 20 
l/s. This is continually negotiated and many times granted by the different reservoir systems in 
Punata, although in recent years this situation is involving more conflict.  
 
Agreements may be further complicated especially when there is snow or rain on the mountains 
which increases the base flow in the river. In this situation, the Pilayaku and Mitha water-rights 
systems operate simultaneously, but if water is released from a dam, new negotiations and 
disputes between the "mitheros" and users of the dam will take place about how to distribute 
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their respective flows at the main intake. Most of the time, an agreement is reached; sometimes 
to the benefit of Mitha users and other times for the dam users, depending on the flow at the 
main intake. Here, Mitha and Pilayaku systems show the strength of these traditional rights or 
traditional water distribution systems of the river flow. The usos y costumbres in both systems 
are expressed as the right to irrigate with river water, under an established distribution schedule 
based on sequential rights of the communities near the main intake (Bustamante and Gutiérrez, 
1999). Although the Pilayaku system tends to claim a given flow rate, especially when several 
systems are in operation simultaneously, the flexibility is evident in that these collective rights 
can be negotiated in relation to other rights frameworks. This demonstrates the dynamic nature 
of the usos y costumbres demarcated by social relations and the flexibility that they lend to 
peasant irrigation systems’ functioning overall. They also show the flexible definition of 
collective water rights regarding these sources, although with a more accurate definition for 
individual rights. Despite the precise definition of individual rights (as “reference rights”), 
daily practice within communities, or in inter-communal distribution, also features high 
flexibility and water mobility. This all materializes as adaptive variations in flow rates, 
irrigation times, water demands, agreements for exchanging water turns, etc. which ultimately 
results in an apparently chaotic water distribution system (“materialized rights”). 
 
3.3.2 “Usos y costumbres” -- physical and organizational dimensions  
 
The system called "Rol" in Punata, uses the river flow water when it exeeds 300l/s at the main 
intake. Despite its seasonality and uncertainty, is a very important water source for remote 
communities, for many of them their only resource to prepare (fallow) land and eventually to 
irrigate maize. The physical dimension of water control is perhaps the most important in this 
system, as it will come into operation only when river flow is greater or close to the indicated 
discharge. Once this is foreseen or physically verified, it depends on the organizational capacity 
of communities far away from the Punata intake to assert this right and operate the system. 
Communities that are entitled to this system define a distribution sequence at the main intake. 
According to the number of members, they can get water for 12 to 48 hours (per community). 
Internally, each community mobilizes people to clean ditches and streams, and “accompany” 
water from the main intake down to the community. They organize distribution of water among 
themselves. 
 
Access to water in this system is increasingly difficult, partly because the communities at the 
head (near the main intake) are demanding and using more water from this source, but changing 
rainfall patterns also affect the river’s hydrological regime. So, communities far from the intake 
annually claim and defend their rights to this source, and exercising these usos y costumbres 
has been and remains a source of confrontation, protests and conflicts between Punata 
communities (Gandarillas et al., 1993; Saldías et al., 2012). Negotiations ever continue to move 
or readjust the main intake, to ensure water enters into the Pucara river’s main courses. 
 
In organizational terms, the Rol system did not have a visible (formal) structure. This led to 
tensions and conflicts between communities with rights to the system, especially between 
upstream and downstream communities. In response to downstream communities’ claims, the 
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peasant organization in Punata (Central campesina) intervened in coordinating water 
distribution to reduce conflicts. This has revitalized this organization’s legitimacy.  
 
 
Picture 3-1. Water distribution within communities in Rol system 
Photo: I. del Callejo 
 
The “usos y costumbres” under this Rol system, unlike Mitha and Pilayaku systems, represent 
peasant communities’ practice, effort and mobilization by physically controlling large river 
discharges to convey water from the main intake to a community, after having negotiated and 
reached agreements with other communities. These usos y costumbres therefore also represent 
important, dynamic negotiation mechanisms – the political dimension of water control - 
between the communities associated around the irrigators’ organization and those communities 
without irrigation (that is, without regulated irrigation). Currently, these communities outside 
Punata dams’ area of influence are called "communities without irrigation", because they have 
no rights to these regulated systems and face strong limitations on accessing any source, either 
surface or groundwater. These communities have access only to Rol or to river floods during 
the rainy season, which are increasingly difficult to access because of the distance from the 
main intake and because that water is used by communities upstream and by those closest to 
the main intake. The next chapter will discuss how they developed collective strategies of 
"reorganizing communities" to access more water from this system. 
 
3.3.3 The territorial dimension of the “usos y costumbres” in Punata reservoirs 
 
As was mentioned above, uses and customs denote specific features of water management in 
peasant irrigation systems. These features are molded by or adapt to physical-environmental, 
cultural and socio-political conditions in each locality, and are continually renegotiated when 
such conditions change. Ultimately, one of the most concrete expressions is in water rights, 
both collective and individual, defining who can and cannot use water and existing 
infrastructure. These usos y costumbres are also manifested in day-to-day practice in the system 
and reinforce the perceptions or images that water users have of themselves vis-à-vis other 
people or groups that do not use their system’s water (Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998; 
Boelens, 2008a; Seemann, 2014). This section discusses these different expressions or images 
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of usos y costumbres, taking as illustrations irrigation systems in Punata again that receive the 
water from three different dams (Totora Khocha, Laguna Robada and Llusk’a Khocha) (see 
Figures 1-4 and Figure 4-7) showing their multi-tiered (nesting) nature and the different 
repertoires that comprise such expressions.  
 
The Totora Khocha system’s usos y costumbres are perceived and project different images for 
different actors. Among users of this system in Punata, the image of usos y costumbres is the 
investment that water users must assure, year after year, both in work and in monetary 
contributions for system operation and maintenance, to have access to one or at most two 
irrigation turns per year. This image could be summarized as communities and water users’ 
effort, investment and sacrifice. Some users view this effort as beneficial, others as an 
"overload" because only one or two turns a year offer them somewhat disappointing benefits. 
This “internal” expression is different for different user communities. For users in remote 
communities far away from the main intake, who have access only to Totora Khocha, water is 
essential for land preparation (fallow) and/or complementary irrigation17 of maize or alfalfa. 
Work and money investments for these users are then essential to cultivate at least one cycle 
of grains or fodder crops. For users and communities located near the main intake, other water 
sources in the zone are more secure. Totora Khocha offers these peasants an additional resource 
to negotiate with third parties about water, agricultural products or any need that families may 
face. 
 
Also for Laguna Robada, usos y costumbres are expressed among irrigators in Punata as 
resulting from sacrifice, effort, organization and self-management. It is a right that they 
inherited from their grandparents (with historical roots, based on communal heritage and family 
effort), and have a direct link to their own family history, reflecting the abuses suffered during 
the time of the hacienda regime. Stories about this dam tell about the deaths that occurred 
during its successive restorations, which increases the historical and symbolic value of these 
usos y costumbres. 
 
For Llusk’a Khocha-Muyu Loma system, the water source’s usos y costumbres and the link 
with their grandparents’ efforts are less visibly expressed. Ten communities in Punata use this 
source. Because of the long distance to convey water from the reservoir to the irrigated area 
and due to new settlements along the river, water availability is decreasing year after year. 
Some users claim that in this system "the organization is declining" and that they have to invest 
increasing efforts to control water conveyance. The next chapter, on collective action for water 
control, will discuss this case in terms of the close link between organizational and operational 
(technical) water control. 
 
In Punata, 65 communities use Totora Khocha. These communities feel their reservoir’s usos 
y costumbres reflect “ownership", vis-à-vis communities without irrigation surrounding 
                                                 
17 Complementary irrigation is understood here as the irrigation that is practiced just before or during the rainy 
season. In this case, water application to plots, either for land preparation or for a specific crop, plays a 
complementary role, together with rainfall. Neither the irrigation nor the rainfall are enough to fulfill water 
requirements. 
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Punata: Totora Khocha “… is our dam…” which has been built "…for us", “…with funding 
directed to us…" and built “through our own efforts". "We got funding...” (…) “and those who 
did not take the risk, or who dropped out at the beginning…have no right to use these 
waters…”. These fragments of a local leader’s testimony in Punata express the clear image that 
Totora Khocha’s users want to project towards “external” communities. Their usos y 
costumbres mean ownership. 
 
For a decade, as part of discussions to possibly extend the Totora Khocha system (by building 
the Vandiola water transfer project), these expressions of usos y costumbres show increasing 
notions of ownership. Communities with water rights to this system argue that, if the dam is 
extended, their children and those with no water rights in their communities would be new 
beneficiaries, but not people from other (external) communities … “we do not negotiate with 
non-users". 
 
The territorial dimension of usos y costumbres. Punata’s reservoir systems have their dams 
and the catchment located outside the jurisdiction of the user communities. They are located in 
communities at the upper part of Pucara watershed, in the jurisdiction of other municipalities 
outside Punata (Llusk’a Khocha-Muyu Loma and Totora Khocha in Tiraque and Laguna 
Robada in Colomi). In recent years, the demand and interest of communities in the upper parts 
of the watershed in using water from these sources, has notably increased, and therefore 
tensions and conflicts between them and the users in Punata are more and more evident. The 
upstream communities are forcefully increasing their demands and claiming "territorial rights" 
over water sources. They use different mechanisms to exert pressure on downstream 
communities. They started requesting the diversion of a small portion of the flow, a practice 
that every year was accepted by Punata organizations, but not without going through long 
negotiation processes. In recent years however the upstream communities prevented the 
passage of water crossing their lands and did not allow Punata irrigators to even approach to 
the dams. These conflicts have been mediated in some cases by municipal authorities, by 
government agencies and by the Federation of Irrigators of Cochabamba (FEDECOR). 
 
As a strategy, irrigation organizations from Punata also claimed "territorial rights", not 
originating from their own but from the former landowners’ hacienda, arguing that "... these 
dams belonged to our bosses ...", "... they were people from Punata not from Tiraque, they were 
the owners of those dams and we have inherited those water sources... " (interview with Punata 
user). Here, peasant leaders use different regulatory frameworks plus historical "images" and 
symbols, which can sometimes seem contradictory. An image of the hacendados as exploiting 
peasants may be replaced by an image of "ownership and control" attributed to those same 
hacendados, yielding their usos y costumbres and especially territorial rights over these 
sources. 
 
In recent years, these rights or territorial claims, in Tiraque, in Punata, and other dam systems 
in the valleys, are being fiercely contested, placing historic agreements between upstream 
communities and lower-basin user communities back on the table. This is exacerbated by the 
irrigation law which demands water rights (usos y costumbres) registration for formal 
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recognition by the national irrigation authority (the National Irrigation Service), and for new 
investments to construct dams (Seemann, 2014). 
 
In short, collective water rights, expressed as usos y costumbres in irrigation systems in which 
water sources are located in places other than where water is actually used, are in growing 
dispute, based on territorial claims. Although there are no cases (yet) in which downstream 
communities have lost their rights, conflicts are evident. These conflicts show a change or new 
imbalance in power relations between upstream and downstream communities. Irrigation 
systems that seemed to be strong in their organizations and in consolidating their water rights, 
as is the case of Punata’s organizations, are increasingly vulnerable to new water demands (real 
or fictitious) in the headwaters. Ultimately, claims based on territorial arguments, and the 
physical control that upstream communities have over these water sources, appear to control 
water more effectively than (only arguments based on) usos y costumbres regarding current 
use or historical agreements between upstream and downstream communities. 
 
Complexity in expressions of usos y costumbres, rooted in culture, in social relationships 
between the group of people sharing a water source and their history, or between these users 
and third parties, show how important relations are between and within irrigation systems. 
Social networks intermingled with water networks and the water cycle reveal hydro-social 
networks and territories (Boelens et al., 2016), transcending geographical, political-
administrative or hydrological boundaries. The results of these complex inter-relationships 
show that hydro-social networks’ boundaries are not fixed in physical-geographical terms, 
much less in political-administrative or social terms. In time and socio-space, these boundaries 
are re-defined continually. We also see that territorial arguments are increasingly important in 
defining usos y costumbres, as a foundation for defining water access, water rights, and in 
general water management. This, in turn, shows how different territorial notions “overlap”, 
molded by water management and control, assuring that some have water access and others are 
excluded (cf. Hoogesteger et al., 2016). 
 
3.3.4 The multi-level character of usos y costumbres 
 
This section summarizes some characteristics of the organizational and water allocation 
practices, showing the multilevel character of water control in a reservoir system such as Totora 
Khocha in Punata. This will help identify distinctive expressions of usos y costumbres at the 
system’s different levels. These usos y costumbres have different meanings, in terms of social 
relations and power relations, depending on the level of social aggregation and the current 
socio-political contexts. Water rights define social relationships among those who can (or are 
entitled to) use water and also between them and those who cannot use water. Therefore, rules 
between water users and third parties are defined.  
 
The Totora Khocha irrigation system in Punata is as an example of multilevel expression of 
usos y costumbres, in both organizational terms and operational elements. This expression of 
the usos y costumbres is different for individual users, communities, irrigation groups, or the 
whole system. In Totora Khocha there are several organizational and operational levels: at the 
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highest level, the irrigation committees of Tiraque and Punata are each backed by a large 
organization in their provinces (the Tiraque Irrigation Association and the Punata Irrigation 
Association, respectively). The relationship between the two organizations is governed by an 
agreement that defines the benefits (water allocation) and obligations (operation and 
maintenance) at a proportion of 60% for Punata and 40% for Tiraque. In Punata, water is 
distributed among eight groups according to the water infrastructure division (main channels), 
each group comprising a similar number of communities, so that the 65 communities 
composing the system are served. Within each group, user communities distribute water 
internally according to each community irrigator’ shares. These shares and how to organize 
them through governance agreements is subject of continuous negotiation, at multiple scale 
levels. The multilevel character and territorial dimension of usos y costumbres clearly 
demonstrates institutional boundaries’ flexibility or permeability in Bolivia’s peasant irrigation 
systems. This shows again, as argued by Cleaver (2000) and Mehta, Leach & Scoones, (2001), 
how inappropriate it is to view institutions as a fixed structure within well-demarcated 
boundaries. 
 
Considering usos y costumbres as expressed at their different levels becomes relevant, for 
example, when implementing irrigation projects, when contributions from farmers (irrigators) 
are defined either in cash or in working days (labor shares), or when re-defining collective 
rights in systems that are already operational. It is also important to specify information flows 
and perceptions at these different levels, for example to support negotiation between conflicting 
parties over a particular water source. 
 
3.3.5 “New” usos y costumbres in groundwater systems. Individual efforts, collective 
principles 
 
In several regions of Bolivia, as in Cochabamba and Punata Valleys, groundwater use has 
increased rapidly as an alternative to the physical and financial constraints on implementing 
large-scale irrigation systems. Most groundwater systems that are implemented in 
Cochabamba, and especially in Punata, are generally small multi-family systems. They start 
when a group of families decide to collectively invest to drill a well in order to meet their water 
requirements, in response to water demands unmet by other systems, to a drought event, or to 
new demands created by intensifying irrigated agriculture in the area. For almost two decades 
in Punata (1990 to 2010), these family groups took full funding responsibility to implement 
and then operate these systems by themselves. These groundwater systems in Punata are mainly 
used for irrigation and some for domestic supply, but there are a variety of other productive 
and non-productive uses of these waters (Del Callejo & Vásquez, 2007). 
 
When wells are drilled in Punata, their usos y costumbres are the set of rules or specific 
agreements that a group of people have established to extract groundwater, usually near their 
plots. To implement the system, a first contribution (investment by each family willing to 
participate) is necessary in the beginning. The group, depending on their relationships and, of 
course, on funding opportunities, can eventually get support from the municipality, the central 
government or any NGO working in the area. This support may help cover the costs of drilling, 
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the pumping system, and electrical installation. But the most important basis for creating water 
rights to these systems is each family’s monetary investment. Water rights are called "shares", 
and can be fractional (e.g. half shares, one share or at most two shares). Most tube-well system 
users have only one share. Arrangements for water allocation in tube-well irrigation systems 
are system-specific but are generally distributed through a fixed-turn system, defining the run-
time equivalent to a share. Irrigation distribution mainly diverts the whole discharge (mono 
flow) to each user during each turn. There is some flexibility, allowing other families (users or 
non-users) to access water through irrigation turns from other water users or from the system. 
This can be done by buying (paying in cash) or by any other mechanism (loan, exchange, lease, 
or different types of arrangements based on reciprocity practices). 
 
In terms of water control, a certain degree of risk and uncertainty is present in initial stages, in 
choosing the well location and engaging the drilling company. Once the well is operational, it 
may represent in practice a relatively stable, secure water source, with minimum management 
requirements, although with high operating costs (electricity) and eventually replacing or 
repairing the pump. All these practices, strategies, investments, construction of rules, cultural 
and monetary values and the final possibility of accessing water as a key element of their 
livelihoods are reflected in tubewell-particular notions of usos y costumbres. In groundwater 
in Punata and elsewhere in Cochabamba Valley, this is all relatively recent but is already 
claimed and defended as traditional usos y costumbres.  
 
What becomes apparent in these examples of usos y costumbres in drilled-well systems is the 
growing importance of commoditization and socioeconomic differentiation that is associated 
with implementing these systems. To be part of this kind of systems, a necessary requisite is 
peasant families’ cash investment possibilities. Not all households can afford this investment, 
and therefore they will be directly excluded from the system. A later section will discuss the 
different possibilities and strategies to afford this kind of investments. Next, despite their 
individualistic character, these system’s organizational and mobilization capabilities are still 
very strong, showing unavoidably the collective prerequisite of water management. Many 
examples in Cochabamba and Punata valleys have shown this: people collectively or 
individually using tubewells can and do mobilize jointly to defend their water rights, under the 
slogan of defending their usos y costumbres against the threat of their water being used by 
others, or being licensed to private companies, as was the case of the "water war" in 
Cochabamba (Boelens et al., 2010; Perreault, 2006). 
 
3.3.6 Uses and customs in atajados systems in the community of Rumi Cancha, Aiquile.  
 
Relatively recently, especially after the droughts of the 1980s, thousands of micro-irrigation 
systems using "rainwater harvesting" have been built in arid regions which have little chance 
to implement other technologies for irrigation water supply. These systems, called “atajados”, 
are constructed in particular for individual families. Very few collective systems are currently 
working. Built for individual households, the systems are managed independently of the 
communal organization. While it is not usual to specifically speak of usos y costumbres in 
managing these systems, local norms are certainly important issues. This shows, for example, 
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in developing reservoir construction practices, learning and developing technology to capture 
water and irrigate the family's crops, consolidating the catchment area and the reservoir’s 
structure in itself. 
 
One key aspect defining these water-harvesting systems’ success is managing the catchment 
area. This is precisely the meeting-point between farmers who manage their atajado 
individually, where the community’s role may be crucial. When such systems are implemented, 
they agree to delineate catchment areas and channels that feed the reservoirs. In some cases, 
depending on the catchment area’s characteristics (not only its area but also natural barriers 
that hinder conveyance and water storage) these agreements may be more or less conflictive. 
In other cases, positioning of the atajados constructed may also influence the benefits for those 
who built them. The community supervises all these situations. 
 
Physical control over water is closely linked to the spatial distribution of land, individual or 
collective access to this land, or to internal norms that the community has established for land 
management. Examples of these norms involve defining individual and communal land (plots), 
but also which parts of community land are meant for cultivation or for grazing animals or even 
for water harvesting. This means that access to water in these individual systems, can partly be 
defined by usos y costumbres that have been developed or will be adjusted according to land 
access and land management. An important factor also defining physical water control is the 
investment capacity (in work and eventually in money) that a family has, as well as the 
availability of external funding. 
 
3.3.7 Technological artifacts that re-define usos y costumbres 
 
An interesting case, showing the dynamics in the usos y costumbres in relation to population 
growth, pressure on land, and technological innovation, are the peasant communities in the 
Mishka Mayu river basin. In this place, technological adaptation from surface to sprinkler 
irrigation has developed and has direct implications for the expression of usos y costumbres, 
reason for which this case is mentioned here as an illustration. 
 
The Mishka Mayu river basin is a neighboring basin to the upper part of Pucara river basin, 
where Punata is located. Communities have a long tradition of intensive potato growing, using 
irrigation on very steep slopes.  Their water source use, canal construction and water-
distribution practices date back to the hacienda period. Haciendas established a distribution 
system for springs and river water, along the entire basin, defining 24-hour irrigation turns for 
different sectors. After land reform in 1953, land was distributed among hacienda workers, and 
peasant communities or unions were formed. The hacienda’s usos y costumbres were adopted 
by communities, expressed in the form of irrigation turns for user groups located along main 
canals. Each user had a 24-hour opportunity to use and, over five decades since the reform, 
new families were gradually incorporated into the community. Unlike the other cases studied 
in this thesis, in Mishka Mayu the only prerequisite to be part of the community and hence to 
get water rights in one of the systems was to form a new family and meet the age requirement 
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(21 or 23 years). This continually redistributes water (rights) among former families, and new 
families when they inherit land. 
 
In the early 1990s, promoted by an NGO but then taken up by the peasants, sprinkler irrigation 
was introduced and then massively used by communities in the whole river basin. Currently, 
almost 100% of the farmers use this technology, taking advantage of the pressure generated by 
their steep slopes. Delgadillo (2003a) and Rodríguez (2003) explain the technological 
adaptation process in detail, showing water distribution practices and ingenious adaptations 
and modifications of sprinkler devices and accessories, with very common materials found in 
any local shop in Cochabamba. The case shows how peasants introduced and adapted artifacts 
to generate their own technology, reduce erosive effects of irrigation on steep slopes, and 
reduce stress and irrigation problems at night, while shortening irrigation turns and thus the 
irrigation interval for each user. Besides, the artifacts and adjustments in irrigation practices 
and water distribution clarified and gave new expression to usos y costumbres, under increasing 
pressure on water, due to communities’ population growth. What were once 24-hour successive 
irrigation turns along channels have now become 12-hour turns per user, applying water during 
the daytime (not during the night), with a maximum of three sprinklers without secondary 
nozzles18. 
 
Picture 3-2 Sprinkler irrigation in Mishka Mayu community 
Picture: J. Jimenez 
 
3.3.8 Summarizing the different expressions of usos y costumbres 
 
In Bolivia, usos y costumbres prevail in everyday water management and particularly in 
peasant irrigation. Before the irrigation law was enacted, official norms, formalized laws or 
other written regulations had been absent or did not pertain to irrigators’ rules and knowledge 
systems. As demonstrated, usos y costumbres have value and meaning only in practice, and 
between those people and organizations that have built that set of rules, regulations and 
                                                 
18 Technological adaptation of sprinkler irrigation included removing one nozzle from sprinklers to increase the 
discharge and reduce their pressure requirements and also reduce irrigation time. By removing or enlarging the 
nozzle, they increase the discharge and also the drop size, increasing the risk of soil erosion. To avoid this, Mishka 
Mayu peasants adapted a piece of wire in front of the secondary nozzle to intercept and distribute the waterjet in 
smaller drops, improving the sprinkling effect. 
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agreements. They are also dynamic and variable in space and time. That is, usos y costumbres 
regulate social relations in specific space-time contexts (Boelens, 2015; Rocha et al., 2015, 
2016; Seemann, 2014, 2016). 
 
The usos y costumbres tend to reflect different values about water as such, but also about water 
as an element integrating different actors. Thus, in some cases, usos y costumbres will privilege 
water’s value for peasant families’ food production. In other cases, they represent ancestral or 
historical claims, while other expressions make it possible to claim identity and territoriality. 
They may also represent the effort, collective work or monetary investment; and in some cases, 
they embody "water source ownership" by those who practice such customs. The examples 
illustrated in the previous sections show the contents of usos y costumbres in their material, 
socio-cultural, political and economic dimensions.  
 
In addition to the above, we must also emphasize the "permeable" character and flexibility of 
usos y costumbres, which are continually being recreated and readjusted to the physical 
conditions, to new agreements between their creators and even to third parties. They also 
interleave with territorial dimensions and notions of ownership, and sometimes are mediated 
by technology. These limits are not absolute but constitute flexible and strategic water control 
institutions. 
 
The various examples and illustrations described in this section also show how prevalent 
customs are in Bolivia, as the foremost way to regulate access to and control over natural 
resources including water, especially in rural areas. The state’s absence, indefinitely postponed 
water legislation, and especially the volatility of the "state" concept for rural communities, have 
all reinforced local institutional construction (Seemann, 2014). Thus, usos y costumbres, 
beyond just a range of normative and rules governing access and use of water, have become a 
key tool to achieve autonomy for peasant communities in terms of physical, social and political 
control over their resources. This control is not managed by external agents through “external 
rules” but rather is a part of a set of rules, norms, practices and agreements under codes and 
local peoples’ own language. It frees them from state control, or from other agents. 
 
Finally, these organizational practices, social mobilization, collective work, resource 
investment, control of organized groups' behavior and the defense of group’s interests vis-à-
vis other sectors or groups of society and the state, in turn have transcended the field of natural 
resources. Now they are part of the practice for different marginalized sectors of Bolivian 
society to make different types of demands, or as strategies to reach new spaces of power in 
local spheres and in new government structures.  
 
3.4 Constructing normative frameworks from local practices.  
 
The previous section discussed several examples that demonstrate the validity and prevalence 
of customary rules around water management and water control in peasant irrigation systems. 
This section describes two examples showing the formal implementation of “legal resources” 
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by peasant organizations. The examples show how organizational capacity, demonstrations, 
lobbying and influence from their representatives in government spheres can turn demands by 
farmer organizations into official norms, to influence water control. Some difficulties and 
requirements for practical implementation are discussed at the end of the section. 
 
3.4.1 Illustration1: The law on extracting aggregates 
 
In the valleys of Cochabamba, rivers are the main source for irrigation water. Their marked 
seasonality defines a fairly short irrigation period and therefore they are complementary to 
rainfall. Peasant communities, who use rivers as their only water source, are subject to various 
types of adverse factors: "the capriciousness of rivers" because of their seasonality, their 
unpredictable flows, either as excess or shortage, resulting in increased insecurity and risks to 
crop production, or because of the physical security of the communities themselves. The 
overflow of mountain rivers, with large amounts of material, sand, stones and water, could be 
fatal to surrounding villages or communities if anything affects their course. 
 
A continuous struggle for peasant communities, settled along the rivers, has been the extraction 
of materials such as sand, stone or gravel, often carried out illegally and sometimes legalized 
by concessions granted under the national mining code. This scheme granted rights to extract 
aggregates for construction (sand, stone, gravel). With the rapid growth of cities and peri-urban 
areas, demand for construction aggregates has also grown significantly and this has 
increasingly affected natural watercourses. The rivers of Cochabamba’s upper and lower 
valleys are quintessential deposits of these materials. 
 
One example is in the "Lower Valley” of Cochabamba, communities located between the 
municipalities of Capinota and Parotani. The area developed very intensive agricultural 
activities, thanks to reliable flows from the Tapacarí and Arque rivers. This area produces large 
areas of vegetables very intensively, up to three harvests a year. To achieve these levels of 
intensity and yields, farmers use chemical fertilizers intensively, but also combine with their 
widespread practice of "lameo" which is to irrigate their plots with the first arriving river flow, 
laden with large amounts of lime and clay sediments. This practice replenishes soil nutrients 
and raises and consolidates these plots year after year, as they have literally been "reclaimed 
from the river". Farmers in the region have become experts in "building" soil terraces along the 
river. They annually control river flow, build retaining walls, irrigation canals and other 
drainage and protection works. For this purpose, they form cooperatives to organize work to 
build the necessary infrastructure and to coordinate distribution of the land that has been 
“built”. They invest their own resources, but also negotiate some support from municipalities 
or NGOs, for implementation. 
 
Practicing lameo as land reclamation has been increasingly affected by aggregate extraction 
concessions (mainly fine material such as sand or fine gravel). This activity creates ponds in 
different parts of the river, and changes its path and behavior, which can flood areas that are 
being recovered (new areas), or undermine and collapse protection walls, or even flood 
agricultural areas with established populations. 
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In the Upper Valley, the Jatun Pucara Mayu (Pucara river) is a seasonal river, with less water 
than the Lower Valley. It is located in a steeper zone, and features extraction of coarse material, 
gravel rather than sand. This river overlaps water from the different irrigation systems used in 
Punata Valley, mainly water from the three dam systems, subsurface flow (Pilayaku), basic 
river flow (Mitha) and flood flow (Rol and Riada). Especially water from dams is transported 
through the river for considerable distances, 20 to 40 km. Large discharges are released from 
the reservoirs so the flow arrives as quickly as possible to the irrigation area, to reduce 
conduction losses and prevent water theft along the river course. Aggregate extraction directly 
affects all these systems. In the case of reservoir systems, the ponds dug in the river course to 
quarry gravel cause delays and losses in water transport. Mitha and Rol systems are also 
affected by blocking the specific points where water is diverted, or in critical situations 
changing the river’s flow regime endangers protection works built along the river. 
 
Through their representatives within the Cochabamba Departmental Federation of Irrigators 
(FEDECOR), and with the Federation’s support and mobilization capacity, especially irrigation 
organizations from these two valleys (Punata and Capinota) got the attention of regional and 
national political authorities. After different actions (marches, public protests, lobbying, and 
especially alliances with municipal governments), irrigators got a law enacted to regulate the 
extraction of aggregates from rivers. Law 3425 finally was enacted on June 20, 2006 and its 
regulations in April 2009. This law grants rural communities, irrigation organizations and 
communities around aggregate extraction sites, the possibility to decide over these resources. 
A local regulatory body was established, in which these groups have direct representation with 
voice and vote together with the municipal authority, with full powers to grant or extend 
operating licenses for aggregates extraction, revoke them, and decide about management plans 
for rivers and watersheds. 
 
3.4.2 Illustration  2: Groundwater regulations in Punata 
 
In Punata municipality, irrigators have had longtime internal conflicts over unrestricted 
groundwater extraction. In the 1970s, under special programs by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and the United Nations, the first wells were drilled. Later, since the 1990s, this process has 
accelerated. Data from previous studies (Delgadillo & Lazarte, 2007b; Ríos, 1999) show an 
increase of over 200% in the number of wells drilled in less than 15 years, increasing extracted 
volumes by almost 100%. 
 
In 1998, a new water-users’ organization was formed in Punata, by groundwater-users 
committees (for both irrigation and drinking water). This initiative covered all Punata systems 
plus well systems for irrigation and drinking water throughout the Upper Valley of 
Cochabamba, encompassing approximately five municipalities. This organization, headed by 
Punata systems, pressured the municipality to implement a municipal norm to regulate 
groundwater exploitation, given the lack of any national norm, or norms from their own 
organizations, and because several conflicts had emerged. Confronted with conflicts among 
peasants and especially among irrigators, about a subject that was not regulated in their usos y 
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costumbres, without mechanisms in public institutions to further clarify, regulate or issue a 
legal opinion on this situation, the Deep Wells Association (Asociación de Pozos Profundos) 
had to resort to lobbying Punata Municipal Council members for approval of a municipal 
ordinance, which was approved in April 2005. Three important elements can be identified in 
this ordinance that show the complexity of regulating a “non-visible” resource such as 
groundwater: 
 
First, water users saw this ordinance as a safeguard against possible interference, and therefore 
conflicts, among tube-well systems. Simple, concrete, measurable criteria had to be introduced 
to regulate groundwater extraction. Thus, for northern Punata, where there is greater 
groundwater potential, wells should not be drilled closer than 500 meters and, in the south, at 
distances of 1000 meters, because this is considered a more vulnerable area. While these limits 
are not based on strict hydrogeological criteria, they were proposed as a solution to avoid 
confrontations between water users (not just irrigators). The second important element is this 
municipal norm’s transitional nature. It recognizes the gap in national regulations, stating "... 
until the national government by law, regulates the use of groundwater" (Gobierno Municipal 
de Punata, 2005). The third important element is the role granted to this peasant organization, 
the Deep wells Association, "to approve" drilling activities in Punata municipality. 
 
An interesting part of this story are the opportunities that water user organizations deploy and 
combine from different institutional repertoires, either from state structure or their own 
institutions, to reassert water control. Additionally, this could be interpreted as a concrete 
measure to counter Hardin’s assumption regarding the "tragedy of the commons". Enforcement 
of this norm is mediated by different mechanisms. On the one hand, the organization of well 
users found no national or other official regulations to help them sustain their own practices; 
they were obliged by circumstances to look outside their scope, to the municipal level, to create 
the necessary regulation (“legal shopping”, Benda-Beckmann et al., 1998). However, this norm 
requires specific control mechanisms by municipality, toward communities and toward private 
drilling companies, to enforce the norm. Moreover, there are no mechanisms or coercive 
sanctions, or the technical capacity or staff to play this monitoring role. Enforcement of this 
rule seems to elude municipal control; rather, this role was returned to communities and 
organizations, so they are in charge of "social control" to enforce this norm.  
 
This norm may be strictly enforced or not. In many cases Punata irrigators already know this 
local regulation and have begun to use it, although with some "flexibility”. In many cases, this 
was succesful; in others it encountered severe restrictions. The Deep Wells Association has no 
resources (technical, financial, administrative) to regulate well-drilling. Thus, over the last 
decade, about 100 new wells have been drilled (Mayta, 2012). Moreover, paradoxically, 
according to testimony by some irrigators in Punata, the Municipality has started breaching its 
own ordinance: during elections, as part of their political campaigns, or recently, as part of 
national programs such as "Mi Agua" or "Mi Riego", municipal authorities have helped 
communities drill new wells, regardless of technical criteria and their own ordinance. 
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Almost ten years after enactment of the municipal ordinance, the groundwater situation in 
Punata is becoming critical, because of water table depletion and growing conflicts between 
water users. During the last years, given the absence of national regulations about groundwater 
use and the relatively new institutional setup under the new Law on autonomies and 
decentralization (Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización “Andrés Ibáñez”), Punata’s 
well organizations and other water users' organizations in Cochabamba have resumed 
mobilizations to exert pressure on local and regional government (“gobernación”) in order to 
discuss a new Departmental Law to regulate groundwater use.  
 
3.4.3 Reflection on regulating and formalizing local practices 
 
Both examples (the national law on aggregates and the municipal ordinance on deep wells) 
show the importance of local organizations and their experiences with certain problems that 
pose risks or threaten communities’ water control as a basis for people to resort to different 
strategies to promote building their own institutions. In these processes, the examples show 
that formalizing local practices or “putting norms on paper” is neither the only nor the most 
important requirement for institutional development. What these examples show is the need to 
consider the multi-dimensionality of the problems that must be solved to support everyday 
water control practice.   
 
Part of the political dimension, institutional development and locally managed rules aim to 
effectively or sometimes symbolically control people’s behavior. In Punata’s groundwater 
case, promoting this protective norm has meant searching for a different domain aside of the 
usos y costumbres, that will enable some preventive measures that cannot be easily 
manipulated. Further, this norm affects both irrigators and urban populations. Therefore, the 
most logical way to tackle the problem seemed to be a municipal ordinance. This meant that 
the rules governing collective resource use were transferred out of the scope of customary 
norms (usos y costumbres) and put under official (formalized) state regulations.  
 
In the organizational domain, to fully implement customary norms and practices through state 
institutions, these institutions should have operational, administrative and technical 
mechanisms to enforce norms. Local organizations were urged to use their own representation 
and social control mechanisms to enforce both norms. However, local organizations lack such 
mechanisms and capabilities, despite their organizational and mobilization strengths. 
 
These two cases show that written rules "normalized" in state structure, though generated from 
people’s practical experiences, "from within", have no guarantee that they will be fully 
implemented. The reason seems to be the historical separation and mutual denial between local 
institutions and state institutions. This has created parallel structures with different logics, 
codes, practices and purposes, leaving large gaps (in both state and customary frameworks) 
when implementing the norms. In these two cases, implementation was taken away from local 
organizations or institutions, into the realm of state bureaucracy with all its weaknesses. 
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In Bolivia, institutionalizing water governance by the state has always proven to be very fragile. 
Local institutions’ recognition and progressive incursion into state institutions is assumed to 
mean an important step forward. However, it is difficult to predict how long it can take to make 
the two frameworks compatible and achieve results. An immediate consequence of 
"institutionalizing" local norms and practices in the state is potentially many procedural and 
public management errors, bureaucracy, corruption, or simply that the rules and public 
management procedures are ignored locally because few understand and apply the rule, or 
because some begin to use "flexible" and sometimes discretionary practices to manage public 
bodies and resources.  
 
Another drawback of explicitly recognizing customary law is the difficulty or impossibility of 
putting it into practice with all its implicit elements (which come from daily practice), because 
local norms tend to focus on very specific, practical problems (and contexts). Therefore, they 
require very detailed regulation of all administrative, legal, financial and technical backups for 
their actual implementation. In Bolivia, these backups or institutional mechanisms to enforce 
formal regulations are being (re) constructed or in many situations they are simply absent, 
resulting in a very unstable, changing institutional situation (see also Del Callejo, 2010; Rocha 
et al., 2016; Seemann, 2014). 
 
3.5 Concluding remarks: Collective action and institutional development of the 
irrigation sector 
 
Peasant agriculture in Bolivia is still the sector that uses most water resources in the country, 
governed by local norms and practices under a changing, incipient state institutional framework 
and grounded in highly dynamic local institutional arrangements. Policy support for the 
agricultural sector, particularly that of peasant irrigated agriculture, has been implemented in 
different periods, from different development models, but with some common features. Some 
of these policies have emphasized the state’s role in the productive sector, others have been 
more liberal, leaving agriculture and irrigation, to the "free play of market forces". 
 
What remains as a result of state and nongovernmental actions is irrigation infrastructure and 
attempts to "re-regulate" the sector. In the institutional realm, on the one hand, water users, 
especially peasant irrigator leaders, have engaged in remarkably occupying power spheres and 
influencing national water institutions. On the other hand, irrigation systems, from below, are 
continuing to reproduce and recreate water-management practices and interactions between 
systems in complex ways, often in conflicting situations. 
 
The new institutional framework, in an ongoing adjustment, poses several challenges and 
questions about its influence to create favorable conditions for greater water security for 
Bolivian peasant farmers. Important challenges and questions are, for example: 
 
•  Issues of equity between irrigators and non-irrigators, because the norm and the process 
of implementation of the new institutional framework appear to favor the irrigation 
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sector; leaving impoverished peasant sectors with limited or no access to water (Crespo, 
2006). Further, there is a lack of institutional mechanisms to improve management, 
distribution and access to state resources (funding, grants, technical assistance). 
•  While the state has favored the water sector by creating water-government agencies, 
mechanisms favoring inter-sectoral water management in river basins or at least 
coordinated action among all levels of government and water use sectors, nonetheless 
are incipient or remain absent.  
•  The drive to involve farmers and irrigators leaders in state agencies and creating supra 
organizations (national federations or associations of water users), seems not to be 
accompanied by mechanisms to ensure full legitimacy to represent peasants in such 
spaces. The same happens with these representatives’ accountability to their 
constituencies. This has resulted in conflicting attempts to establish most of the 
Departmental Irrigation Services (SEDERIs) and, for example, internal conflicts and 
divisions in the Cochabamba Irrigators Federation.  
 
In Bolivia, formalizing practices and norms under the state’s official framework goes beyond 
just their “recognition”; rather, it implies a sense of "recomposing" the image and content of 
the usos y costumbres – even though it is supported by the image (and arguments) that this 
process is grounded in social demands, mobilizations and historical claims about recognition 
of customary norms. At the one hand we see a state that aims to take over control through 
“recognition politics”. At the other, practice often shows the prevalence so far of usos y 
costumbres and local institutional arrangements, without any need for formal recognition.  
 
This chapter has shown the differences between policies and institutions in Bolivia, in 
comparison with other countries in the Andean region. In Bolivia, historically a strong 
organizational culture was built and revived after the 1952 national revolution through labor 
and agricultural unions and later by water-user organizations. Additionally, decentralizing the 
state such as in the 1990s has strengthened these organizations, this time around natural 
resources, particularly water. This has deconstructed the state apparatus, to extend its 
operational arms to lower levels, and in the opposite direction encouraged peasant mobilization 
to form national organizations. Before the MAS government came to power, this has raised a 
new structure for water governance and managing other natural resources, scaling-up peasant 
power and prevailing local forms in resource management and institution formation (Perreault, 
2005, 2006; Roa-García, 2014; Rocha et al., 2016; VRHyR, 2013). 
 
Meanwhile, local irrigation institutions have been built and are continually recreated through 
“uses and customs” including more than only rules, regulations and agreements for access to 
resources: they interrelate organizational practices, administrative arrangements, mobilization 
of resources, election of officers and representatives, etc. (Albo, 2004; Andolina, 2012; 
Hendriks, 2006; Perreault, 2008). In irrigation systems, they may include very specific 
operational aspects, such as water-distribution criteria and practices and system operation. 
These meanings and implications show water control as essentially a part of peasant 
organizations’ “struggles for autonomy” (van der Ploeg, 2008), challenging state institutions 
and norms that seem to create more uncertainty and lack of control over managing their 
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resources and livelihoods. Ongoing development of usos y costumbres also shows the 
importance of "legal shopping" and "institutional bricolage" as core elements in irrigation 
governance -- hence norms, rules, practices and thus institutions, are continuously recomposing 
(Benda-Beckmann, 1981; Benda-Beckmann et al. 1998; Cleaver and de Koning, 2015). They 
regain meaning in local contexts, because the different "localities" give their own meaning to 
the official institutional framework by using several resources: local interpretations and 
application of practices and customs, including also "normalized" rules (see also Boelens, 
2008a, 2015; Long, 2001b; Roth et al., 2005, 2015). 
 
In recent years, "normalizing" usos y costumbres under Evo Morales’ MAS government raises 
several contradictions in Bolivia. The goal of explicit recognition by law was to defend peasant 
irrigators against other use sectors (giving them legal security). Generic recognition of usos y 
costumbres seems to create several problems. One is that this recognition is "attached" to 
technical-administrative instruments (water-rights registration and authorization) yielding 
control to state institutions and local organizations. That issue is currently “in limbo” since 
neither national nor departmental irrigation services have technical facilities, trained and stable 
personnel, or the information to make decisions about it. This meant promoting the irrigation 
law for generic recognition of usos y costumbres and thus of water rights, though specific 
instruments are nonexistent. To a large extent, the current legal framework appears to be 
fictitious, and practice is different. In practice, these rights remained supported by the peasant 
mobilization forces that have prevailed. This shows again that the "usos y costumbres" (rather 
than registrations or authorizations) were and are locally regulating water management in 
practice. Here, an important aspect that determines uncertainty in the irrigation-policy 
institutional framework and, at the same time, the prevalence of customary ruling, is that state 
support (if present at all) is usually intermittent, depending on financial and political 
circumstances, e.g., being restricted to political elections. 
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Chapter 4 . Collective action for water control in peasant irrigation 
systems 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the various forms of organization through which collective action has 
been and is mobilized for accessing, controlling, maintaining and managing water for irrigation 
in the study area. I do so based on the notion of "social cohesion nuclei", defined as symbols 
and bastions of belonging which, in addition to family, historical and ethno-cultural ties, have 
facilitated the formation of peasant organizations for collective action in the Bolivian 
Highlands. These organizations initially mobilized for freedom, land and water. Yet once the 
first two objectives were achieved, accessing and later managing irrigation became one of the 
central social cohesion nuclei for peasants and communities. 
 
Unlike most other Andean regions in Bolivia, communities in the valleys of Cochabamba do 
not come from a specific ethnic group or any particular "lineage". Instead, they are the result 
of complex relocation schemes and migration which started before the Spanish colonization. 
The composition of the communities is influenced by the valley’s geographical location, its 
favorable characteristics for agriculture and its strategic position in terms of trade and transit 
of commodities and agricultural products between highlands and lowlands. Around this valley, 
as Barnes and Torrico Angulo (1971), Dandler (1984), and Lagos (1997) agree, communities 
have historically built social alliances of opposition and resistance against the hacienda regime 
or as a reaction against the state through the formation of social cohesion nuclei that change 
over time. Though initially organized against the hacienda system and for accessing land, in 
recent decades water has become one of the main social cohesion nuclei for rural communities 
and water users organizations and has led to the creation of broader water centred federations 
(see also Perreault 2005, 2006, 2008).  
 
This chapter shows how in first instance community organizations and broader peasant unions 
mobilized around the ‘peasant’ or ‘campesino’ identity for accessing external investments for 
the construction of irrigation infrastructure that would allow for irrigated agriculture. For these 
broader organizations the claims related to accessing water for irrigated agriculture initially 
formed just one of the many demands they struggled for. Once water and infrastructure for 
irrigation materialized the organizations changed under the influence of the intervention 
projects and because of the changing internal dynamics that managing and controlling water 
on a day-to-day basis demands. This resulted in the creation of a large and very diverse array 
of organizational arrangements in and around water control. As is further described in this 
chapter I show that these arrangements are not fixed but that these co-evolve with the changing 
environmental, social, technical and political transformations that take place in the area.  
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These processes of organizational development also challenge conventional discussions about 
participation The academic and professional literature on irrigation and development 
interventions often discusses (and encourages) the need to promote user participation, from the 
initial project idea to design and implementation (Cleaver, 1999; Gow and Vansant, 1983; 
Hendriks, 2002). This paradigm is based on several assumptions which in turn originate from 
different approaches and discussions on participation. Under a more instrumental approach, it 
is assumed that intervention outcomes will be "more appropriate" to local contexts and needs 
and more sustainable over time, inasmuch as local people get involved in the whole process. 
Other approaches view participation more from an empowerment perspective, no longer just a 
means to achieve certain goals but rather as an end, "empowering people to make their own 
activities and development projects" (Parfitt, 2004:539). Yet as I show in this chapter, the local 
populations are often already a participant in struggles for irrigation water before external 
intervention projects come into the area to develop irrigation systems. Therefore it is strange 
that intervention projects actively aim to incorporate ‘them’, ‘the locals’ in projects while in 
fact it is the external intervention projects that temporarily participate, transforming the local 
realities. Therefore in this chapter I discuss irrigation organizations’ development, in a few case 
studies. This analysis shows amongst others the confrontations and conflicts during 
interventions, showing local organizations’ progressive involvement. It shows how water users 
deal with, internalize and transform the ideas of intervention projects to make them fit to their 
own socio-cultural and environmental reality. This sets important question marks around the 
relations between users and their organizations vis-a-vis development and intervention 
projects. It also sets important question marks around notions of collective action and 
participation and how these are understood, lived and translated into water control in irrigation 
systems. 
 
In this chapter’s last section I also show how, through the creation of networks and alliances, 
the water users organizations have been able to up-scale their struggles (see Hoogesteger and 
Verzijl, 2015) and demands for water and for other state’s services. These concentrate not only 
on water access but also and importantly to voice in decision making on matters that concern 
their day-to-day water use practices.  
This chapter’s discussion focuses on answering the following question: 
How do the various forms of collective action in peasant irrigation systems become manifest 
and how do they inter-relate with the different dimensions of water control? 
4.2 Changing demands and organizations: From freedom to access to land, to 
water control 
 
4.2.1 From “haciendas” and “piquerías” to peasant unions and communities 
 
It was fundamentally in and from the Upper Valley of Cochabamba (and particularly from the 
village of Ucureña) where Bolivia’s mid-20th century peasant liberation movement emerged 
and succeeded. Many scholars, such as Barnes and Torrico-Angulo (1971), Dandler (1984), 
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Kohl (1978) and Larson (1988), sustain this idea, elaborating on the success which resulted 
from this first peasant movement union formed long before land reform in the “Valle Alto”. 
These authors also show that the peasant movement was growing simultaneously but with 
varying intensity in other regions of the country, either among hacienda workers (colonos), or 
outside haciendas, around them, promoted by "free" peasants who acquired land before the 
agrarian reform. Dandler (1984) describes how peasantry mobilization and "social 
consciousness" emerged and developed through the encounter among different social sectors 
such as workers, peasants and soldiers during the Chaco War in the early 1930s, and subsequent 
events that ended in the so-called "national revolution" of 1952. The peasant movement’s 
leadership and increased visibility spread from Cochabamba’s valleys to the rest of the country. 
At its base was the organization of communities that were struggling to defend their freedom 
and gain and maintain access to land, water and the means of production that would enable 
peasant communities to be free. This connection was based in part by the need of labourers to 
coordinate and upkeep water distribution within and between haciendas, and with local 
communities with access to water (Zimmerer, 2000).19 The political-economic context was 
given by relationships of exchange (barter), trade and production generated within and outside 
haciendas, especially with people in the main villages (pueblos): haciendas, merchants, 
craftsmen, etc. These included exchanges based on principles of reciprocity, but also 
relationships of dominating and controlling the work force and the surplus generated by 
peasants (Lagos, 1997). Protest against exploitative relationships contributed to the movement 
toward agrarian reform. Influenced by the political situation at that time which favoured 
peasant organizations, many labor movements across the region and the country as well as 
many indigenous rural communities took the form of agricultural unions. This trend also 
predominated in highland areas and other regions where indigenous communities existed 
before the Spanish colonization (Albó, 1987b). After the reform, there was a period of 
readjustment in rural social relations of production. Hacienda workers became peasant owners 
of small plots in the valley, under an individual land ownership regime, but under collective 
water management. 
 
For decades, this shift also meant a gradual construction of the identity of the peasantry, as a 
social-organization structure, and this image was projected to the rest of society. Baud (2010), 
Kohl (1978) and Lagos (1997), among others, mention the search for creation of a new identity 
as a way of breaking with the prevalent image of “indios” (Indians) which had, and still has, a 
strong racist, discriminatory connotation. Farmers’ unions used the peasant or ‘campesino’ 
identity as a symbol in social and political struggles for land and liberation and, simultaneously, 
it was deployed and deepened as the self-image of peasant communities. Its use appealed to 
the sense of cooperation for agricultural work in its different aspects, or to become visible when 
seeking other social vindications from the state. The formal structure and some organizational 
practices have been maintained to the present by peasant unions, even when developing new 
contents and creating new links. Despite all changes, the identity of peasants (campesinos) as 
                                                 
19 Zimmerer (2000) states that in the Cochabamba valleys, during the Spanish colonial period but also before 
and after agrarian reform, water was one of the ordering factors for occupying land and, to some extent, for 
distributing land between communities and haciendas. 
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workers of the land has remained strong. This identity as peasants has also been boosted by 
official sectors during Bolivia’s agrarian transformation, as part of the rhetoric of liberation 
and alleged social equality. Officialdom or revolutionary movements have often used it as a 
political strategy to gain more support from rural areas; by adding an agrarian argument to the 
mobilizations. As part of this, most mobilizations have and still use the slogan: "Land to the 
tiller" (“La tierra para quien la trabaja”). 
 
The country’s peasant-union structure has followed the state’s political and administrative 
division (as counterparts and, simultaneously, counterpowers, to state structures). At the 
national level, there is the Trade Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia 
(CSUTCB). The second level (at the Departmental level) are the Departmental Federations of 
Peasants. Within these, the so-called "Centrales Campesinas” exist, corresponding to the 
provincial level, followed by the "Subcentrales Campesinas" (in what were cantonal 
subdivisions) covering a variable number of agrarian unions or communities, which are the 
lowest organizational unit. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Organizational structure of agricultural unions in Bolivia  
(Source: Prepared by the author) 
 
In Punata and in most western regions of the country, agrarian unions’ presence as an agent 
and instrument of political negotiations is still important, even though their relevance and 
importance in many areas has been overshadowed by other peasant organizations. De Morrée 
(1998) describes the different functions that communal peasant organizations perform, 
highlighting the dynamics within them, resulting in constant readjustment of organizational 
structures, positions and functions, and the creation and coexistence of various types of parallel 
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peasant organizations. In general, these are promoted by new political circumstances, for 
specific community needs or in response to interventions by development projects. 
 
Immediately after land reform, an important function of peasant unions was (officially) 
receiving land endowments to distribute among their affiliates. Other functions were (and still 
are) related to formal representation in dealing with actors and institutions "external" to the 
community; namely other peasant organizations, state institutions or NGOs. Another visible 
feature is to defend their communal land, territories and other resources. Internally, several 
functions have also been defined, in different regions, such as managing their resources (e.g. 
water and forests), organizing communal tasks, such as the building, rehabilitating and 
maintaining roads, schools, health centers, drinking water systems, etc. These tasks are usually 
coordinated with the technical and financial support of local governments or NGOs. 
 
In this process of building what are now rural communities in the Cochabamba valleys and 
more broadly, three complementary elements of identity and cohesion favored strengthening 
of the community organization: land claims, social vindications and recognition (building a 
rural identity) and access to power spheres and government by means of approaching through 
political alliances the central government (Albo, 1987a). This whole process of organizing and 
unifying the region’s peasantry has not been harmonious or conflict-free. Nor has there existed 
homogeneity and equality among peasants. On the contrary, in building their organizations or 
in different vindicatory mobilizations, there have been internal conflicts, reflecting imbalances 
in power relations (Lagos, 1997). 
 
4.2.2 From agrarian unions to “water communities” 
 
Punata Valley offers important illustrations of water-based peasant mobilization and collective 
action. This demonstrates not only its agricultural importance but also the organizational 
capacity to mobilize around water. Organizations and collective action were formed and driven 
by demands, conflicts and vindicatory movements associated with reform. These were 
facilitated and supported by existing ties and relations around collective water management. In 
Punata several irrigation systems and related water distribution arrangements were already 
operated (many in conjunctions between haciendas and free communities) before the land 
reform that started in the early 1950s. 
 
After land reform, in Punata, several peasant irrigation organizations or water committees 
formed transforming the hacienda-based water management arrangements into collectively 
managed systems. In the 1960s new peasant committees were formed around the Laguna 
Robada system and later for the Lluska Khocha dam. Communities from Punata also made the 
first attempts to capture and harness the lagoon waters of Ovejeria Khocha that later would 
become the Totora Khocha system in the late 1980s (Gandarillas et al., 1993) (see Figure 4-7). 
As part of the Inter-Valley Irrigation Project (PRIV) that aimed to implement irrigation projects 
to improve the infrastructure of the existing systems in the valley, in 1993 the water users 
organizations that had managed the Laguna Robada, Lluska Khocha and the new Totora 
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Khocha irrigation system, joined organizationally and created the user based Punata Irrigation 
and Services Association (ARSP). 
 
At the local level, farmers from different Punata communities, particularly in the northern 
valley, organized into small committees to get support from various governmental and non-
governmental organizations to invest in drilling wells to access groundwater for irrigation. 
These systems started in the 1980s with state support and international cooperation to cope 
with severe drought conditions during that decade. Additionally, many farmers invested their 
money to create a new tube-well system. Thereafter groundwater use increased progressively 
in Punata, promoting formation of self-managed systems for irrigation, domestic drinking 
water or combined-use wells (Delgadillo and Lazarte, 2007b). In the late 90s, the groundwater 
dependent committees organized into the “Drilled-wells users' association of the Upper 
Valley” (AUPVA). AUPVA includes almost all Punata irrigation systems, several drinking-
water or combined-use systems and also similar systems in other provinces. In Punata there are 
currently more than 300 systems with well committees.  
 
Some communities in southern Punata, in the peri-urban area, started using wastewater from 
the urban area during emergencies. After the municipality installed a sewage system and 
wastewater treatment plant in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a new organization was formed, 
the "Association of Irrigation with Wastewater", which includes five communities that created 
their rights to use this source (Camacho, 2007). 
 
In the end, Punata Valley’s different water sources are not able to cover water demand, and 
even less, distribute it uniformly for different areas and communities (Saldías et al., 2013). 
Beyond the 65 communities associated with the Totora Khocha dam and organized in the 
ARSP, there are many other communities downstream, south and southwest of Punata. These 
communities have no secure irrigation water, only sporadic flows when large river discharges 
arrive and fill the main river branches. To implement several new projects for the valley, they 
have formed a new organization, the “Association of Communities Without Irrigation" 
(Asociación de Comunidades Sin Riego). This organization continually competes and 
challenges existing organizations; making claims to get the Government's attention and get 
funding for their projects aimed at accessing irrigation. What is crucial to understand is that all 
this organizational development in Punata has resulted in an overlapping of organizations in 
different socio-territorial spaces. These organizations co-exist, compete and complement each 
other in different spaces of representation and political mobilization. Besides the participation 
in their own communities, this research has found that all peasant families living in different 
zones of Punata participate in at least two of these organizations. Families that are "closer to 
the water" may belong to four to seven of these organizations. Participation in these different 
organizations is an important strategy to sustain collective water-control which stands at the 
basis of household strategies for farm reproduction (see next chapter).  
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Figure 4-2. Social organizations for water in Punata  
(Source: Prepared by the author) 
 
Figure 4-2 shows how, over the last three decades, organizational dynamics in Punata regarding 
water, and especially irrigation, have increased. It highlights the progressive development of 
an increasing number of organizational structures in Punata. These different structures overlap, 
compete, negotiate and complement each other in a context of increased organizational 
multiplicity. The following sections analyze specific examples of the organizational forms that 
have developed in this area and through which collective action for water control is mobilized 
in the area. 
 
At present irrigators in Punata argue that the traditional agricultural and peasant unions "have 
lost their strength" due to the increased influence of water centred organizations. However, in 
the northen communites of Punata these organizations are still active and alive, in particular to 
organize water distribution for the Mitha system (basic river flow). Here, within each 
community (peasant union) there is a "committee" to distribute water from different sources 
(especially Mitha and water from reservoirs). As a result, at community meetings, the main 
topic addressed is irrigation. Other topics, such as basic infrastructure, schools, roads, etc. are 
also discussed, but in the background or in passing. That discourages some community 
members without water rights from attending community assemblies. The weakening of 
communities organized as solely agricultural unions coincides and contrasts with the 
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emergence of what we can call "water communities", which have surpassed boundaries, 
geographical, timing and other ties rooted in the peasant organization. Some examples that 
illustrate this are the well systems in Punata and elsewhere in Cochabamba. In these, 20 to 50 
families organize to invest, drill and operate a well system. This organization makes its own 
rules. These small collectives that comprises farmers from various communities are no longer 
linked with their community organizations to guarantee their access to water. Another clear 
example is the peri-urban water committees along all Cochabamba’s valleys (including 
Punata). There, communities or formalized Territorial Grassroots Organizations (OTBs) lost 
functionality, making room for water committees or associations (usually for domestic water-
supply systems). These new organizations now deal with water and other communal tasks. 
They participate in municipal politics to demand resources and have in some way replaced 
OTBs and peasant unions. 
 
In South Punata, in communities that have little or no irrigation water, communal organizations 
(agricultural unions) have still greater "force". This is because they are still the organizational 
basis to claim water whenever available, for instance to control the Rol-system water, sewage 
water, or claims for new (water) projects. Communal organizations, here, are the only hope 
that one day they also can join in water control benefits. This has also been visible in recent 
years, since these communities have begun to take control of Punata’s top-level organization 
(Peasant Sub central), dividing this valley’s peasant sector between irrigators (grouped in their 
own organizations) and communities without irrigation, strengthening union organizations and 
their supra-organizations. A similar situation to southern Punata is occurring in other zones of 
Cochabamba Valley, especially those with little water, such as Aiquile and Sacabamba, where 
paradoxically water issues are the main topics discussed at communal meetings. 
 
4.3 Organizational diversity and development: change and adaptation for water 
control 
 
This section discusses how usos y costumbres are expressed in organizational and operational 
tasks and in collective action at different levels. To illustrate how water control is organized 
and dynamically changes to deal with new socio-political and environmental conditions it 
presents cases from the irrigation systems of Sacabamba, Punata and Rumi Cancha (atajados 
systems). In addition to demonstrating the different water-control tasks, it also identifies key 
elements of collective action and how these are organized and have changed over time. The 
description of the cases and their dynamics shows how changes in technologies and in 
environmental variability, are accompanied by collective action and active participation of 
users in water control related activities and in organizational adaptations as the basis to ensure 
the sustenance and socio-technical sustainability of the irrigation systems. 
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4.3.1 Atajados systems in Aiquile: Land management related to water control 
 
Atajados systems consist of small reservoirs for harvesting rainwater from small catchment 
areas. These are used for either small scale irrigation or as water supply for cattle. Atajados are 
mainly constructed by individual families sometimes with the support of external projects. In 
Atajados systems three operational levels can be identified (see Figure 4-3): micro water 
catchment, including the canals to convey water to the reservoir (atajado); small dams, locally 
also called atajados; and the application zone (household farm fields) (Tammes et al., 2001). 
Decisions on how and when to capture and use water are also made by families. A key aspect 
of water control in these systems is access to catchment areas, which may be owned by the 
family, by other families, or in many cases, a portion of the catchment or the feeding canals to 
the atajados may be under communal control. In these last two situations, these areas may be 
disputed. 
 
In Rumi Cancha, during the atajados project implementation, an organization was created ("the 
laguneros committee"), since not all members of the community would be project 
beneficiaries. To facilitate collaborative work among families the committee led the 
construction phase. Currently, this organization is latent, although it could meet again to 
resolve any dispute or problem between atajado users. However such disputes are usually 
discussed and solved by the communal organization. The committee, and especially the 
communal organization (farmers’ union), played an important role in the negotiations and 
mediation among disputants. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3. Operational and organizational water control in Rumi Cancha Atajados 
systems  
(Source: prepared by the author) 
 
Therefore, the technical and organizational dimensions of water control in practice in atajado 
systems rests primarily on the mobilization of family labor at the individual level. However, to 
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solve problems among irrigators and with non-irrigators the community organization has 
played an important role. It has mediated in the resolution of conflicts. For several years, 
negotiations were facilitated between families, to coordinate the location of catchment channels 
that interfered with each other. In other cases, a more definitive solution was land exchange 
between users or sale of portions of land, so the capture area can be completely controlled by 
each family. The communal organization’s commitment and actions were to raise funds and 
manage new projects to benefit families with no atajados. This case shows an example of 
individual water management and water control under the umbrella of a well-functioning 
communal organization. 
 
4.3.2 The Chiyara Khochi irrigation system, Sacabamba 
 
The case of the Chiyara Khochi irrigation system in Sacabamba, shows an interesting trajectory 
in developing irrigators and rural communities’ organizational capacity. In this area that 
initially had no experience in water management, its organizational capacity revolved around 
the peasant unions, which played a fundamental role and became empowered.  
 
Three main milestones can be identified in the development/adaptation of this water user’s 
organization: The first one was the project’s design and approval, in which peasant’s union 
played a key role; the second was around project’s implementation until the initial system’s 
functioning in which an irrigation association was formed; and the third important milestone 
was the organizational and operational adaptations linked to the new interventions 
implemented in the system for lining main distributaries (north and southern channels). In this 
section, these changes, and the organizational development are discussed in front of the (new) 
technological and environmental conditions present in the area. 
 
Cossio (2004) discusses the role played by the peasant subcentral of Challaq'e in negotiations, 
first with the Central Campesina of Sacabamba and then with the municipality. This highlights 
the pivotal role of farmers' organizations in rural municipalities’ decision-making, which may 
define communities’ fate, according to their leaders’ capacity and the "organizations’ strength" 
in these negotiations. As quoted by the same author, leadership by a representative of the 
Subcentral Challaq'e in the peasant Central (the region’s parent organization) facilitated the 
creation of an alliance with an NGO (CIPCA) that was working on irrigation projects in the 
area. Their collective strategies of political pressure facilitated the approval by the Sacabamba 
municipal council to support the project. 
 
These negotiations also defined which communities would be project "beneficiaries", 
excluding at least two communities that then expressed their interest in also being part of the 
project. As described in Chapter 1, four of the five user communities in the Chiyara Khochi 
system belong to the Challaq'e Subcentral and one to the Sacabamba Subcentral. The latter 
was included in the Project, partly because the Mayor had land in that community and could 
influence final selection of beneficiaries, since the municipal council is the entity that channels 
public funds or cooperation to finance such projects (Cossio, 2004).  
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The limited possibilities of developing irrigation in the area, because of the scarcity of water 
resources, environmental constraints due to soil fragility and climatic constraints (frost), and 
the size of the population to be benefited (about 150 families), initially raised doubts about the 
feasibility of implementing irrigation projects in the area.  
 
At this stage, one of the key elements for project approval was the political conditions 
prevailing at that moment of history in which administrative decentralization process started in 
Bolivia through the implementation of “Law of popular participation” since 1994. In 
Sacabamba as in most of other rural municipalities, local governments were gradually 
controlled by grassroots organizations (peasant unions). So, it was the best scenario for 
Challaqe and Sacabamba subcentrals to put their demands in first order in the municipal 
agenda. 
 
After project approval and because of the high amount of investment and relatively small target 
population, the Challaqe subcentral, with CIPCA and the municipality, adopted a key strategy 
to make financing and project implementation viable. This strategy divided the project’s 
various components as if they were separate projects, negotiating each component with 
different funders. 
 
The irrigation organization started along with the implementation of the irrigation project in 
Sacabamba (in 1994), initially as "the project steering committee", under the control of the 
peasant union organization. Once the successive stages of the project were concluded, in 1999 
it adopted the form of the Challaque Irrigation and Agricultural Services Association 
(ARSAC). This was the first irrigation organization in the area, and as in many other places in 
Bolivia, they adopted the structure of an agrarian union, although it was conceived as a parallel 
autonomous organization from peasant unions. The highest authority of the ARSAC consists 
of a general assembly of members, then a board in principle comprising a president, vice 
president, and four secretaries (operation and maintenance, recording minutes, finance, and 
conflicts).  
 
Operationally, when the system started running, two canaleros (channels keepers) were 
included to assist in distributing water in the north and south channels; and an accountant-
secretary for the administrative affairs (Vega and Iriarte, 2003). 
 
Finally, the last organizational adaptation was crucial to reconcile the demands of water and 
irrigation practices in accordance with environmental and socioeconomic conditions. Vega and 
Iriarte (2003) identified three operational levels, although the first level, corresponding to the 
catchment area, can be differentiated into two: the water storage (dam) and the main water 
intake (diversion dam) from which water is captured and chanelled to the distribution system. 
The other level corresponds to the irrigated area (distribution between head-system, northern 
and southern sectors, see Figure 1-6) and finally irrigation blocks within communities. Water 
is used through “largadas” (reservoir water releases) defined as a total time in which all users 
have irrigation water according to their water rights. During a largada the dam is closed every 
night because irrigation is done only during the daytime. This is possible due to the relatively 
 98 
 
short distance between the reservoir and the irrigation area, so that not much water conduction 
time is needed. 
 
Organizationally, the Chiyara Khochi system has a relatively simple structure, with two levels 
directly related to collective system management and one as individual users. The first level 
corresponds to the irrigators' association as a whole (ARSAC), then irrigation groups within 
the three sectors (header, north and south channels). These groups were organized some years 
after the system’s initial operation, basically to support the work of canaleros (canal keepers) 
at fixed points, where water is distributed to groups of families. Individual users are directly 
served by canaleros. 
 
As discussed by Cossio (2004), ARSAC began with a structure similar to a union organization 
(sindicato), but after some years of functioning some positions in the organization were 
cancelled because they were not functional at all. This was the case of the operation and 
maintenance secretary and the accounting secretary. Subsequently, new positions were created 
to meet operational requirements. These were the positions of a “vocal mayor” (major assistant) 
and five "vocaleros" or representatives of each community. Two commissions were also started 
(one per channel), with representatives from the five communities, to support the overloaded 
canaleros’ work. 
 
Figure 4-4. Operational and organizational water control levels in Chiyara Khochi 
system  
(Source: Prepared by the author) 
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The studies conducted by Vega and Iriarte (2003), Cossio (2004) and Chila and Delgadillo 
(2010) and the field work of this study, show that the system is in continuous process of 
management adjustments.  
 
In addition to the organizational levels directly involved in management (as depicted in Figure 
4.4.), trade unions (peasant unions and peasant sub-central) retain a fundamental role in the 
area, especially in the political arena. These organizations have directly influenced the system’s 
creation but also indirectly through the municipal government. Cossio (2004) describes how 
these organizations’ peasant leaders and representatives influence the municipality to include 
a community as project beneficiary. Currently, these organizations’ role is important. While 
not directly involved in water management, they demonstrate their presence and interest in 
consolidating existing water rights. Possible compensation for injustices or inequities, through 
direct negotiations with the municipality, and new projects for communities not currently 
benefited, are aims they seek to accomplish. In turn, this is connected with these organizations’ 
growing interest and control over the local government, which they view as an opportunity to 
access and negotiate greater benefits for their communities.  
 
Trial and error in the Chiyara Khochi system. The materialization of physical and 
organizational water control 
Today the Chiyara Khochi system is composed by various user communities and an irrigators’ 
organization that have to coordinate to manage the irrigation system which depends on a dam. 
The Chiyara Khochi irrigation system is relatively young in its experience and operation. Being 
a new system, it is still in the experimental stage, making adjustments in water management 
and therefore in developing water-control practices.  
 
In order to demonstrate the close link between organizational requirements and adaptations and 
current irrigation practices, the main characteristics of the system are summarized as follows: 
 
• System’s water source is located relatively close to the main intake and to the upper part 
of the irrigation area (less than 1 km), with no irrigation communities along the route, or 
at the reservoir’s basin, so there is no direct interaction with other water systems and 
organizations.  
 
• Soils in the irrigated area are highly susceptible to erosion because of their texture, 
structure, reduced plant cover, steep slopes and shallow depths. This condition imposes 
that field irrigation should be performed with small discharges, long irrigation times, only 
during day time and with large labor requirements (two or more family members). 
 
These conditions have progressively marked the way the system is operated and all the 
organizational adaptations.  
 
The system runs by water releases (largadas) from the dam, lasting 4 to 5 days. Water 
allocation is performed by different water flows simultaneously leading to different sectors 
(header, north and south) and among them to different irrigation blocks. Each user receives a 
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flow of 5 l/s for 8 hours, this amount being referred to as an "irrigation share". The irrigation 
system operates only in the daytime, hence the dam’s gate must be closed late every afternoon. 
A year can have only 10 to 12 water releases (largadas), scheduled from June to December 
(Vega and Iriarte, 2003). 
 
The flows that are handled in the plot do not exceed 5 l/s, therefore the application times are 
long. This form of application matches the sandy soil types that could not stand larger flows 
and consequently defines the requirements for water distribution and operating and organizing 
the entire system. The result is a high operational intensity (technical and organizational 
dimensions of water control) at all levels: starting from the daily opening and closing of the 
dam during a water release (largada) and also for water-distribution tasks such as dividing 
flows and delivery to each user. This, in turn, requires high organizational accompaniment by 
the Irrigation Association. For instance, leaders have experimented with organizing irrigation 
groups or including community commissions to help canaleros with water distribution, since 
this task is beyond the canaleros’ current capacities. 
 
At the plot level as well, irrigation practice may be intensive, despite the small discharges 
applied to the fields. At least two, but sometimes three or even four family members, participate 
during field irrigation. It is not an exclusively male task but usually the couple and children 
participate in irrigating family plots. 
 
This Chiyara Khochi system case shows the tension between the physical elements of water 
control (expressed as the need to apply low flow rates for long times during day times only at 
the plot level) and the organizational elements. Physical-technical requirements generated very 
high organizational requirements (daily opening and closing of dam gates, dividing water into 
two or three main flows, subdividing flows for groups and to individual users) which were 
implemented through successive organizational adaptations.  
 
Finally, in an effort to improve the system’s infrastructure since 2010, ARSAC and communal 
organizations (peasant unions) started new rounds of negotiations and actions to get new 
projects for their communities and families. Through the current support from state programs 
on water (MI AGUA and MI RIEGO programs), they executed new canal-lining projects in 
southern and northern canals and some of the distributaries as well as projects to build 
secondary regulation  systems through individual reservoirs (atajados). 
 
4.3.3 The Punata Irrigation Systems 
The case of Punata is the most emblematic in terms of development and empowerment of local 
organizations. This empowerment began after the land reform, when several communities 
assumed the management of dam systems by "committees" organized by themselves. Later, 
starting in the 1960s, various irrigation “improvement projects” (construction of irrigation 
infrastructure) were implemented. Some were directly demanded by the irrigation committees 
to the central government (Ministry of Agriculture) at that moment. These projects, and 
especially the experience from the “Inter- Valleys Irrigation Project” (PRIV), unveiled Punata 
communities’ organizational and self-management capacity. 
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Gandarillas et al. (1993) recount in great detail the experience of the Punata Inter-Valley 
Irrigation Project (PRIV). This experience has been a very important contribution to 
understanding irrigation in Bolivia and the Andes, by exposing or uncovering what previous 
engineering approaches had treated as a "black box". Among the aspects that stand out is the 
clash between technocratic approaches adopted at the start of interventions versus peasant 
organizational and irrigation practices. Gradually, mutual learning has developed new 
capabilities in organizations, as a result of ongoing negotiations, conflicts and confrontations 
with new experiences, resulting from interaction between different groups of irrigators and the 
project’s technical staff. Within this, the main issue has proven to be the process of defining 
“water rights”, their different forms of creation, expressions, content and operational 
implications. This definition mainly applies to subsequent irrigation infrastructure re-designs 
and construction and water distribution in practice, all immersed in what Coward (1990), 
Gerbrandy and Hoogendam (1998) and Boelens and Vos (2014) call “creating hydraulic 
property” (see summary in Box 4.1). 
 
Table 4-1 summarizes some important milestones in irrigation interventions and the different 
organizational adjustments and strategies employed by Punata’s irrigators. Some interventions 
by the state, development agencies or irrigation organizations, pursued strategies initially based 
on social mobilization. These mobilizations were demands and protests against projects that 
violated water rights, hampered organizational and irrigation practices, or in other cases limited 
the flexibility required to handle the infrastructure to manage several systems simultaneously. 
The undeniable presence of large numbers of peasants when providing labor input, building 
and reaffirming their water rights during the works, was also important. 
 
Table 4-1. Main irrigation interventions and organizational adaptations and strategies 
Year Description of 
interventions 
Organizational 
development/adaptation 
Collective strategies during 
interventions 
1952 Land reform Agrarian unions formed Social alliances with labor unions 
and other social sectors 
1968-
1970 
Construction of Llusk’a 
Khocha dam 
10 Communities organized 
around a new water source 
Collective work for creating new 
water rights 
1982-
1988 
Improvement (expansion) 
of Laguna Robada and 
Llusk’a Khocha dams 
(Punata Project phase I) 
Autonomous irrigation 
committees structured for each 
reservoir system 
Mobilization, Organization and 
execution of collective work  
1989-
1991 
Execution of Totora 
Khocha project 
(Construction of the dam, 
and main channels (Punata 
Project  phase II) 
Punata Irrigation and Services 
Association conformed (ARSP) 
Collective work, Mobilization 
(demonstrations of “social force”), 
Protests against water rights 
definition and main infrastructure’s 
design) 
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1992-
1994 
Operation and maintenance 
and support to on farm 
irrigation  
Internal adjustments to ARSP’s 
operational structure 
Collective work,  
Organizational adaptations (internal 
tensions in the ARSP) 
1994
-
1997 
Projects’ turnover to ARSP 
 
 
 
 
Self management of dams 
systems 
Crisis within ARSP: unbalance 
in power relations among the 
three dam systems 
 
New restructuring of ARSP: 
Council of Committees 
conformed  
- Organizational adaptation: 
Laguna Robada and Llusk’a 
Khocha committees threatened to 
quit ARSP 
- Lluska Khocha and Laguna 
Robada transformed themselves 
into new Associations 
- Rotation of ARSP’s leading 
positions by committees 
1997-
2004 
Negotiations and execution 
of new projects by ARSP: 
Mora Mora and Warmi 
Waqana Projects 
 
New projects of drilling 
wells  
 
 
 
 
New tube wells committees and 
tube wells association formed 
 
 
Demands and new projects 
negotiations with regional and 
national authorities, lobbying 
2004-
2006 
Improvement of tertiary 
channels (“Project Punata”, 
implemented in various 
phases) 
Association of “Communities 
without irrigation” formed 
Demands,  
Project management,  
Political alliances with regional 
government 
2007-
2010 
Design of Vandiola Project 
(expansion of Totora 
Khocha system) 
Vandiola steering committee in 
Punata formed. Tensions 
between Punata and Tiraque to 
negotiate new distribution of 
water shares. 
Demands, mobilization and 
protests. Conflicts and negotiations 
of agreements (with Tiraque and 
Koari , Irrigators federation - 
FRIA) 
Aliances with other irrigation 
organizations 
2010 - Irrigation projects under 
MI AGUA and MI RIEGO 
Programs  
New tube wells systems formed 
and lining of secondary/tertiary 
channels 
Demands to municipal and regional 
government (lobbying) 
Elaboration of project profiles 
Source: Prepared by the author 
 
 
The Punata Irrigation and Services Association (ARSP) was formed to support the 
management of all Punata dam systems (Laguna Robada, Lluska Khocha and Totora Khocha) 
although during the early years, its tasks were mainly (only) focused to support Totora 
Khocha’s operation. 
 
Initially, the ARSP was formed under a typical corporate structure, plus traits of the union 
structure predominant in the Cochabamba valleys (see figure 4-5). The directorate (directorio) 
had a president, vice president, and various technical and administrative functions or portfolios. 
The highest decision-making level was the General Assembly of Members, although this was 
not in the original design. Additionally, an intermediate function between the assembly and the 
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directorate was occupied by representatives of each community in what was called a Junta 
Directiva (board of directors). After a few years of operation, now without the Project’s 
intervention, the organization took its own form after an internal crisis in 1997. 
 
Figure 4-5. The initial organization structure of the ARSP 
(Source: Prepared by the author based on Montaño, 1995) 
 
The Laguna Robada and Llusk’a Khocha irrigation committees that existed years before 
ARSP’s birth, threatened to retreat from that organization and to set up their own associations, 
because they neither received the benefits to which they were entitled by belonging to ARSP, 
nor occupied the expected position on the decision making and power structure within that 
organization. Some examples of the conflicts or the complaints of these organizations were 
about the difficulties to receive actual support (transportation or other facilities) from ARSP 
for inspections or the operation of the dams, but also because in successive elections of the 
ARSP’s directorate, main positions were always chosen to Totora Khocha’s leaders and not to 
people from the other two systems. 
 
At the beginning of this organizational crisis, the irrigation committees changed their names, 
also becoming associations of irrigators for each dam. That is to say, at one point there were 
two "associations" that were part of the ARSP. Then, after long rounds of negotiations, they 
implemented the following settings as depicted in figure 4-6: 
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Figure 4-6 Current organizational structure of ARSP 
(Source: Prepared by the author based on Ampuero, 2007 and Saldías, 2009) 
 
1. Some functions within the Directorate structure disappeared, because of their reduced, 
unclear or not functional tasks. 
2. The general assembly is recognized as the highest decision-making body, although at 
the beginning it was not clear how this body might work because of the number of 
affiliates (more than 3000). Ultimately, the Assembly is an important representation 
mechanism for raising demands from both communities and individual users to the 
Association’s board, and also as a mechanism of accountability to the communities for 
actions by the ARSP Directorate. In this case, it was agreed that the assembly has one 
representative out of each ten community members. Each community is responsible for 
exercising this right. 
3. The Board of Directors, consisting of representatives from all user communities plus 
the ARSP officers, was replaced by a "Council of Committees." This was because of 
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the apparent duplication or confusion of roles between the assembly and the board of 
directors and the very limited participation of committees from Laguna Robada and 
Llusk’a Khocha in making ARSP decisions. The board, created from the ARSP’s start, 
was one of the first adjustments proposed by farmers, as a social control instrument, to 
"monitor" leaders’ work. Its role was crucial, especially at the ARSP formation stage, 
seen as a new way of organizing and uniting farmers and other peasant organizations. 
Being responsible for managing systems that were being intervened was an important 
role, too, which later became less crucial. Currently, the Council of Committees 
comprises representatives of the three irrigation dams’ committees, which was an 
important step to balance the benefits and obligations they owe to the association, as 
well as to achieve equity among ARPS member organizations and to balance power in 
decision making. 
 
This shows that the organizational model influenced (or promoted) by the project was not 
consistent with the irrigators’ organizational logic. They sought equal support for all three 
committees, besides balancing these organizations’ status, with none subordinate to another, 
all having the same rank: A question of image, hierarchy and equity. 
 
It is interesting to see, in this case, that irrigation organizations in Punata (Laguna Robada and 
Llusk'a Khocha Committees), used the model or icon of an “irrigation association” as promoted 
also by the project as a “stronger” organization. So, they changed the status of their own 
organization from a committee to an association, as a strategy to improve their political position 
and try to balance power relations within ARSP. 
 
After completing the main interventions in Punata and transferring management to users, the 
latter started searching for government and international donor support to implement more 
projects, to improve their systems or to build new ones. Some strategies also involved political 
alliances with the Cochabamba regional government (at that time, the Prefecture), to meet their 
demands. Between 2004 and 2007, several projects improved channels, with funds from the 
prefecture and directly managed by the ARSP as the “executing entity”. Riding electoral 
situations or other political confrontations in the country and the region, irrigators in Punata 
and the Cochabamba Upper Valley were continuously demanding even more ambitious and 
expensive projects. These included the Yungas de Vandiola project, to cover the Totora Khocha 
system water deficit. This project especially reveals the management and negotiation skills 
developed by the Tiraque and Punata associations. These associations are directly related to 
other organizations in the basin, to the central government, the provincial government and even 
international donors’ representatives. Other examples are the Kewiña Khocha project, or the 
Lope Mendoza project, to transfer and regulate flow from other basins to irrigate different areas 
of the Upper Valley. In all these cases, project approval, design and implementation go through 
many negotiation stages and cycles. The first stage is negotiations between potential users and 
then between different, mainly peasant organizations, claiming territorial rights over water in 
the watershed.  
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Later, negotiations with the central government and international cooperation, to channel the 
required funding. Further, negotiations, pressuring and lobbying the regional government 
through peasant representatives in the departmental legislative assembly or direct negotiation 
with departmental authorities for project approval. 
Box 4-1. Synthesis of the experience gained while implementing the Programme and Inter-Valley Irrigation 
Project (Prav and PRIV) in Punata*.  
In 1977, Prav (Highland and Valleys Irrigation Program) started, based on an agreement between the Governments of 
Bolivia and Germany. In the Valleys, it included building dams in Tiraque, to irrigate Punata and Tiraque. 
The project started with an ambitious plan to integrate all the river basin’s sources into a single system, with the following 
objectives: 
• Reduce migration to urban centers 
• Promote food security 
• Raise peasants’ standard of living 
• Create new jobs 
• Increase agricultural production and productivity (Source: PRIV final report, 1996). 
Timeline: 
• In 1978, reconstruction of the Laguna Robada dam 
• Construction of the Koari dam 
• Since 1982, construction of Lluska Khocha / Muyu Laguna Loma dams and expanding Laguna Robada 
• From 1985 Khocha Totora design, starting construction in 1988 
• In 1988, a specific project began (called Proyecto MAYOR) to provide technical assistance in agriculture and field 
irrigation 
• In 1990 main works were completed. Khocha Totora started operating in 1991. 
• In 1990, and due to gradual restructuring of the Ministry of Agriculture and its relationship with German cooperation, 
the PRIV (Inter Valley Irrigation Project) began, to complete all works from previous phases and "... prepare and support 
system operation and maintenance by users organized into water-user associations. Through its extension service, the 
project seeks to improve the economic and productive use of irrigation ..." (Gandarillas et al. 1993: 22). 
• The program concluded in 1994, with final transfer of infrastructure and management to users. 
 
Major disagreements, re-encounters and reversals along interventions 
• Difficulties with the works design. Farmers "did not allow engineers to work." 
• Several works in the irrigation area had to be re-designed and rebuilt as being inappropriate to socio-territorial 
demarcations or constituting obstacles to current practices: breaking communal boundaries and avoiding “traditional 
irrigation practices” such as “lameo” (land recovery near river banks). 
• Long conflicts and negotiations between projected water users and the supposed "water owners" (Punata and Tiraque). 
• Repeated failures in agricultural extension services (new crops) and technical assistance in farm irrigation: The 
engineers believed that peasants did not know how to irrigate and farmers thought that engineers did know. After some 
time, both changed their minds. 
• A first project turning point was to “promote” their activities more, organize more meetings, newsletters, media, new 
communication strategies. The results appear to be the same. 
• A new project turn-around: try to listen and understand what was happening in the field. 
• The final stage was changing the engineers’ role, from “development promoters” to "companions of peasant projects”. 
Finding organizations’ progressive empowerment. 
 
Some lessons learned from this experience: 
• The highly responsive capabilities of farmers to address problems, redefinitions or decisions to be made in designing 
and implementing works. 
• The need to first understand their practices and the context in which they take place before implementing extension 
programs or technical assistance. 
• The need for flexibility in project implementation time. 
• Engineers need to be prepared for understanding “farmers co-design”. 
• Despite being an eminently infrastructural engineering project, its dynamics showed that, in this case, it was 
more important to define water rights’ many dimensions: practical or concrete but also symbolic and political. 
------- 
* This experience is discussed in detail in the PRIV 1992 publication: "God gives water – What do projects 
do?" (Gandarillas et al. 1993). 
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4.3.4 Organizational requirements for operational/technical water control in reservoir 
systems in Punata  
 
Reservoir systems in Punata are operated through water releases (largadas) from the dams. 
These largadas last from one to two weeks depending on the source, until all users with water 
rights to these sources have been served according to their corresponding "shares" (water 
rights). The three dams (Laguna Robada, Llusk’a Khocha and Totora Khocha) deliver 
relatively large discharges to individual users (between 80 and 200 l/s). As explained in Section 
1.4, the main irrigation principle from these sources is applying large discharges in a short time 
(a few minutes up to 30 minutes) also referred to as "wild flooding” (Bos and Nugteren, 1990). 
The logic behind the practice and interplay between the different operational and organizational 
levels can be explained as follows: 
 
Water releases (largadas) from the dams should be for the shortest possible number of days. 
This is because of the water losses due to the distance to convey water through the river from 
the reservoirs to the irrigation zone (25-40 km) and also because of the agricultural settlements 
along the entire route. The only way to reduce losses is to send large flows from the dams. In 
the irrigation area, it would be possible to divide "more manageable" flows, however this would 
extend the run time by a ratio inversely proportional to the decrease in the flow rate or the 
increase in the number of people who irrigate simultaneously with reduced flow. This means 
that besides the control along the river, control and surveillance in the irrigation zone would 
also have to be increased proportionally. 
 
In this case, water control is expressed organizationally in different ways: Organizing groups 
of "tomeros" (intake keepers) is a way in which users make sure there is no water theft along 
the entire route from the source to the irrigation area. Crucial also is maintenance work at the 
community and system level, as in the case of Totora Khocha, where the community organizes 
brigades that monitor the inter-basin conveyance channel. They also monitor the irrigation area 
through community groups that irrigate simultaneously, in addition to organizing turns within 
each community. At the family domain, this also involves organizing work, determining who 
is watching the water’s path and who is managing water on the plot.  
 
Socioeconomic and political dimensions are expressed by the original agreements and ongoing 
negotiations between irrigation committees of Tiraque (on the upper part where the reservoirs 
are located) and Punata, and the agreements, negotiations or conflicts with populations along 
the river. 
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Figure 4-7. Punata's reservoir systems and inter-basin water transfers  
(Source: Prepared by the author based on Delgadillo and Durán, 2012) 
Internally as well, there are mechanisms used to define largada water release dates, the water-
sharing agreements, and fines or charges for selling the remaining water flows at the end of the 
largadas (called "tails"20). In the technical dimension, there are activities starting with opening 
dam gates, operation of the main intake in the river, flow division and driving water through 
the correct channels to deliver water to each user to apply on their plot. 
 
The reciprocal relationship between the levels of individual and collective water control in the 
Punata reservoir systems is evident. Thus, simply by changing (sub-dividing) the delivery flow, 
the necessary operating levels in the system (distribution points) are also increased. This also 
has direct organizational implications for the irrigation system and for organizing family labor. 
All these management and organization practices mean that large discharges are delivered for 
short periods to each user. An important water control factor has proven to be soil 
characteristics. Water users prefer whenever possible deeper soils with high water-storage 
                                                 
20 The dams operate by discontinuous flow or largada water releases and not as continuous flow. Due to the 
distance between the reservoir and the irrigation area, some hours before the end of an irrigation turn, the dam 
gate is closed and the residual flow of water is used to complete irrigation for the last communities in turn. 
However, most often, after finishing an irrigation turn, a reduced flow remains in the river for some hours. This 
flow of water is called the "water tail" (cola de agua) and is sold by each committee as a turn according to a 
certain order of request made from irrigators. The directors of each irrigation committee define how and when to 
start selling those turns. The funds generated are to operate the irrigation committee itself. 
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capacity – this way, irrigators in Punata try to “store” their water share in the soil, which has 
direct technical, organizational and normative consequences. This practice also partly explains 
why crops are produced with relatively long irrigation intervals (Del Callejo and Vásquez, 
2007). Considering the different water control dimensions and levels also helps understand the 
results of irrigation practices in terms water-use efficiencies. At the plot level, irrigation 
efficiencies are relatively high (70-80%) (Delgadillo, 2003b; Romero, 1998). They are 
accompanied by water and soil management practices that farmers have developed over years 
of experimentation to optimize water use (Delgadillo, 2003b). 
 
Different management and water control capabilities are seen at the level of irrigation systems. 
For example, the dams of Laguna Roboda and Lluska Khocha show different reservoir 
management practices, water conveyance, and water distribution and response to their systems' 
physical and socio-territorial conditions. The committee of Laguna Robada has demonstrated 
high organizational capacity for negotiating with communities upstream. Therefore, this results 
in reliable, relatively stable operations over the years, making it well-recognized and valued as 
a system in the Punata valley. Lluska Khocha, by contrast, has undergone a gradual "decay" 
for several years, resulting in greater water-access insecurity in terms of frequency and flow. 
This is due to the increased pressure from communities around the dam, the physical condition 
of the reservoir’s water feeding channel, in addition to losses along the river. In both cases, a 
decrease in overall conveyance efficiency is observed, being much more critical in the case of 
Lluska Khocha (with efficiencies as low as 20%). 
 
Figure 4-8 shows a trend to increase flow rates at the dam gates and decrease the flow that 
reaches the main intake in Punata. This shows “water losses” along the path, which in fact 
reflect irrigation systems’ increased vulnerability to territorial claims by communities upstream 
and water theft along the water course, especially in the Lluska Khocha system and, to a lesser 
degree, in Laguna Robada.  
 
Figure 4-8. Variation of discharges between the dam and main intake for Laguna 
Robada and Llusk’a Khocha systems in Punata  
(Source: prepared by the author based on Del Callejo and Vasquez, 2007) 
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This provides insights into the systems’ capabilities to cope with these insecurity factors, and 
indicates that technical measures/tasks at the damsite works are not sufficient to deal with the 
area’s broader, prevailing organizational and sociopolitical conditions.  
 
Totora Khocha in the Punata System  
 
The Totora Khocha surface water irrigation system is a reservoir system that is fed mainly by 
water transfers from other basins (called “sistema de aducción”). Once in the basin, water must 
be transported along the river for nearly 30 Km before entering the distribution system in the 
irrigation area where 65 communities make use of its waters for irrigation. The system has six 
operational levels and up to four organizational levels. The organization that manages the 
irrigation system is the Totora Khocha Committee, which is part of the Irrigation Association 
of Punata (ARSP). For Totora Khocha, all these levels require an impressive capacity to 
mobilize people. Unlike other systems that can be managed through their representatives or 
specific operators, this requires the participation of grassroots users at practically all levels. 
 
The inter-basin water transfer level and conveyance to the irrigation area are the most 
demanding because of the distance and the settlements along the water courses that demand 
constant monitoring during reservoir operation. First are the so-called "emergency brigades" 
that must remain at the basins and their conveyance channels 24 hours a day, every day, for 
four months. This is organized by the Totora Khocha irrigation committee and supported by 
the Irrigation Association, calling on communities to cover 24-hour oversight turns for that 
purpose. To convey water from the reservoir to the irrigation service area, it takes the same 
form, nominating "tomeros" (water intake keepers) at key points of the river. This shows they 
can monitor during irrigation period and prevent water theft by the communities living along 
the route. 
 
When water reaches the irrigation area, it is divided into eight streams (nowadays nine branches 
are being tested) distributed into "irrigation groups" of communities that can be served by one 
of the main channels. Division within the group is controlled by sequential turns, following 
communities (within each group, one community irrigates at a time) according to individual 
water rights expressed in time (the sum of the shares of families with water rights).  
 
Inside the community, each appoints a “water judge” who handles water distribution to each 
individual user according to their "shares” (water rights). In this work, it is up to every single 
family to convey and monitor the water flow from the delivery point to its plot. 
 
Throughout this long journey of water from the river, all these organizational levels and 
operational tasks are being adjusted over time. These adjustments have been implemented to 
try to control "insecurity factors”. Physical/technical water control, is therefore mutually 
interrelated to the organizational, socioeconomic, and political dimensions of water control. 
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4.3.5 Tube well systems in Punata 
 
Well systems, by contrast to dam systems, are located near each irrigation area. These systems 
include family groups from one or more communities. The average number of users is 40 
families. Each well operates independently and has no link with the Irrigation Association 
(ARSP), though some of them are organized in the "Tube-well users’ association” (AUPVA). 
These systems are very simple in operational and organizational terms, with only two 
operational and two organizational levels: well operation, and transport from there to apply 
water at each irrigation plot by individual users. For well operation, a “motorista” (pump 
operator) is appointed from the group of irrigators. An individual user requests the motorista 
to include her/his name on the list, according to a predefined order. The motorista is in charge 
of switching the pump on and off at the beginning and end of the turn or when the system has 
agreed on a daily stopping time. Water users go to the well or to a specific point where water 
is and convey the flow to her/his plot. These systems represent a relatively “secure” source of 
water, although there are clear indications of interference between wells and over-extraction of 
groundwater in Punata. An insecurity factor of underground water also involves other sources 
in Punata, because groundwater recharge is related to dam operation and water runoff during 
the rainy season. This seems to be a key incentive for well users to also continue working for 
Totora Khocha system management. 
4.4 Creation of supra-organizations:  Scaling-up collective action and 
empowerment 
 
The three cases in this study show collective action through different organizational forms, but 
all basically have taken a union structure. Under these distinct forms, social organizations play 
different roles, with different priorities and under a variety of strategies, in which water has 
proven to be a key element. The cases of Rumi Cancha, around the “atajado systems” and 
Chiyara Khochi in Sacabamba, show transition in water organizations’ experience and 
development. In these locations, experience is gradually being built on agrarian unions’ 
organizational strength. For Punata, organizational development around water has exceeded 
organizational limits by single communities or peasant unions, and also the territorial limits in 
which these organizations were developed, inextricably overlapping hydrosocial territories and 
networks (Rocha et al., 2015). This section will discuss the creation of water supra-
organizations as a very important strategy for water control and the quest for autonomy, 
implemented by Punata organizations. 
 
As mentioned above, Punata irrigation systems depend almost entirely on sources outside user 
communities’ territory. Moreover, successive interventions in river basins to rehabilitate and 
construct irrigation infrastructure have reinforced collective water rights. This made visible the 
agreements between communities located at the water sources and downstream user 
communities or organizations. These agreements are, however, not static, and have been 
marked by intense negotiations and conflicts between organizations. 
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A first example of these conflicts, negotiations and organizational strategies is implemented in 
the Totora Khocha inter-basin water transfer system (sistema de aducción) in upper Tiraque 
(See Figure 4-7). Koari communities traditionally used the water basins (referred to by the 
project as basins A, B and C). After a long process of negotiation (Montaño, 1997), these 
communities agreed to convey water in the rainy season (November to March) to Totora 
Khocha, while they would use the water and the built infrastructure the rest of the year. As part 
of this negotiation process and in order to assert their rights, Koari communities formed in 1992 
the Koari Irrigation Sub-Association (SARK). This however was inserted as one of the 
(subordinate) irrigation organizations within the Irrigation Association and Services of Tiraque 
(ARST). Koari communities decided to form a new association, independent of ARST, because 
of problems in operating the inter-basin transfer channel (overflows, land erosion), the growing 
demand for water in Koari communities, and the limited benefit of belonging and being 
subordinate. In 1998 they obtained legal status as the Koari Irrigation and Services Association 
(ARSK). 
 
This strategy was implemented by Koari irrigators to achieve autonomy and management 
decision-making capacity, and avoid being subservient to ARST. It was also a symbolic 
response to show the same level of "hierarchy" as the Tiraque and Punata associations, which 
were “taking their water outside their jurisdiction” (Del Callejo et al., 2012). 
 
Later, as a result of efforts by Tiraque and Punata irrigation associations (ARST and ARSP, 
respectively), to improve or expand irrigation systems, there was a new reaction by 
communities in the upper Tiraque. Conflict began regarding design of the Yungas de Vandiola 
Project. This project proposes a transfer from more distant river waters to cover a current deficit 
in Totora Khocha storage, benefiting Punata and Tiraque communities. Water would pass 
through the upper Tiraque communities and complement the water transferred from basins A, 
B and C. Given this, the upper communities, led in part by the Koari Association (ARSK), 
formed the Cochabamba Irrigation Federation of Indigenous Farmers (FRIA). This 
organization seeks to bring together several irrigation organizations (associations), mainly in 
Tiraque. This strategy leveled power relations between irrigators from around the valley and 
made current “small” or “weak” organizations more visible vis-à-vis “strong” organizations 
such as the Punata and Tiraque Associations (ARSP and ARST). At one point, they even tried 
to reach the same level of importance as the Cochabamba Federation of Irrigators (FEDECOR), 
since they did not feel clearly represented or assisted in their demands. The stronger actions 
that demonstrated the upper communities’ new positioning through the FRIA took place during 
the negotiations to enable completion of final design studies for the Vandiola project and for 
new projects to improve water transfer from catchments A, B and C. This new positioning 
motivated organizations like ARSP to consider joining the new federation (FRIA), in order to 
have a say in decisions made from within this "supra-organization," especially those that might 
affect their own interests. 
 
Again, as part of collective strategies, organizations dealing with water have used different 
organizational resources, not limiting their actions to their own organization, but expanding 
their coverage and scope to higher spheres. For the organizations in upper Tiraque, creating a 
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"supra-organization" was an important strategy to reaffirm and make their "territorial rights" 
for water visible to outsiders. In the case of the ARSP, trying to associate with the new 
federation would enhance this new organization’s legitimacy and effectiveness as an additional 
resource to also strengthen their control over water sources, reinforcing their traditional 
agreements with Tiraque organizations. 
 
4.5 Social mobilization 
 
There are countless manifestations of mobilization capacity or "social force" (Eggink and 
Ubels, 1984) that peasant organizations utilize or are developing to manage their resources. 
These also defend them in dealing with “external parties” (state, transnational or national 
private companies, or other water-use sectors) or to make their demands visible to generally 
put pressure on local, regional or national government authorities (Hoogesteger 2013a). This 
section analyzes examples showing irrigation organizations’ mobilization capacity. In day-to-
day water management activities, this mobilization capacity is expressed in a wide variety of 
actions, such as in the work of operating and maintaining infrastructure, or at annual meetings 
of members to elect new leaders or to make important decisions for the organization. However, 
this mobilization ability can also be expressed beyond these management activities. The cases 
of Chiyara Khochi and particularly in Punata illustrate the different situations in which this 
strategy is exercised, beyond the irrigation system’s area and projecting the socio-political and 
normative dimensions of water control as part of social or class demands. 
 
The first examples that came to light in the case of Punata organizations were during project 
implementation between the 70s and 90s (see Gandarillas et al. 1993). At critical moments, 
such as when defining the Totora Khocha system’s area of influence, seemingly disorganized 
or nonexistent communities downstream from the area of influence were the first to mobilize 
and protest at being excluded from the project. During the works, concrete demonstrations by 
these same groups of peasants included protests, mobilizations and threats to blow up the intake 
works if the design did not change. This is because the infrastructure in the river kept water 
from passing on to Punata’s southern communities, mainly to those who would not benefit 
from the project (Gandarillas et al. 1993). Due to the great number of project beneficiaries (at 
that moment around 52 communities) numbering more than 3000 irrigators, these protests 
could be “neutralized" by those who did benefit from the water. Another reason was that many 
peasant families from the excluded communities were related to “beneficiary communities” 
through family or ritual ties, which gave them some hope of water access in the future. This 
was a clear example of a confrontation of powers: those chosen as beneficiaries and those that 
were not. The first group exceeded the second not only in number but also in other 
organizational capabilities, in economic power and in capabilities of relationships with 
government and political spheres. 
 
Other examples of forceful demonstrations, and more successful outcomes, were the marches 
staged by Punata well users. Initially there were complaints to the electricity company in 
Punata, but then, once the Upper Valley Tube-Well Users’ Association (AUPVA) was 
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organized, another large contingent of irrigators joined from other parts of Cochabamba valley. 
This time, promoted by the Cochabamba Federation of Irrigators (FEDECOR), and after taking 
over the electricity company’s buildings in different provinces, and occupying the central office 
in Cochabamba, irrigators were able to get electricity rates reduced for all community 
groundwater systems. They could demonstrate that communal irrigation, and even drinking-
water systems, were being charged commercial or industrial rates. Although since 2004 the 
electricity rates have been reduced, this remains a sensitive issue to watch for the irrigation 
organizations (Perreault, 2008). 
 
To some extent, the Punata irrigation organizations’ mobilization capacity, especially the 
ARSP, can also be seen in their demonstrations and subsequent political alliances with the 
Cochabamba regional government from 2004 to 2007. Irrigators used this mobilization strategy 
to gain support for implementing various irrigation projects in the Punata jurisdiction. In 
"retribution", for several months irrigators provided political support for the regional governor 
(at that time called Prefecto) when he was facing criticisms and complaints from other sectors 
of society and mainly from the central government. However, in 2007 this alliance faced a 
crisis because of political struggles between the central government and Cochabamba’s 
regional government. Punata irrigators then had to divide their support: first attending 
concentrations convened by the Prefecture but then attending the Cochabamba Irrigators’ 
Federation demonstration against the Prefect. The result of these demonstrations, joined by 
other sectors of farmers, coca producers and workers related to the central government was the 
Prefect’s resignation, after a recall referendum. 
 
The first examples show the mobilization capacity to resolve internal problems or tangible 
issues or in response to interventions that will alter conditions or internal balance in the 
intervened areas. These last examples show that, rather than being static or with restricted 
functions, local organizations have developed broader capacities that encompass political 
negotiations and that demonstrate they are immersed in organizational and political networks 
far beyond their own communities or their irrigation systems. This in turn, requires extensive 
knowledge about and involvement in the local, regional and national institutional and political 
context, the state and the market. Increasingly, peasants "walk in different worlds": those of 
their own institutions, the world of the bureaucracy of the state, and even in international 
spheres. 
4.6 The co-evolution of endogenous water development processes 
 
This chapter has presented how grassroots organizations have stood at the basis of the 
development and later management of the irrigation systems in the case study area. As shown 
most irrigation systems have their origins in either local collective action for the construction 
and operation of small irrigation works and/or the demands that peasant unions made for the 
development of irrigation infrastructure in the area. Many such intervention programmes came 
with their own sets of demands and guidelines in terms of organizational structures; most of 
which promoted the creation of water users’ organizations that were separate from the unions 
and other local organizations. The cases of Punata and Chiyara Khochi in Sacabamba illustrate 
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the organizational structure adaptations and the different reasons that led to the specific 
structures that are there at present. In Punata, political-organizational elements internally 
prevailed to balance the benefits and control over decision-making in a larger organization such 
as the ARSP. This reorganization also affected the dam operating-system aspects. For 
Sacabamba, on the contrary, the reorganization was motivated by operational requirements, 
because the organization initially created by the project did not meet these requirements, and 
it also left out the local organizational forms. In any event, although the two organizations 
followed different paths and also made particular adjustments, in both cases we see the 
importance, validity and progressive strengthening of the organizational capacities that were 
gradually generated under the form of water-user associations. These organizations have to a 
large extent displaced the peasant unions in the water control domain. 
 
This development of peasant organizations and their (growing) capabilities to manage and 
negotiate their projects also show the elements that go into negotiating and interacting during 
and beyond interventions. This, as suggested by Long (2001a), "…factors that originate 
externally are then mediated, and often substantially transformed by cognitive and 
organizational structures ... and so come to form part of the resources and constraints of these 
social strategies that are developed" (Long 2001a:45, 46). The cases also show that 
interventions do not take place separate from the local population. These are often the initiators 
of the projects through the advancement of their demands, the creation of networks and the 
negotiation of projets once these are implemented. As stated by Long and van der Ploeg (1989), 
interventions do not take place within a linear cycle; they take place within ongoing cycles of 
new interventions that overlap and are partly born, internalized, reformulated and readapted as 
part of peasants’ own projects. This constitutes rather a "confrontation or interpretation of 
different worlds of life and socio-political experiences, which can be significant to generate 
new forms of social practices and ideology ...” (Long and van der Ploeg 1989: 230). Thereby, 
the examples reported in this section show that the actual outcomes of these interventions are 
the result of the interactions between and among the different communities of the area and the 
intervening agencies. A combination of different strategies in the organizational, political and 
technical domains is essential in redefining “water control systems”: their different components 
and levels. In the valley, the cases show organizational empowerment, resulting in a gradual 
change where organizations began to manage their own projects. Water control is therefore not 
only about participation / involvement or project management, but also about managerial power 
and controlling its various components. Skills which the users have developed based on their 
own endogenous development strategies which are shaped by their own initiatives and their 
interaction with external interventions.  
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Chapter 5 . Water control and spheres of production / reproduction on 
peasant farms  
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the peasant farm or the "chacra campesina", the importance of 
farmer-driven water control and its inter-relationships with key factors influencing the 
irrigator’s household reproduction. To analyze these inter-relationships a specific research 
question was addressed: 
 
How do different peasant families’ farming strategies relate to water control and control 
over production? 
 
Discussion starts by identifying some strategies used by families to access and control water, 
then other agroproductive and livelihood strategies linked to the market and to reproducing 
farming are analyzed. The discussion reveals interactions among and within market and non-
market spheres, as well as the relationships between collective and individual (family) 
domains, all mediated by local institutional arrangements and cultural repertories. 
 
Given the heterogeneity and diversity of peasant production, this chapter’s central topics will 
be illustrated using case study findings at the household level, in the three areas of study 
described in Chapter 1 and analyzed in the collective domain in Chapter 4. Again, rather than 
seeking a comparative analysis, this chapter illustrates the diversity of peasant agriculture, as a 
result of local (endogenous) development processes. This agriculture is based on family / 
collective strategies that seek to control certain physical, organizational and socio-economic 
production conditions. Therefore, this chapter intends to develop a comprehensive approach to 
understand complex cultural-institutional and socioeconomic processes involving irrigated 
agriculture. 
 
For this purpose, after briefly describing and contextualizing the cases studied, strategies for 
accessing water are a key starting point to implement different peasant farming systems. Next, 
we discuss some productive strategies regarding water control and control over production. 
Finally, an analysis of peasant production units’ organization of labor will explain 
manifestations of heterogeneity and different farming styles and local agricultural development 
patterns. 
5. 1 The cases studied 
 
Three to four cases were selected in each area studied (three in Punata, four in the Chiyara 
Khochi irrigation system in Sacabamba, and four in Rumi Cancha community). The following 
table summarizes the most important physical characteristics differentiating these three areas 
and directly influencing peasant-farming characteristics: 
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Table 5-1. General characteristics of the area studied  
 Case study 
Physical 
Characteristics 
 
Rumi Cancha 
 
Punata 
Sacabamba 
(Chiyara Khochi 
system) 
Altitude (meters) 2200 2720 3000-3200 
Annual rainfall (mm) 
 
Rainy season (80-
85% of total rainfall) 
549 
 
December-February 
389 
 
December-March 
701 
 
December-March 
Temperatures 
(ºC) 
19 14.7 11.4 
Soils Loamy clay, moderate 
deep 
Silty loam, loamy 
clay, moderate deep to 
deep 
Sandy loamy, silty 
loamy 
Shallow 
Sources of irrigation 
water 
Atajados (small 
individual-family 
reservoirs), 
galerías filtrantes 
River flow 
3 Reservoirs 
Tube wells 
Challaq’e reservoir 
Main cropping 
patterns Maize, beans peanuts 
(rainfed) 
Onions, tomatoes, 
potatoes (irrigated) 
Maize, alfalfa, broad 
beans, carrots, onions, 
potatoes, flowers 
depending on the 
available water 
Wheat, barley, oats 
(rainfed) 
Potatoes, broad beans, 
small areas of 
vegetables (irrigated) 
Average land tenure 
(Ha) 
3.3 1-1.3 1.8 
Source: Prepared by the author 
 
After a short description of the studied areas, 7 out of the 11 cases studied are summarized in 
the next paragraphs as the most illustrative for the purpose of this chapter.  
5.1.1 Agriculture in Punata 
 
Agriculture in this valley has a long history and diversification. One of the most important 
crops in Punata has been (and still is) maize, with a great number of varieties. Some are eaten 
roasted, others to make flour, others are eaten fresh (cob), others are cooked dry (mote), or used 
to make “chicha” (an alcoholic beverage). Along with corn production, people have developed 
different experiences and vocations with different crops such as vegetables, legumes and fruits. 
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Progressive control of different water sources has enabled agricultural intensification in the 
area. This intensification21 however, has not resulted in a homogeneous pattern of crops and 
agricultural practices, but rather in a variety of production systems. As shown in the north, 
given the soil conditions and the availability of regulated water (two or three reservoirs and 
wells), intensive horticultural production systems tend to predominate. Going southward, water 
availability decreases (only one reservoir and occasionally water from a seasonal river) and 
thus cropping intensity is lower. In these areas, more extensive production systems will 
predominate, based mainly on producing alfalfa and maize (see Del Callejo, 1999; Del Callejo 
and Vásquez, 2007; Rocha and Mayta, 2007). This intensification has been accompanied by 
cycles of either specialization or diversification in different areas: some mainly flowers, others 
with vegetables, sometimes with fruits or other crops and different varieties of maize or forage 
for milk production (Del Callejo, 1999).  
 
Besides these characteristics of agricultural production, in Punata, like in other areas in 
Cochabamba’s valleys, migration (to Argentina, the United States, or in the last decade to 
Spain) has been a very common livelihood strategy for more than four decades. Searching for 
better opportunities to get an income, given the great uncertainty in Andean agriculture due to 
small land-holding, droughts and market prices, migration has been important to livelihoods, 
in terms of income, and also as part of social mobility, access to services and information, 
possibilities to save money to invest in agriculture, and also to send remittances home to family. 
Intricate social networks at both origin and destination back these strategies, which in many 
cases enable peasant migrants to broaden their farming systems at their destinations (Benencia 
and Geymonat, 2005; Dandler and Medeiros, 1985; Vargas, 1997). 
 
For the Punata area, this chapter studies three illustrative cases: the Ubaldo family, the Montes 
family and the Soto family.22 They are introduced below. The first family grows vegetables 
intensively, the second produces corn and milk semi-intensively, and the third is a “semi-
rainfed” milk producer. 
 
The Ubaldo family has six members: the parents (ages 66 and 61) and four children (two 
daughters, 30 and 28, and two sons, 25 and 23). Currently the two daughters are abroad, the 
elder in Argentina and the younger one in Spain. The two sons studied and graduated in 
Cochabamba and occasionally come home over the weekends to help their parents. 
 
 
                                                 
21This document assumes the criteria defined by Rocha and Mayta (2007) to differentiate degrees of land-use 
intensity. Intensive systems are those in which a family produces three or more harvests a year; semi-intensive at 
least two crops a year; semi-rainfed is only one harvest and may use complementary irrigation. Later, we discuss 
intensification as linked with increased use of inputs. 
22In this document, the names of the families who cooperated with this research are fictitious, to protect their 
privacy, and because the description or interpretation of their activities, practices, decisions or the rationale behind 
them are illustrations of reality: manifestations of the broader understandings by families of  the complexity of 
the socio-cultural, economic, and kinship relations in which family members are involved. 
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Figure 5-1. Spatial distribution of production zones and the studied cases in Punata  
(Source: Rocha and Mayta, 2007) 
The couple inherited land and water rights from their parents, who had worked on different 
haciendas, although Mr. Ubaldo’s father also had plots in an area of "piquería" - areas under 
individual ownership by "free peasants", without any obligation to the haciendas. Initially, they 
had 0.7 hectare of land, and also worked in “compañía” (share-cropping) or through other land-
leasing. Gradually they were able to buy more land and they currently have 2.5 hectares. As 
for access to water, when they married they had, by inheritance, water from the Lluska Khocha 
and Mitha systems. Mr. Ubaldo also worked to secure water rights in Lluska Khocha and later 
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in Totora Khocha. About twelve years ago, they invested to obtain shares in tube wells. 
Currently, they have water rights to two dams, the Mitha system and three wells around their 
community. Moreover, in recent years they gained access to Laguna Robada by “anticrético”, 
which is a type of contract to access a good (in this case, water) by lending a sum of money 
that, upon completing the agreement or contract, is returned by the owner to the contractor 
(anticresista). 
 
The Montes family lives in the community of Tambillo Centro, close to the boundary between 
northern and southern Punata. Currently the family consists of the couple and their 
granddaughter, as their six children migrated to Argentina. Mr. Montes is 68 years old, Mrs. 
Montes 57 and their granddaughter is 16. The family concentrates its activities on agriculture, 
animal husbandry and a specific task which Mr. Montes performs some years, as operator of 
one of the community’s wells. 
 
Mrs. Montes comes from a neighboring community and in her youth she sold alfalfa at the 
Punata market. Mr. Montes began working in agriculture from an early age, as his father was 
a peasant leader who was traveling continuously. After agrarian reform, hacienda lands were 
distributed among the farmers living there, although landowners also kept some plots, which 
later reverted and were distributed among the ex-colonos’ children. Thus, when Mr. Montes 
was still young, he had access to a small plot. In his youth, he also participated in constructing 
the Laguna Robada dam and thus acquired water rights. Mr. Montes reports that when he was 
married he had children, and water, but had such small land area that they could not survive. 
For this reason, he had to migrate to Argentina. They saved some money to purchase more land 
in their community. 
 
After nearly 20 years of successive migrations for different-length stays in Argentina, he saved 
sufficient money, bought more land in the community and also invested in collective well 
drilling, along with other local families. Currently, the family has 1.4 hectares, mostly acquired 
by purchase. They also have a plot in Tiraque (upper basin) where they work by share-cropping 
with “compadres” or acquaintances in the area. The family has communal water from two 
wells, Laguna Robada, Totora Khocha, and river water (Mitha and Rol). 
 
The Soto family currently consists of three members: the couple, both age 58 and a son 15 
years old. Seven children (four daughters and three sons) have migrated to Argentina and 
Spain. The family’s main activity is dairy farming, growing maize and alfalfa for feed.  
 
The couple is from the same community, and both inherited land from their parents, and Mr. 
Soto also received about half a hectare after land reform (called the "youth provision"). In total, 
they have approximately 3.8 hectares, 40% purchased and the rest inheritance and the 
provision. They make their milk into fresh cheese (locally called “quesillo”), which they sell 
to merchants who collect it locally. Sometimes Mrs. Soto sells quesillo directly on the market, 
sometimes also with cooked corn (mote) and her own family did not migrate anywhere. Mr. 
Soto has also worked as a bricklayer in nearby communities and he is primarily in charge of 
working their land and feeding cows. Because they live in a community far away from the main 
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water intake of Punata, they receive water only from Totora Khocha and sometimes river water 
(Rol). About a decade ago, they invested in a "share” of water in a well system and a couple of 
years ago in a second well. This additional water complements their water supply for their main 
crops, especially alfalfa. 
 
5.1.2 Agriculture in Rumi Cancha community, Aiquile. 
 
Livelihoods in Rumi Cancha community are based on various activities: agriculture, livestock 
raising, trade, transport and migration. Agricultural activities consist mainly of rainfed 
cropping of corn, beans, and peanuts and small areas of irrigated crops such as onions, tomatoes 
and occasionally potatoes. Irrigated agriculture develops as small oases around water sources, 
such as atajados or infiltration galleries, which capture very small subsurface flows. 
 
Agricultural activity is complemented by raising animals, mainly cattle, sheep and goats. These 
cattle are fed with the "challa" (the leftover cornstalks and leaves, used as fodder), stover and 
other crop residues and by grazing and browsing shrubs in the surrounding hills. Since rainfall 
is concentrated mainly in the three summer months, agricultural activities in community areas 
without irrigation last no more than 6 months a year. In the other months, people migrate to 
Chapare region (tropical areas), where they settled on colonization land.23 There, they grow 
crops such as fruits and coca. In recent years, the frequency and timing of migration to this 
region has been changing, depending on the availability of water for irrigation in the 
community. Irrigated areas in the region have specialized in onion production. This vocation 
dates back a long time in this region, especially in the province of Mizque (adjacent to Aiquile), 
and has even led to an onion variety called “mizqueña" widespread in the valleys of 
Cochabamba. 
 
          
Pictures 5-1. Contrasting landscapes in Rumi Cancha. The oasis effect of atajado systems 
Photo: W. Caceres 
 
Two of the four studied cases are described below as the most illustrative of this area. 
                                                 
23 Between the 70s and the 90, as part of a social and agricultural development policy, there was a process of 
directed migration (colonization) from various regions of the country to the tropical region in Cochabamba. In 
many cases, communal organizations from those regions were replicated almost entirely in the tropics.  
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The Lima family are peasants from the same community of Rumi Cancha, with five members: 
the couple (Mr. Lima, age 36, and Mrs. Lima, 32) and three small children (12-year-old son 
and two girls, ages 8 and 5). The family has an area of 1.25 hectares divided into four plots 
with rainfed crops, which they purchased. They now also have an atajado, enabling them to 
irrigate approximately a quarter hectare. This family, like most in their community, has a plot 
of land in Chapare, and they constantly travel there to "keep their right" to their plot. According 
to Mr. Lima, their greatest revenue comes from coca production, which allows them to have a 
relatively steady income every three months. In Rumi Cancha community, they produce corn, 
peanuts and small areas of irrigated crops, rotating potatoes, onions and tomatoes. They also 
raise cattle (10 head) and sheep (30). 
 
The Roldán family has five members: Mr. Roldán (58) comes from the same community and 
Mrs. Roldán (54) from a neighboring community. Currently they live in Rumi Cancha with 
three of their children (a son, age 26, and two daughters, 24 and 22). They have another 
daughter who is already married and lives elsewhere. Mr. Roldán says that not long ago all 
agriculture in the area was rainfed, producing only maize, peanuts and occasionally potatoes. 
Since 1985, the first atajados were built in the area and they started producing other crops, 
such as onions and then tomatoes, garlic and "mishka" potatoes (early sowing of potatoes under 
irrigation). This family has had two periods of substantial changes in their livelihoods. Before 
1985, they lived on corn and peanuts combined with some livestock and cultivating coca in 
Chapare. After 1985, they reduced migration periods to 4-5 months and since 2001, after the 
second atajado was built, this migration was further reduced. Mr. Roldan explains that, by 
diversifying their production, they do not have much time to travel. They leave only 
sporadically to keep their land in the Chapare region. An important part of the farming system 
is also raising animals, having around 6 cattle and 200 sheep. 
 
5.1.3 Agriculture in Sacabamba 
 
As mentioned in the overview of this case (see Chapter 1), the Sacabamba irrigation area is 
located at 3000 to 3200 meters above sea level, with rains concentrated from December to 
March. These two factors have conditioned this area for a long time, to rainfed agriculture 
based on wheat, maize and potatoes. Since 2001, the Chiyara Khochi irrigation system 
(Challaq'e dam) was launched, and agriculture in the area has been changing gradually, 
currently producing irrigated crops such as potatoes (mishka), onions, beans and occasionally 
complementary irrigation of maize and small fruit areas. 
 
Agricultural activity is combined with raising animals: cattle, sheep, transport animals 
(donkeys, horses, mules) and other small animals. The importance of cattle is increasingly 
widespread in the region, as draft animals to till the land, and some families are experimenting 
with raising a few cows to produce milk. Each family also raises sheep in significant numbers, 
although in recent years this has decreased because of labor intensity in irrigated crops and 
reduced grazing, both resulting from agricultural intensification. Sheep raising is still important 
to provide guano (manure). The illustrative cases were selected for this zone because they offer 
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contrasts in terms of water and land availability (one case with reduced water availability and 
the other with greater availability). 
 
The Juvenal family has of 10 members: the couple, both age 49, and eight children. The eldest 
daughter (26) no longer lives with them but works in Cochabamba. The rest of the children live 
with their parents, four daughters, ages 23, 18, 12 and 11, and three sons of 22, 20 and 6. This 
family inherited all their land from their parents, a total of four hectares of rainfed land and two 
hectares of land that can be irrigated. When the Chiyara Khochi system started implementation, 
Mr. Juvenal contributed his work to acquire water rights. They now have one "irrigation share” 
equivalent to 12 hours at a flow rate of 5 l/s every turn (water release or largada). This family, 
like many others in the area, grows rainfed wheat and potatoes, complemented with sheep 
raising and temporary migration. Currently the family is changing its production strategy to 
plant “mishka” potato (early sowing), but without specializing only in that crop. They maintain 
significant areas of wheat, maize and recently they are experimenting with small areas of 
vegetables and fruits. 
 
The Gamez family also has 10 members: the couple, both aged 51 years, and eight children. 
The three older daughters live away from home with their own families. Three sons stay at 
home (26, 18 and 12 years) and two daughters (22 and 8). All the family land was inherited 
from their parents.  Currently they have half a hectare of rainfed land and approximately two 
hectares that could be irrigated. During Chiyara Khochi system implementation, both spouses 
worked and each acquired one “irrigation share”. That means they have two 12-hour irrigation 
turns each water release (largada) with about 5 l/s flow rate. This family has its team of oxen, 
a donkey and chickens, and a decreasing number of sheep, now no more than 10. Previously 
they considered themselves potato and wheat growers. Currently, they are more concentrated 
on the mishka potatoes, reducing their wheat area and diversifying with maize, beans and small 
plots of vegetables and fruit, especially peaches. 
 
Below are some details of the families studied. Table 5-2. highlights the small areas of land 
under irrigation available to families (between 0.13 and 2.4 ha). Family size averages seven 
members, but due to each family’s life cycle and some members’ migration, current labor 
availability averages only three members. 
  
 125 
 
Table 5-2. Household’s land and labor  
Id_ 
Case 
 Case 
study 
Case 
Location 
Crops Land 
holding 
(Ha) 
Cultivated 
land 
(Ha) 
Irrigated 
land 
(Ha) Family 
size 
Current 
members 
Permanent 
family labor 
1 Ubaldo Punata Vegetables 
(onions), flowers, 
maize, alfalfa 
2.6 2.4 2.4 6 4 2 
2 Montes Punata Alfalfa, maize 1.1 1 0.7 8 3 3 
3 Soto Punata Maize (grain), 
maize (sweet), 
alfalfa 
4.2 2.4 1.5 10 3 3 
4 Roldan Rumi Cancha Maize (grain), 
onions, peanuts, 
beans 
2.25 2 1 6 4 4 
5 Lima Rumi Cancha Maize (grain), 
potatoes, peanuts 
1.25 1.25 0.25 5 6 2 
6 Estevez Rumi Cancha Onions, maize, 
beans 
5 5 1 6 6 5 
7 Rogelio Rumi Cancha Onions, maize 
(grain), peanuts 
3.25 2.25 0.75 4 4 2 
8 Franco Sacabamba Potatoes, wheat, 
maize 4.5 2.75 0.5 5 5 4 
9 Alvarez Sacabamba Potatoes, maize 0.5 0.5 0.13 5 2 2 
10 Juvenal Sacabamba Potatoes 6 1.5 0.37 10 9 6 
11 Gamez Sacabamba Potatoes, maize 2.5 1.83 0.25 10 7 5 
Source:  Prepared by the author 
 
5.2 Strategies for access to water 
 
The cases studied, under very different hydrological conditions of water availability and socio-
organizational environment, illustrate various strategies that peasant families pursue to access 
and control water. These strategies show that, beyond those conditions that to some extent can 
be determined collectively through water rights and collective water management practices, 
water access ultimately depends on how each peasant household is able to manage other 
factors, such as social relations (social networks), economic resources (money and other assets) 
and physical factors (access to water infrastructure). 
 
This section discusses several of these forms of access to water, analyzed in this chapter as 
"water access strategies", expressing water control in the family domain. "Strategies" do not 
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mean something necessarily structured or planned in advance by families. Rather, they arise as 
actions and decisions that peasant families are often taking contingently, and in some cases 
only based on improvisation.24 As shown below, most of these water access strategies are based 
on gradual, purposeful construction of social networks and relationships in the communal or 
extra communal domains. Ultimately, different strategies coexist. 
 
5.2.1 Family relationships and social networks 
 
Peasant families develop highly dynamic actions around agricultural production to access water 
and other resources, in order to configure their livelihoods. This dynamic is based on social 
relations in the family domain and beyond. 
 
Especially the Punata cases, then Sacabamba and to a lesser extent Rumi Cancha cases, show 
the broad variety of possibilities regarding water access forms. For Punata, the confluence and 
overlap of several irrigation systems at different times and covering different irrigation areas, 
the infrastructure shared by these different systems, and flexibility in managing them, enable 
families to "maneuver" or play in space and time with water availability and access beyond 
what their own water rights define. 
 
Under these conditions, peasant families have access to water through different strategies, for 
example: 
 
• Strengthening family networks. It is very common to continuously construct and use 
family networks as a strategy for water access. In the cases studied, for example, the 
Ubaldo family appeal first to their relatives, to get water for some of their numerous 
plots. This is done either by exchanging water turns, buying irrigation turns, or setting 
up another type of reciprocal relationships with their relatives (ayni mutual labour 
exchanges). Furthermore, the fact that the couple come from different communities 
means their respective families have access to water to irrigate plots in these 
communities. Relationships of godfathership, ritual kinship relations benefiting 
compadres with access to water, and other family members or neighbors in the 
community, are also important (see also Del Callejo 1999; Soto, 1997). 
• Social networks in the communal or extra-communal domains. The community to 
which a peasant family belongs is the first social space favoring social networking to 
access water. As discussed in Chapter 3, belonging to a community strengthens 
possibilities for cooperation in this regard. Additionally, previously studied cases in 
Punata (Del Callejo, 1999; Soto, 1997) show that these relationships become strategic 
to access water through "those who are near the water"; that is, with leaders but also 
with irrigators located at the head of the system or near the intake or in key positions 
(socially and physically) in the same or other communities. Scattered distribution of 
                                                 
24 Improvisation does not connote random, unintended or non-rational actions. Rather, this is "adaptation to 
internal and external circumstances, which are constantly changing"... "improvisational capabilities" (Richards, 
1993). 
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plots in different communities also plays a very important role. The Ubaldo and Estrada 
families, having plots in various communities (5 and 3 communities, respectively), has 
meant that they can buy extra irrigation turns from different sources and exchange or 
borrow turns. This does not mean that scattering plots automatically guarantees access 
to water. This depends more on the social relations involved, which may be favored by 
these plots’ location in the territory of one or different communities, and mainly by 
each irrigation system’s water management "flexibility". 
• Relations of reciprocity and agro productive complementarity for access to water. 
Families’ social relations develop different mechanisms for resource mobilization. 
Reciprocity relations, expressed in the Andean region as "ayni" involve mutual aid for 
work (exchange of labor for labor). These relationships can include a whole range of 
productive and non-productive activities, agricultural products, labor, money or any 
resources or assets that a family needs at some point (Boelens, 2015; Mayer, 2002; van 
der Ploeg 1990). The case studies show, for example: 
 
• Water for Water: Borrowing Lluska Khocha turns and giving back well water 
(Ubaldo family) or Totora Khocha turn for well water (Estrada family) 
• Water for work: Work on planting and harvesting for a water turn from Laguna 
Robada (Soto family) 
• Water for money: money loan (for migration) for water right in Laguna 
Robada (received by Ubaldo family). 
• Water for companionship: Estrada family’s daughter helped her grandparents 
for a few turns from Laguna Robada. 
 
Agroproductive relationships also include share-cropping. Share-cropping is a clear 
mechanism to access scarce or missing resources such as water, land or labor. In previous 
research, Del Callejo (1999)  and Vega (1996) show that this arrangement was very common, 
as a strategy to gain access to land when the family has small areas to cultivate, to maximize 
the use of family labor, to maximize water use, or even as a strategy to access to better-quality 
land or a better location relative to irrigation infrastructure, thereby facilitating water access by 
other mechanisms. 
 
Currently in the study areas, there is evidence of a reduction in share-cropping, especially in 
areas where farming is becoming more labor-intensive due to irrigation. For Punata, this has 
been further affected by high out-migration by young people and adults (20 to 40 years), 
consequently increasing labor cost in the area. Mr. Ubaldo eloquently explains: "... now it is 
not worth it to practice share-cropping, because you work alone and provide your own water 
and besides you need to hire laborers… and wages have increased so much... at the end of the 
day, the other partner earns money by doing nothing". 
 
In the other cases studied, the Chiyara Khochi system and especially Rumi Cancha, the above 
strategies are not as visible or they are mediated by other factors, which although seemingly 
obvious, need to be discussed. For Chiyara Khochi system, one could argue that, because 
irrigation is relatively recent, agriculture and water management are at an intermediate stage of 
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mutual adjustments: peasants are testing aspects of water distribution to meet productive 
initiatives (demands), but also the interest in developing certain productive innovations, require 
water management adjustment. 
 
This also means a close relationship between activities and strategies of experimenting with 
new crops and new practices in the peasant farming system, while adjusting infrastructure 
operation and water distribution as part of collective strategies. This is a very good example of 
how collective interests and actions are negotiated and then determine decisions made in the 
family agroproductive domain. In the Chiyara Khochi system, families avoid running risks 
related to share-cropping, precisely because they are in an adjustment phase. Under these 
conditions, sharecropping does not necessarily offer to cover or share such risks, but only 
complements the resources both parties have. Labor cost is another issue, and has also 
increased, although to a lesser extent, in the Sacabamba area. 
 
Because atajados are highly localized systems, located practically next-door to each plot, 
physical constraints and water availability to irrigate very small surfaces allow no flexibility in 
shared access or other water-access strategies. When atajados systems began implementation, 
these micro-irrigation systems’ individual character generated some conflicts over control of 
the water catchment area (communal lands, individual lands, or areas shared by several 
families). However, after operating these systems for some time, heavy rainfall and the need to 
act immediately to "harvest" rainwater has promoted the "need for cooperation" among 
neighboring families. Thus, there are fewer conflicts and more agreements reached, to assist in 
water uptake into atajados that share catchment areas, the most important strategy for these 
individual systems. 
 
5.2.2 Family investments in irrigation: workforce, the role of migration and off-farm work 
 
There are several ways by which water rights are created in Bolivia’s peasant irrigation 
systems. Among the most common is community membership plus "investment" of work 
during infrastructure construction (state interventions or their own) (Gerbrandy and 
Hoogendam, 1998; Gutiérrez, 2005). In the last three decades, money investment has also 
become a common way to create water rights, especially in groundwater systems (Delgadillo 
and Lazarte, 2007b; Rocha et al., 2016). Once an irrigation system is formed by collective 
effort (family investments that create “hydraulic property”), during system implementation and 
operation other mechanisms are often put in place that change the overall pattern of water rights 
established at the beginning. For instance, transfers by inheritance, sale of water rights, 
temporary sale of water turns, exchanges from one community or one subsector to others, are 
the most common. In other systems, even cash payment is permitted or monetary calculation 
of wages spent by users who started working to construct the system, as a basis for calculating 
the cost of new water rights. This situation is rare but can occur. Of all these various forms, 
what is important to discuss now is labor and monetary investments from families’ perspective: 
investments seen as family strategies. 
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Investing family labor to create water rights in general depends on the family’s ability to take 
on that workload. The labor investment is highly variable, depending on the size and 
complexity of the work or the number of users who initially decide to "risk" this investment. 
Depending on how much effort they have to invest, the risk or uncertainty foreseen by peasant 
families, and their ability to solve them, they can decide to make such an investment or not. 
Commonly, irrigation interventions (building new systems or upgrading existing systems) 
typically last much longer than planned and therefore require much more effort from future 
system users. This causes many families to withdraw and therefore lose their water rights 
before the end or even at relatively early stages. 
 
Table 5-3 shows average values of families’ contribution in work and in cash, to create their 
water rights in various systems. Two features of these cases are remarkable:  
The first is the high labor requirement in systems such as Chyara Khochi and the restriction 
that this investment means for a peasant family, ultimately meaning they can access water or 
they will be marginalized. In this case, construction work involving families happened mostly 
during three years which were critical for families. As discussed already in Chapter 4, work 
investment to acquire water rights has value in terms of identity (collective) and as individual 
and collective effort. Ultimately, it represents a balance between risking the family’s livelihood 
and the hope, usually uncertain, to get water. Peasants, often based on their knowledge of the 
weather and local conditions, may doubt future possibilities to irrigate. In other circumstances, 
a family consisting of a couple and several children, or an elderly couple, may simply not be 
able to afford such a work investment. In all irrigation systems studied, there are stories about 
the effort that investing work or money meant to creating their water rights. For Sacabamba, 
during construction of the Chiyara Khochi system, extreme situations were reported, in which 
some families, having worked to construct the system, were unable to grow enough food to 
cover their needs, having to enter into relations of long-term ayni with other communities to 
get food for part of the year. 
 
Table 5-3. Labour and monetary investments in creating water rights in the systems studied. 
  Case  
Characteristics  
of the investments 
Chiyara Khochi system* Irrigation systems in 
Punata** 
Atajados systems in Rumi 
Cancha*** 
Amount of working days per 
family (per water share) 
150 working days Wells: between 0 to 90 days  
Reservoirs: 130 days 
Most atajados: 50-70 days 
Extraordinary cases: 32, 146 
days 
 
Source of labor  
Overall family labor and 
“ayni” (reciprocity 
relations). In many cases 
men and women worked to 
acquire separate rights 
Wells: In general family 
work  
Other systems: combining 
family work and hiring 
laborers 
7% only family labor  
14% only hired 
50% “ayni” (reciprocity) 
and family labor  
29% combining diferent 
ayni (reciprocity) schemes, 
family labor and hiring labor 
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Type of work  Road construction, 
excavation and lining of 
canals 
Channel construction. Many 
wells should not require any 
channel building, using only 
existing infrastructure. 
Compaction and settlement 
of embankments, headworks 
and atajados protection. 
Period of investment 1995 road construction 
1997-1999 
Totora Khocha system: 
calculated 130 days; 30 
executed at the beginning 
and 20 in money. The rest 
was distributed in 10 years. 
Concentrated in 2-3 weeks 
after construction. Then 
every rainy season until 
embankment consolidation 
Required monetary 
investment  
None Wells: 40 to 700 USD 
Reservoirs: 6 USD per year  
50 USD per atajado 
Possibilities of water rights 
acquisition by monetary 
investments only 
Currently no new water 
users. At the beginning of 
operation new users were 
admitted by paying 500 
USD  
In some wells at a cost 
between 300 and 500 per 
"water share”. 
Other systems do not admit 
new users 
None. 
Prepared by the author based on the following sources: 
* Cossio (2004);Vega and Iriarte (2003) 
** Delgadillo and Lazarte (2007a); Gutiérrez and Claure (1995); Montaño (1995) 
*** Cáceres (2009) 
 
 
The second striking feature is regarding cases where monetary investments are made to build 
drilled wells systems, in Punata and in other areas of the valleys of Cochabamba. The use of 
groundwater for irrigation has become very common in these valleys, according to their 
potential and despite the initial investment costs. 
 
The Punata Valley is an example of this. As explained in Chapter 4, to start with this type of 
undertaking, a group of peasant families gathers and begins to discuss the physical and financial 
possibilities. Identifying a communal place near a road, or on a vacant lot, usually solves the 
physical part, provided that it meets with the approval of some local "expert" in detecting 
groundwater by dowsing methods. The company can verify this after drilling. Other groups 
hire a company to make hydrogeological studies before drilling. Excepting the first wells 
drilled by a FAO program in the 70s, and a few others under some cooperation program, most 
Punata wells have been drilled with co-funding by peasant families. Such funding covers 50 to 
100% of the drilling and pump installation costs. This has meant an investment per family of 
40 to 700 dollars (Ortiz, 2015), depending on the percentage of support from some institution, 
the well’s costs (related to depth) or the number of families associated to invest. 
 
A peasant family is commonly unlikely to achieve this investment directly. Previous studies 
(Del Callejo, 1999; Delgadillo and Lazarte, 2007 Soto, 1997; Vega, 1996) show different 
strategies to achieve these investments: 
- Investing savings from migration (mainly to Argentina or recently to Spain). In many 
cases, this investment and land purchase are the main reason motivating middle-aged 
migrants (25-35 years) to migrate temporarily (for example, the Estrada family above). 
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- Access to credit from relatives, friends or some godparent. Often this is paid for with 
savings from migration, demonstrating again the importance of family networks. 
- Access to financing from rural microcredit organizations. Currently, this mechanism is 
common to cover immediate needs or emergencies. In most cases, these loans are also 
paid with savings or remittances from migration. 
- Sale of a plot of land to reinvest in well water. 
- Investment of extraordinary earnings from agricultural production (Ubaldo family 
case). 
 
From the different strategies listed above, the first three forms of investment to acquire water 
rights (water shares) in well systems are linked to migration. Dandler and Medeiros (1985) 
show that up to 54% of migrants from the valleys of Cochabamba to Argentina returned and 
invested in ventures such as land and other assets (in this case water), to establish themselves 
as "autonomous households" (Dandler and Medeiros, 1985: 52; see also Le Grand, 2014). 
 
For atajados systems in Rumi Cancha community and all intervention areas with this type of 
system, their construction has been based mainly on community members’ interest in 
participating in the project and their physical possibilities (land availability and suitability for 
building such infrastructure). This interest often reflects a household’s immediate investment 
capacity and possibilities to assume the risk of such investment. The atajados in Rumi Cancha 
have meant an investment of 50 USD per family, besides the labor investment. Again, in this 
case, migration to Chapare region and off-farm work has been the only way for families to 
afford that investment. 
 
5.2.3 Involvement in water organizations: “knowing where water is” 
 
Holding a position as a community authority or any water organization occurs through different 
mechanisms, rotating positions being one of the most common in Andean irrigation systems. 
Gutiérrez (2005) also mentions nominating or selecting people with more experience to hold 
key positions. From some community members’ point of view, these positions can mean a 
"heavy burden", since in most cases there is no payment or only token compensation (monetary 
or communal work on the leader's fields). This is also directly subtracted from the time a person 
(man or woman) can devote to their crops or family. However, other families see service as 
community officers as an important strategy to access water. The Ubaldo and Estrada families 
show such strategies. 
 
In the first case, Mr. Ubaldo tells his story, about how he learned from his father, besides 
agriculture and irrigation, the "business" of leadership. Walking around with his father, who 
was an important leader in Mitha system distribution just after land reform, Mr. Ubaldo 
acquired that knowledge about Mitha water management and has repeatedly been chosen as 
his community’s leader in that system, as a water judge. That experience has enabled him to 
determine water’s location very precisely and who is irrigating at some point from that source. 
This has enabled him to access Mitha water turns, by dealing with other irrigators, to further 
expand their "hydrosocial networks" for water access. This knowledge led Mr. Ubaldo to also 
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make the decision, several years ago, to exchange water rights with his brother: water from the 
Lluska Khocha system exchanged for Mitha water. The exchange was positive for a while 
because of his site-specific knowledge on water turns, although in recent years the Mitha 
system has become more insecure due to settlements along the river that interfere or steal water 
from this system. 
 
Similar strategies happen with Punata’s reservoir systems. Being a leader in committees, or at 
the community level, acquaints leaders with water mobility. They learn which people are 
willing to exchange turns, transfer water flow from one community to another, or to buy water 
turns or “water tails” (the flow remaining in channels after “largadas”). Such examples 
demonstrate that social networks and mobilization and control mechanisms for family 
resources, such as their water access strategies, transcend communal boundaries, irrigation 
systems, or other socio-territorial domains in which peasant families commonly move. Families 
use a very complex combination of social, ritual or institutional work relations, combining 
these with exchange relations mediated by money. This emphasizes the dynamics and 
importance of social networks, which are not restricted to re-creating (only) reciprocity based 
on non-market relationships. Complementarity and reciprocity in the Andes have often been 
romanticized, thereby ommitting the complex and dynamic interactions between commodity 
and non-commodity speres in every Andean families’ water control strategies (Boelens and 
Albó, 2007; Vos, 2010; Zoomers, 2013). Many actors are involved in this web of relationships: 
family members, friends, godparents, neighbors, leaders, public authorities, financial 
institutions, loan officers, and also businesses that handle remittances from abroad. 
5.3 Range of agro productive strategies. From water control to farming security 
 
This section discusses agroproductive strategies, closely related to irrigation practices and 
water management. We will illustrate these different strategies to show their relationship with 
water control, and how collective water control will influence family-domain production 
decisions. Very common practices, as part of broader strategies, such as (fallow) land 
preparation, are extremely significant factors that a family can actually control at the farm level, 
given other physical, environmental or socio-organizational conditions or constraints. 
 
5.3.1 Water and soil management practices. Fallowing to cope with water shortage 
 
One of the first practices, a set of arrangements to deal with water scarcity in the Cochabamba 
valleys, has been preparing the ground, fallow preparation. Fallow preparation here ranges 
from primary tillage / plowing the soil, irrigation application and then successive plowings to 
"soften" the soil and homogenize the moisture contained therein. In some cases, this practice 
begins with the last irrigation for a previous crop, or an irrigation just to moisturize the soil if 
the ground is too dry for the first plowing. Usually these practices end with the "wisk'ada" or 
"closing" of the preparation work (Delgadillo, 2003b), which may include dragging a wooden 
plank to "seal the ground" and prevent excessive evaporation from allowing it to “warm up” 
before sowing. 
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In areas such as those studied, these practices have different objectives and are also performed 
differently. These practices as a strategy also deal with water scarcity differently. Delgadillo 
(2003b) classifies land preparation methods according to the time between tilling the soil and 
planting/sowing. This period may be short (one to two weeks), intermediate (one to two 
months) or longer (3-8 months). Systematically analyzing practices in the Cochabamba valleys 
and the names used locally, we may identify these three groups as "land preparation", "fallow 
preparation" and "annual fallowing" or "watabarbecho", respectively. 
 
In rainfed lands, soils are prepared with the first rains. The purpose of land preparation practices 
under these conditions is basically to loosen and aerate the soil, and then to wait for successive 
rainfall to be stored in the soil to enable sowing, germination and subsequent crop growth. In 
irrigated areas, depending on water availability or insecurity, various practices have been 
adapted differently and for different purposes. The cases described in this study provide good 
illustrations of these variations and strategies used to control water by agronomic practices and 
strategies. 
 
The objective of land preparation (called "short fallow"), is not necessarily to store water in the 
soil profile but rather to provide the minimum or necessary moisture for sowing/planting. This 
practice is usually implemented in areas with high water availability (such as the well area in 
Punata). It is also applied in areas such as the atajados that do not have high water availability, 
but families have their individual water source next to their land and therefore do not need to 
prepare the soil too early: in both cases, it involves a relatively “high degree” of technical water 
control. Another factor influencing these practices are soils’ physical characteristics. In areas 
of shallow soils or coarse texture (sandy loam or sandy) it makes no sense to irrigate long in 
advance, because the water (little or much) applied to the soil would be lost. 
 
"Fallow preparation" (intermediate fallow) is practiced in areas with a relatively secure water 
source, if possible a few months before the rainy season. The aim, in this case, is to prepare the 
soil, to reach favorable temperature and moisture for seeds, for uniform germination and plant 
emergence. In addition, it attempts to store a significant amount of water in the soil profile, to 
ensure the crop’s initial growth until the first irrigation is applied or the regular rainy season 
begins. This practice is part of a productive strategy, to advance sowing/planting timing by 
"playing" with the complementarity between irrigation and rainfall and reducing the risks posed 
by uncertainty in the annual rainfall regime. This is very common and strategic in a situation 
where cultivation is not possible with only irrigation or rainfall alone. 
 
Currently, under this logic, the Khocha Totora reservoir system is a very important source for 
fallow preparation in southern Punata (used by the Soto family and many others in this area) 
and to a lesser extent to the north, which has also other dams and wells (for example, the Ubaldo 
and Montes families, which have intermediate access to water). A similar situation occurs with 
potato sowing in the Chiyara Khochi system. Part of productive strategies that are being 
adapted by peasant families consists of "adjusting" the early potato sowing campaign 
(“mishka” season) by preparation irrigations (observed in all cases studied). This, in turn, 
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requires adjustments in dam operation and water distribution, to enable such preparation 
irrigations (larger discharges). 
 
Besides climate factors, crop characteristics, and especially water availability, the soil’s high 
water-storage characteristics are important to success with this practice. The partial uncertainty 
in water and rainfall availability is "controlled" to some extent, by complementarity between 
rain and irrigation, storing water in the soil profile. Again, this practice would not make sense 
and is not practiced in areas with shallow or very permeable soils, such as Rumi Cancha or 
some areas in the Chiyara Khochi system. 
 
Finally, it is the "watabarbecho" or annual, long-fallow treatment, commonly practiced in areas 
where the only irrigation available is "storm irrigation", i.e. irrigation during the rainy season 
as “complementary” irrigation. This is the case in southern Punata or remote areas that have no 
water rights to any of the dams. In these areas, very large volumes of water are applied to the 
plots, with the last rains in March or April. This can be done even while the previous crop is 
still standing in the plot (Centellas, 1998; Delgadillo, 2003b). Water should be stored in the 
soil for long periods, between six to eight months. Only very deep soils with high water storage 
capacity will serve for this purpose (capacities greater than 150 mm/m). This practice is almost 
exclusively for growing maize. 
 
Beyond the effects or physical explanations of these practices, this technology involves 
knowledge and work organization: recognizing the appropriate soil type, the time to irrigate, 
combining machinery (tractors) with other implements and calibrating them for proper tillage 
depth and land leveling, using oxen and a wooden plow, with three to four people driving the 
water within the plot, and other practices: a range of different skills required to perform the full 
range of practices involved in this "water-scarcity control technology". In turn, this technology 
is an integral part of an array of productive strategies to grow grain, fodder and all derivatives 
(e.g. corn) under conditions of hydrological water insecurity and uncertainty. These practices 
generally involve mobilizing knowledge and family labor; collective work by the irrigation 
organization the families belong to is also a crucial component to assuring water access. 
Starting by "collecting water" from the main intake and conveying it several kilometers up to 
the irrigation area, is hard work that communities are forced to do if they want to irrigate but 
have less access to water. This combines individual and collective knowledge and activities to 
control the water flow from the source to the final use on the plot. 
 
5.3.2 Successional or staggered planting 
 
Staggered planting is an important productive strategy for work organization and production 
(harvest) scheduling on a peasant farm. In literature however, it is only or primarily explained 
for marketing purposes. The case studies nevertheless show that, in addition to this, the 
approach again is to play with complementarity between rain and irrigation and, to some extent, 
to control weather factors such as frost or drought periods. That means, the effort is to have 
some “control” over uncertain water availability: sowing or planting a crop on various plots, 
some weeks or months apart. One of the cases studied (Ubaldo family) shows that this is also 
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an important strategy to distribute family labor available along the cropping season, making it 
less intensive at certain times. 
 
For Punata, in the area served by tube-well systems (the northern zone), water availability is 
relatively controlled. Therefore, staggered plantings are meant to extend the growing season 
and thus to break constraints on market prices and uncertainties in rainfall distribution. Usually, 
the first plantings do not have enough water availability to irrigate large areas, so that it would 
not be possible to cultivate with irrigation only. The last plantings, on the contrary, exactly 
match the beginning of the rainy season. In this way, the family can cultivate a larger area 
without facing the risk of water shortages. The first plantings rely more (but not exclusively) 
on irrigation and the last ones more on rainfall. 
 
The Ubaldo family’s strategy consists of planting onions on different plots, times and places. 
In most years they plant onions on six different plots located in three communities. Mr. Ubaldo 
explains that he rotates and plants at different times, from October to March, because on some 
of their plots the crop is more susceptible to being attacked by a fungal disease (Kamanchaca). 
The same applies for carrots and flowers. 
 
Staggering planting also involves organizing family labor. The Ubaldo family, during this 
study, managed its land, divided into 27 small plots with different crops. With only the couple, 
and their children’s help on weekends, they have no choice but to reduce labor intensity. This 
applies particularly to growing vegetables, which are very demanding in planting and 
harvesting times. 
 
The Chiyara Khochi system is undergoing a major transformation in the cropping pattern and 
production strategies under irrigation. Today one might say that peasant families are still 
experimenting, testing and adapting some of those strategies. In this area, potatoes have 
become the "leading crop" of irrigated agriculture (Vega and Iriarte, 2003). Potato planting 
extends from June through August. The same family grows at least twice, "mishka" sowing and 
"chaupi mishka" (early and intermediate sowing, respectively), to balance the benefits of 
selling potatoes in November or December, with the risks of early sowings that could be 
affected by the last (late) winter frosts. 
 
Irrigation has enabled them to experiment in this direction. According to earlier information 
collected by Vega and Iriarte (2003) and comparing with the data from this study, we can see 
that there is a tendency to reduce this period of staggering (successional planting), tending to 
cultivate not as early as June, but closer to July (practised by the four families studied). The 
staggered planting was also made possible by the system’s flexibility, although there is a 
constant tension between the high management demands and water requirements for such 
staggered plantings. This has been constantly discussed in the association of irrigators 
(ARSAC). Vega and Iriarte (2003:68) mention a testimony that reflects this tension, expressed 
by a user against the irrigators association "... you decide when to release water, but you cannot 
oblige us to plant".  In more recent years this strategy is still in practice, but many families 
have adjusted (and facilitated) this requirement by implementing small individual reservoirs. 
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This enables them to store their water shares (turns) and then to stagger any planting with even 
more flexibility. 
 
The situation of Rumi Cancha community, with atajados systems, is completely different. This 
strategy of successional planting is not used for crops that are going to market, such as onions 
and tomatoes (irrigated) and obviously is impossible for rainfed crops. What the community 
does is to plant small areas (only a few square meters) of vegetables that families grow 
exclusively for their own consumption: lettuce, carrots, tomatoes and others. Some of these 
vegetables are planted or sown by families in stages or rather scattered through the year to have 
food available for as long as possible. This is, on a very small scale, staggering planting self-
supply. 
 
5.3.3 Strategies to optimize water use: combined use and prioritization of water sources 
 
Current knowledge about field-level water management in Punata is the result of many years 
of farmers’ experience, experimentation, and testing by trial and error. This knowledge exists 
and develops along with the conditions that have also been established collectively in managing 
various irrigation systems -- systems that often overlap spatially. From the family domain this 
strategizing happens in a finetuned calibration practice, whereby many families have their plots 
scattered among locations all with different water availability. This shows that the "art of 
irrigation" in Punata is the result of different strategies of combining water sources at different 
times and in different places. This is done in order to irrigate certain crops in different (specific) 
ways or rather to prioritize or almost exclusively use a certain source for a specific crop or 
specific purpose. 
 
For example, the Ubaldo family prepares soil for maize, potatoes or broad beans with priority 
especially for water from reservoirs, particularly in two of the four areas where their plots are 
scattered, based on their knowledge of the soil and its moisture retention capacity. They use 
plots that are closer to home more intensively to grow vegetables, preferring to irrigate with 
tube-well water. For these plots, they generally do land-leveling every year. All these plots are 
perfectly leveled, as small terraces where the water (well water) is distributed very evenly and 
is "ponded” at the end of irrigation (technical irrigation literature could classify this as border 
irrigation; Brouwer et al., 1990) 
 
Allocating different water sources to specific plots (although not always strictly) also helps use 
the family’s available time and labor better, as they can calculate how long these plots are 
irrigated with a particular source. In general, peasant families in Punata already know how long 
they should apply water to each plot (and crop) with every source of water, also differentiating 
the time required either for soil preparation or for crop irrigation. In the case of well water, Mr. 
Ubaldo and others in the zone have to assure water’s first entrance to the plot at the beginning 
of irrigation time, and then they can do other tasks. At the end, they cut off the flow and check 
if water was evenly distributed on the plot.  
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The Ubaldo and Estrada families access to different water sources, leading them to use them 
as part of their practices to manage and prioritize irrigation in different places. This also enables 
them to differentiate those plots’ "vocation" based on different characteristics of microclimate, 
soil and "accessibility"25 to water. 
 
Table 5-4. Main irrigated crops with different sources of water in Punata 
Source of water Main crops Specific uses 
Laguna Robada 
Alfalfa, broad beans, potatoes, maize 
Onions, carrots, peaches, other vegetables 
- Crop irrigation 
- Fallow irrigation (“empanto”) 
- Land preparation (short fallow) 
Lluska Khocha 
Alfalfa, broad beans, potatoes, maize, occasionally 
vegetables (onions, carrots) and flowers  
- Fallow irrigation (“empanto”) 
- Crop irrigation 
Totora Khocha Maize (grain) alfalfa 
- Fallow irrigation (empanto) for 
maize 
- Crop irrigation (different crops) 
Hand-dug well Alfalfa, potatoes 
- Small plots of potatoes and 
alfalfa 
Drilled well Onions, carrots, beet, cabage, other vegetables, 
flowers 
 Alfalfa, peaches, broad beans, potatoes 
- Transplanting irrigation (onions, 
beet, cabage) 
- Sowing irrigation (carrots, 
flowers) 
- Crop irrigation 
Rol Maize (grain) alfalfa, barley, wheat 
- Fallow irrigation (for maize) 
- Occasionally, crop irrigation  
Pilayacu Onions, broad beans, potatoes, flowers 
- Transplanting irrigation (onions, 
beet, cabage)  
- Sowing irrigation (carrots, 
flowers) 
- Crop irrigation 
Waste waters  Maize, alfalfa, broad beans 
- Fallow irrigation (for maize) 
- Crop irrigation (alfalfa, and 
occasionally broad beans) 
Source: Adapted from Del Callejo & Vásquez (2007); Del Callejo (1999); Vega (1996) 
 
While Punata may be a unique situation, in which different irrigation systems overlap, and 
together complicate the analysis of the actual water availability in different communities or 
areas, the above table shows that water availability, as a result of collective and household 
water control, will ultimately determine the type of crop to grow or the production system to 
implement. Areas with water availability only from rivers will tend to produce maize and 
alfalfa for cattle raising. On the contrary, areas with dam systems tend to diversify production, 
                                                 
25 Accessibility means closeness and infrastructural "facilities" for a plot to be irrigated from a given water source. 
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while areas with high availability (such as wells, and Pilayaku) also grow a variety of crops but 
with some predominance of vegetables and flowers. In the other study areas, with only one 
source for irrigation, water availability and therefore the possibilities of extending the irrigated 
area, to expand the agricultural calendar, or to intensify production, are very limited. 
 
5.3.4 Combined use of different water sources and diversity in water uses 
 
Water as such has a very important meaning in peasant life, as a vital element for agricultural 
production (for irrigation), and for other purposes. The case of Punata, and cases in Sacabamba 
and Rumi Cancha, illustrate the different functions of water for peasant families. These 
different functions are closely related to the characteristics of water availability in terms of 
quantity (volume or flow), timing (when water is available), and quality. 
 
As rivers are mostly seasonal sources, their main function is “complementary irrigation” of 
crops at the beginning and during the rainy season. In Cochabamba’s valleys, maize is the main 
crop irrigated with this water. This same source, as already indicated in Chapter 3, is used by 
riverside communities in Cochabamba’s Upper and Lower Valley for "lameo" or soil recovery, 
applying water with sediment, either to restore soil fertility or to form new plots on river-banks 
by terracing. 
 
Other water sources, such as dams, play an important role in watering animals (some small 
animals but mostly cattle), or to prepare bricks for construction. It is also used in Punata by 
artisans to wash leather or for car-wash services.  
 
Groundwater systems in Punata have more controlled flow and generally better water quality. 
Therefore, these sources are used for many applications. In Punata they are used for making 
“chicha”, watering animals, washing vegetables after harvest, car-washing and many other 
domestic uses besides agro-productive uses.  
 
Among the multiple uses of groundwater, in many cases this water is used as the main source 
for domestic consumption. However, in peasant households, human consumption and other 
domestic uses may be outweighed by other productive uses, such as irrigating small family 
orchards, watering animals (cows mainly) or making “chicha” (Del Callejo and Vásquez, 
2007). Although these uses are important in terms of volume and for peasant families’ 
livelihood strategies, they are however rarely considered in designing water systems for 
domestic consumption. 
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Figure 5-2. Multiple uses of water according to the water source 
(Source: Prepared by the author) 
 
In Chiyara Khochi and Rumi Cancha, watering livestock is the most important use besides 
irrigation. In the Chiyara Khochi case, this use has already been internalized in system 
management. This can be seen when someone uses water during someone else’s turn, to fill a 
small reservoir (pond). It is almost considered as animals’ right to water and not as water theft 
or serious misconduct. 
 
Under conditions of scarcity it is also an increasingly common situation to (re)use wastewater, 
even if this water is not treated adequately or at all. In growing towns such as Punata, this is 
also becoming a serious health risk and source of disputes in communities that do not have 
alternative sources. Here, there is an increase in the demand for this water to irrigate different 
crops, included vegetables. 
 
5.4 Organization of labor in peasant irrigation. Dynamics in institutions, 
technology and markets 
  
One of the distinctive features of how peasant-farming systems function, different from 
business production systems, is how labour is organized on the farm and beyond. As discussed 
in previous chapters, peasant irrigation also implies very demanding collective work: the tasks 
individuals (or individual families) perform to accomplish their duties to keep the system 
functioning and as a way to maintain their water rights. This section discusses family labor 
organization for collective irrigation systems as well as for individual production systems, 
particularly the way families and their production systems integrate with broader socio-
economic spaces. Markets, governmental and non-governmental institutions, and technology 
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importantly mediate this integration. The analysis focuses particular attention on the collective 
level of water management as an important factor in those inter-relationships. 
 
5.4.1 Organizing family labor to control water 
 
Family labor in peasant farming systems is intensive. This intensity in farming is further 
increased by the work around irrigation, with all that this activity involves. Table 5-5 
summarizes the type of work that peasant households, in the different areas of study, must 
perform to ensure that they can irrigate according to each crop’s and/or plot’s requirements and 
under the conditions or requirements of the irrigation systems’ collective management. 
Irrigation involves activities and practices that families do individually on their farms, and also 
relates to how the same families, along with others, perform a number of tasks outside their 
farm, with the common irrigation infrastructure. Those tasks are what is usually called 
“collective work” but it does not mean that collective work is just the sum of individual work. 
Ultimately, peasant families have to devote a significant amount of time and work (one or more 
family members), depending on the case, to make the whole system run and then assure that 
water reaches their plots. 
 
Table 5-5. Organizing family labor around irrigation 
 Case  
(Id-
Name) 
Main water 
source 
/system for 
main crop 
Main crops Number of 
irrigations 
for main 
crop 
Family labor 
requirements at 
field/farm level 
Family labor 
requirements at 
system level 
Management 
requirements 
(collective/system) 
1 Ubaldo Tube wells Onions, 
vegetables 10 
Plot leveling,  
Eventually on 
field application 
Once a year canal 
cleaning 
- Electricity  
- Attending monthly 
assemblies 
2 Montes Reservoirs Alfalfa,  
 
 
Maize 
6 
 
 
2-3 
Fallowing 
On plot ditches 
Field application 
- Canal and 
intakes cleaning 
- Main 
conveyance 
vigilance 
- Distribution 
points vigilance 
- Agreements on water 
releases (largadas) 
- Organization of 
maintenance and water 
distribution 
- On time operation and 
water distribution 
- Attending assemblies 
(monthly) 
3 Soto River flow 
(Mitha, Rol) 
Maize 2 Fallowing 
On plot ditches 
Field application 
- Once a year 
ditch cleaning 
- Distribution 
points vigilance 
-Intercommunal 
agreements for water 
distribution 
- Accompanying water 
to communities 
4 Roldán  
5 Lima 
6 Estevez 
7 Rogelio  
Atajados  
Onions,  
 
Maize 
6-10 
 
2 
Plot preparation 
Crop irrigation 
- Agreements on 
micro catchments 
use 
- None 
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8 Franco 
9 Alvarez 
10 
Juvenal 
11 Gamez 
Chiyara 
Khochi 
reservoir 
Potatoes, 
 
Maize 
6 
 
2 
Plot preparation 
Crop irrigation 
(on plot water 
conveyance) 
- Distribution 
points vigilance 
- Organization of 
maintenance and water 
distribution 
- On time operation and 
water distribution 
- Attending monthly 
assemblies 
Source:  Prepared by the author 
 
Table 5-5 also shows that some systems require more work than others, in some cases regularly, 
and in others contingently and sometimes even randomly. Initial work investments to acquire 
water rights, as was shown in Table 5-3, can be also significant. These may often compete with 
regular farm tasks or even prevent families from doing their normal agroproductive work. 
 
In conclusion, irrigation contributes directly to intensify agriculture in general and labor 
employment (family and/or hired) in particular. Crops such as onions, potatoes, flowers or 
other vegetables in general, can represent up to four times more labor requirements compared 
to rainfed crops or even to maize and alfalfa under irrigation. This explains why conversion of 
rainfed agriculture to irrigated crops is not “automatic” or immediate. In many cases, it may 
take two, three or even more years (as in the case of Sacabamba) to achieve the necessary 
adjustments in the irrigation system’s management, families’ labor requirements and peasant-
farm organization. This in turn, denotes the family labor conjunction and organization in 
controlling both production and water. 
 
5.4.2 Cyclicity in organizing labor for peasant irrigation 
 
Irrigated agriculture is the result of combining or to some extent managing various natural 
cycles, such as plant and animal life cycles (Le Grand, 2014; van der Ploeg, 2008; Zoomers, 
1998), and the hydrological cycle ( Molle et al., 2007; Molle and Wester, 2009). In turn, these 
natural cycles are also superimposed on peasant families’ life-cycles (Boelens, 2014; Zoomers 
1998), and on water management social dynamics, "hydrosocial cycles" (Barnes and Alatout, 
2012; Boelens et al., 2016; Linton and Budds, 2014; Molle and Wester, 2009). Year after year, 
cycles start: land preparation, planting, cropping and harvest practices or raising animals, their 
care, breeding and production. Also, as part of the hydrological cycle, water sources are 
"recharged" (e.g. springs or groundwater) or flow through streams and rivers, starting with the 
first rains. In other cases, the water is stored in reservoirs, either natural or artificial, or finally, 
in subsequent years water is also stored in the soil as an outcome of the rain cycle. 
 
Human, physical and organizational work on agriculture and irrigation, will also follow these 
as well as their own “rhythms” or "irrigation cycles", parallel and also intertwined with them: 
starting from organizing for cleaning ditches and channels where water is conveyed to irrigate, 
building defenses in some cases, and decisions on when and how to operate dams, wells, 
headworks, etc. (Boelens, 2008a; van den Dries, 2002; Gelles, 1994). Linked to these 
movements we see, for example, the flow of agricultural products resulting from the crops, or 
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before them, the flow of inputs such as seeds, agrochemicals, fertilizers, or the workforce, 
whether peasant family or hired labor. These inflows ultimately result in periods and cycles of 
higher or lower demands and supplies in the different markets for products and factor inputs. 
All these overlapping cycles are organized by productive and livelihood strategies that families 
are building, often also cyclically. These are manifested through periods when family labor on 
the farm is more intensive, or less intensive, periods of greater or lesser need for money, 
seasonal or medium-term migration, periods when the family focuses more on processing 
agricultural products, or marketing, etc. (e.g., Borras, 2009; Le Grand, 2014; van der Ploeg, 
2008; Zoomers, 2013). 
 
Figure 5-3 exemplifies, as a calendar, the different types of agricultural activities for major 
crops, irrigation and water management activities in irrigation systems, and case studies in 
Punata. It should be noted, however, that these cycles are not static or necessarily repeated in 
the same way year after year. This example intends to emphasize the complexity of inter-
relationships among these cycles. 
 
The different water sources to which the Ubaldo family has access gives them greater water 
availability in quantity and in time. This enables high-intensity agriculture and irrigation, 
combining the different agroproductive, hidrosocial and market cycles creatively. On the other 
hand, the Soto family relies more on water from one reservoir (Totora Khocha) and 
occasionally from the river, apparently reducing their combination of cycles. Also, maize 
production and particularly milk production lead to another type of relationship with the market 
and the community. In general, one could say that success in timing and possibly controlling 
these cycles will make it possible to not only reproduce but also to produce new production 
cycles in following growing seasons or years. This combination of overlapping cycles around 
irrigated agriculture are a key part of reproducing the farm and peasant families’ livelihoods. 
 
Similarly, at the collective level, and often cyclically linked to the activities performed by 
families and leaders of organizations, are the regular meetings and negotiations that occur 
between water users from Punata. Communities at the upper part of the basin, where the dams 
are located, also take part, integrating territory-based cycles of cooperation and negotiation 
over water. 
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Figure 5-3. Example of labor organization, irrigation practices and water management 
practices expressed as annual cycles  
(Source: Prepared by the author) 
 
5.4.3 Organizing family labor in production 
 
Despite the diversity of crops and agricultural and non-agricultural activities undertaken by 
peasant families, they usually organize their farm work around one or two main crops. In this 
study, these main crops are conceptualized as "ordering crops". These “ordering crops” reflect 
certain agrarian vocation in each area or community and irrigation system. Peasant families 
prioritize these crops to organize their resources (land, water, inputs, labor and capital). These 
crops are the most important in terms of family livelihoods, either because of the direct cash 
income they earn, because they are the family’s staple food crops or they play an important 
role in other productive and economic activities. 
 
Table 5-4 (Section 5.3.3) summarizes the main crops cultivated by the cases studied in the three 
regions. For Punata, crops are onions (Ubaldo family), alfalfa (Montes family) and maize (Soto 
family). Although all three families produce alfalfa and maize, these crops’ purpose and 
importance are different in all three cases. The same happens in the other areas. In the case of 
Rumi Cancha, maize is the “ordering crop” for two families (Roldán and Lima families) while 
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it is onions for the other two (Estévez and Rogelio). For Sacabamba, potatoes are the most 
important in all case studies, although they differ in maize (Alvarez and Gamez) and wheat 
(Franco) as a second crop. For each case, we have studied in detail how the family organizes 
the work for these crops: technical itinerary, from planting to harvest, irrigation practices, the 
use of inputs, machinery or animals, the costs incurred and the products’ destination. This 
makes it possible to analyze various aspects of technology, family work organization, and the 
expression of different "farming styles".  
 
In the 11 cases studied, families are at different “stages” of their life cycle, with varying 
availability of resources (land, labor, knowledge, capital, animals, and others) and pursuing 
agricultural activities under different agro-ecological and socio-cultural contexts. Therefore, it 
is obvious to expect them to organize their work differently. However, there are some aspects 
of organizing family labor that call for attention. If we see the extent of use of family labor in 
the main crops, there is a trend or growing correspondence between two variables: the larger 
the family, the higher percentage of family labor use. Next, analyzing land availability and the 
way these families farm, they tend to deploy more family labor on larger farms. 
 
Figure 5-4. Family labor investment in main crops 
(Source: prepared by the author) 
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However, there is a group of families who, regardless of the number of family members and 
the intensiy in the production system, produce their (main) crops with about 50% of their family 
labor and therefore also employ hired labor (paid in cash). For Punata, this form of organizing 
work concerns two very different types of production systems as in the Ubaldo and Soto cases 
(cases 1 and 3, respectively). The former grow vegetables intensively and the latter grow maize 
more extensively. In any event, while some families use more family labor, it is also common 
to hire workers. This hiring means that the peasant families cannot fully cover the work 
required by the different crops they grow. This already indicates that, even when the average 
land size in the different study areas is relatively small, agricultural production is very labor-
intensive. What also becomes apparent is the strong heterogeneity in how peasant farmers 
organize their labor for production, as is discussed in the following sections.  
 
5.5 Heterogeneity in shaping different styles of farming 
 
Heterogeneity in resource access or availability in a household commonly expresses "economic 
inequalities in wealth, income or access to credit" (...) and other resources (Ruttan, 2008: 980). 
From this point of view, heterogeneity as a starting condition for farming practices entails a 
problem. Some authors would argue that therefore, necessarily, heterogeneity slows 
(economic) development and has "negative effects on collective action" (Ruttan, 2008: 980). 
Other authors, on the other hand, while recognizing the fact that wealth differences and socio-
economic inequality constitute major problems, point at the fact that heterogeneity in itself may 
enhance various forms of cooperation "based on interdependence and complementarity of skills 
and resources" (Boelens, 2008a). Meinzen-dick and Raju (2002), for instance, specify that 
social heterogeneity (ethnic, class or caste) can mean a significant barrier, unlike heterogeneity 
in the resources available to families. In the agricultural production domain, it is also common 
to find high heterogeneity in the "initial conditions" of peasant families’ resources (e.g. quantity 
and quality of land, water, labor) that are directly related to priorities and the objectives, and 
therefore, the results of their production. 
 
This section discusses heterogeneity, focusing on understanding the diverse ways in which 
production and work are organized on peasant farms. These manifestations of heterogeneity 
will be discussed through three key concepts or indicators that can be linked to help understand 
the interplay of peasant agriculture under irrigation with water control and its various 
manifestations in different localities. These interactions between the individual and collective 
domains in irrigation and agroproductive processes are understood here as "localized 
expressions of irrigated agricultural development".  
 
The three variables that relate to heterogeneity and which are highlighted here are: (1) the 
intensity of work organization, expressed as strategies to increase or decrease intensification; 
(2) the degree of production specialization or diversification; (3) the market relationship based 
on the commodification / non-commodification of different production factors (van der Ploeg, 
1990). Here, water’s fundamental role is discussed as a key factor in all three aspects and its 
relevance for understanding reproduction of production and of peasant agriculture in general. 
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These three variables of heterogeneity in peasant agriculture are discussed from the notion of 
"farming styles" presented in Chapter 2 (based on van der Ploeg, 1990, 2008). 
 
In literature on agricultural economics, particularly regarding farm management, 
intensification and specialization (to specialize in one or a few products, preferably one item) 
are usually identified and currently promoted as the best way to optimize production. These 
"technological and productive options" enable more "efficient" use of factors and inputs, to 
achieve maximum production and hence maximum returns. Sometimes intensification and 
“extensification” or specialization and diversification are treated as opposite and mutually 
exclusive. From another point of view, “extensification” is analyzed as a starting point for 
peasant production systems, which then will "evolve" into more intensive production systems 
(see the discussion by Erickson (2006) based on the postulate of Boserup, 1965) or from 
diversified production systems into specialized systems.  
 
This section discusses these patterns or production schemes present in peasant agriculture, as 
part of agroproductive strategies. I argue that they belong to a broader set of peasant-family 
strategies aiming at achieving some degree of autonomy. This autonomy is to cope with the 
market or other factors that create dependence and uncertainty (or risks) for reproducing their 
livelihoods, particularly to reproduce their farming system – which may also be related to water 
availability and water control. 
 
5.5.1 Intensification and “extensification” 
 
The case studies show family-strategy cycles, subject in turn to families' cycles and livelihoods 
but also to other (limiting) factors such as access to land, water or labor force or family 
members’ other priorities. Here, agricultural intensification involves the use of inputs, labor 
and other production factors. Van der Ploeg (2008) defines intensification as a “constant but 
steady process to increase production per unit area of land (or animal) by increasing the use of 
inputs and production factors or by improving technical efficiency” (Van der Ploeg, 2008: 45). 
This study has adopted this concept, emphasizing the concentration or increased work in 
productive activities. 
 
Figure 5-5 depicts the amount of labor devoted by families to their main crop (onions and maize 
for Punata and Rumi Cancha and potatoes for Sacabamba).  For an area between 1/3 to 1/2 
hectare, the total amount of labor ranges from 20 to almost 80 persons*day (working days, 
locally called “jornales”). The amount of labor in Sacabamba and Rumi Cancha is remarkable, 
almost double the amount of labor in Punata’s cases. Rumi Cancha and Sacabamba have very 
recent experience with irrigated agriculture. The difference in labor-intensity compared to 
Punata’s cases can largely be attributed to experimentation and adjustments of labor 
organization by these families. In fact, they are following a progressive change from an 
extensive-rainfed cropping pattern towards more intensive land use and production. Irrigated 
crops need more intensive work for sowing, cultivating, weeding, irrigating and harvesting. 
New knowledge and technologies are part of this shift. 
 
 147 
 
 
 
Figure 5-5. Total labor used by families on their main crop per season 
(Source: prepared by the author) 
 
Figure 5.6 shows the distribution of labor along the cropping season. In Punata, for instance, 
the Ubaldo family uses approximately 10 person*days for planting, cultivating and harvesting 
onions and a small amount (4 person*days) for land preparation. On the contrary, Rumi Cancha 
cases show, for the same crop, 25 to 35 person*days of work just for cultivation. This big 
difference reflects a different way of growing onions: a labor-intensive production technology. 
 
Sacabamba families use more labor for harvest, typical of potato production in the Andes, 
which requires huge amounts of labor as part of the technology but also as a cultural practice 
developed for this crop. Potato harvest is almost a celebration, in which some families 
cooperate with the owners. Some of them are hired solely for that purpose, some are paid in 
cash and others with an agreed amount of the harvest, but all enjoy the food and “chicha” 
prepared for that important event. 
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Figure 5-6. Distribution of labor during the different cropping stages  
(Source: prepared by the author) 
 
Maize production in Punata (See cases: 2-Montes and 3-Soto) has a similar pattern, although 
not with less labor than in potato production in Sacabamba. These Punata cases in general show 
that maize harvest is the most labor-demanding activity. The other stages of maize production 
are less labor-intensive because of an important technological change in the Upper Valley. 
Currently, land preparation and maize sowing is mostly done using machinery, considerably 
reducing the amount of labor and time devoted to this crop. During the cultivation stage, the 
only labor required for maize is the “aporque” (hilling soil around the base of the cornstalks to 
bolster them and prevent any tipping) and one or two irrigations.  At the same time, machinery 
use has made it possible to expand the size of maize plots. In general, for Punata and other 
areas in the Cochabamba valleys, this progressive technological change has meant a trend to 
extend maize production, together with very labor- and land-intensive production of other 
crops.  
 
Figures 5.4 to 5.6 show the amount of labor that the families studied devote for one plot and 
the main crop produced. However, the actual production intensity of labor can only be figured 
out if we consider all plots and all family members’ productive and re-productive activities. 
For example: the Ubaldo family works around 2.4 Ha divided into 27 different small plots 
spread among 5 communities, cultivating 8 different types of crops, especially vegetables 
(onions, carrots, beets), potatoes, beans, maize and alfalfa. Besides the agronomic practices 
they execute in each plot, as explained in previous sections, they have to fulfill all the 
requirements for accessing water and other communal tasks. That is, conveying water from the 
intakes or tube wells towards their plots; attending different meetings for each system at least 
once a month; attending assemblies and collective works related to each system; and 
performing other communal duties. On the contrary, the Soto family in Punata grows 
extensively. They cultivate two main crops, maize and alfalfa, on plots relatively larger than 
the other cases. These crops do not have high labor requirements during the cultivation stage 
and their irrigation intensity is lower. All case studies show a direct relationship in production 
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system intensification, in principle conditioned by water availability and then by labor 
availability or by the household’s life cycle. This statement is based on the contrasting 
characteristics of water availability if we compare the Soto family with the other two in Punata. 
 
In the case of the Montes family, they have more water available than the Soto family, however, 
they have adjusted their production system to their own priorities and capabilities. Previous 
research (Del Callejo, 1999; Vásquez, 2007) showed that the Montes family was moving from 
a system of intensive horticultural production to a more extensive system (fodder and dairy 
cattle) mainly because of the family’s age (life cycle) so they can no longer work as intensively 
as before. Besides, the new production system they are adopting gives them a relatively steady 
monthly income, apparently more secure than vegetables’ highly fluctuating prices. 
 
Intensification, from the land-use point of view throughout the agricultural calendar (area 
cultivated per year), also offers the possibility of cultivating outside the rainy season. This 
involves selecting appropriate crops in response to precipitation and irrigation and peasant 
families’ benefits if they can sell such products on the market when prices are favorable. Next, 
labor intensification in irrigated agriculture will also result from crops’ increased technological 
(and agronomic) requirements. Rumi Cancha cases show high labor utilization during the 
growing season, similar to the cases of Sacabamba. The effect of irrigation on agricultural 
intensification is expressed, then, as an increase in labor requirements throughout the crop cycle 
and not only during the stages of planting and harvesting. This increased labor requirement for 
irrigated crops has significantly reduced, for families in Rumi Cancha, the number of times and 
length of periods they migrate to their plots in Chapare, their tropical forest lands. 
 
An equally interesting aspect to highlight in farming and irrigation activities, is that further 
intensification in agriculture also requires peasant families to maintain cooperation and 
reciprocity relations at key stages of the growing cycle, such as planting / sowing and 
harvesting. In these periods, work is strongly based on social networks and family ties within 
or outside communities. 
 
 
5.5.2 Diversification and specialization 
 
In the study of peasant agriculture and economies, diversification has been documented 
extensively as a response or (livelihood) strategy adopted by peasant families to cope with 
uncertainty or risks imposed by the environment (natural hazards such as drought, frost, pests 
and diseases) and also by the market (access to inputs, price fluctuation), or access to 
production factors such as labor, water or land (e.g., Ellis, 2000;  Le Grand, 2014; Mayer, 2002; 
Scoones, 1998). Some authors see diversification as "effective" risk management strategies 
(Valdivia et al., 1996), or a phenomenon recently (re-)"discovered" in discussions about the 
climate crisis, as mechanisms of "adaptation" to climate change (Howden et al., 2007). In 
another arena, regarding agricultural development and the feasibility of diverse types of farms 
and farming in Europe and the United States, diversification is also discussed in terms of 
agriculture’s "multifunctionality": the “implications for the range of functions and farming 
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activities considered relevant” (van der Ploeg et al., 2009; Renting et al., 2009:116). In short, 
diversification can be described as a characteristic feature of peasant families’ livelihood 
strategies. As discussed in Chapter 2, they base their livelihoods on agriculture and on various 
other productive activities, trade, services, and other craft work, usually called “pluriactivity”. 
Within these strategies, this section’s analysis focuses only on agricultural diversification, to 
discuss its relationship with water control and the resulting expression in different farming 
styles. 
 
Diversification and specialization of productive systems in peasant agriculture are often 
perceived as opposing processes. It is generally assumed that peasant agriculture tends toward 
diversification. However, irrigation – depending on water availability and the security it 
represents for the production system – may promote “conversion” toward more specialized 
patterns, which in general are assumed to be more profitable economically. The examples used 
in this section to illustrate specialization / diversification strategies are two cases in Punata and 
two in Rumi Cancha. The former are associated with longtime experience with water 
management and control supported by collective action, and the latter are relatively recent 
experiences, with many water access limitations under eminently individual (family-based) 
strategies realted to managing atajados. 
 
The Soto family in Punata cultivates a small number of crops, especially fodder (alfalfa and 
maize) for milk production (see Figure 5.7). Maize also plays an important role as a staple of 
the family diet, and a small proportion is sold on the local market to produce chicha or through 
neighbors or middlemen for sale as processed food (cooked corn called “mote”). A relatively 
specialized cropping pattern based on fodder and grains is clear in this case, but if we look in 
more detail, the family produces at least four varieties of maize for different purposes (“mote”, 
fresh consumption, dried and roasted and to make chicha). 
 
In this case, the strategy to produce rainfed crops, or others with larger tolerance to water stress, 
is related to insecure water availability combined with the limited availability of family labor. 
 
Figure 5-7. Cropping pattern and market orientation. Soto family strategy  
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(Source: Prepared by the author) 
 
 
The Ubaldo family presents a contrasting situation compared to the Soto family. Besides 
farming an intensive system, their crop diversification is also considerable. Diversification 
extends to crops that are produced either for market (onions, carrots, flowers and beets), for 
their own self-supply (maize), or for both purposes (beans, potatoes, some corn varieties). In 
terms of area, the most important crops are beans, onions and maize. In previous research (Del 
Callejo, 1999) this case was characterized as "intensive horticulturist and florist", representing 
a "farming style" specializing in those cash crops. 
 
Figure 5-8. Cropping pattern and market orientation. Ubaldo family strategy  
(Source: prepared by the author) 
 
Currently and according to Mr. Ubaldo, they have gradually reduced their horticultural 
specialization. While still producing large areas of vegetables, they currently seem to be in a 
transition phase, firstly by diversifying with less labor-demanding crops (e.g. beans and maize), 
and gradually with the intention of also raising dairy cows on a small scale. This strategy seems 
to have been influenced primarily by the availability of family labor (two daughters living 
abroad and two sons helping them only on some weekends). According to the family, this 
strategy was also adopted due to high labor costs and less linkage to different markets than 
before (rising transport rates and fluctuating prices on these markets). Despite these difficulties, 
the family is still strongly linked to both the local and regional markets (Upper Valley and 
Cochabamba Valleys) and nationally (selling their products on markets in La Paz and Santa 
Cruz occasionally, though less frequently in the latter because of increasing production in Santa 
Cruz’ Valleys). 
 
 152 
 
 
Figure 5-9. Cropping pattern and market orientation. Lima family strategy (Rumi 
Cancha)  
(Source: prepared by the author) 
 
 
Rumi Cancha cases (Lima and Roldán families) help to confirm that, as they develop 
experience and knowledge with irrigation, and greater water security, peasant families tend 
first to diversify their production and then may reduce their commitment to other off-farm 
activities. The Lima family changed relatively abruptly from an extensive system of rainfed 
agriculture and goat-raising towards a mixed system (under irrigation and rainfed), growing 
larger areas of maize and peanuts and experimenting with potatoes and onions in very small 
areas. However, the Roldán family, already had an atajado system. A second atajado 
significantly increased their water availability (quantity and security) enabling them to 
intensify and diversify their production even more, reducing extensive crops and significantly 
reducing migration to the Chapare. 
 
 153 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-10. Cropping pattern and market orientation. Roldán family strategy (Rumi 
Cancha)  
(Source: prepared by the author) 
 
Migration to the tropical lands owned by these families, to grow coca and fruits, could be 
considered part of a strategy of “extensification”. Nevertheless, it also means some degree of 
specialization, due to the particular characteristics of coca growing. From a broader family-
strategy perspective, these activities are part of diversified livelihood strategies. 
 
Diversification represents, then, a way to achieve higher use of internal resources, especially 
labor (including knowledge). That maximizes the use of family labor. This then implies that 
diversification cannot be seen as an opposite or an alternative strategy to intensification but, on 
the contrary, an important strategy to reach significant labor-intensity and greater use of other 
inputs and production factors. 
 
In conclusion, diversification or specialization strategies depend on different factors. The case 
studies help identify the most relevant factors: availability of family labor, the family’s life 
cycle, water availability, labor cost, and peasant families’ access to information or level of 
experience regarding new crops. Water access and water control will play a decisive role. As 
in the case of Soto family in Punata, restrictions on access to water make the family engage in 
more extensive farming, combining rainfed and “semi-rainfed crops” (grown with 
complementary irrigation), a specialized strategy for dairy farming. 
 
Combined factors, such as the family’s life cycle and thus family labor availability also have 
their influence, as in the case of the Ubaldo family, who have decided to gradually change from 
a very intensive, diversified farming style towards a less-intensive, less-diversified one. This 
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change is occurring despite their high, secure water availability and access. High labor costs 
and insecurity in getting workers when required by diversified, intensive vegetable production 
also appear to be influencing this transition. 
 
Cases of Sacabamba (the Chiyara Khochi system) and Rumi Cancha reveal a key role for 
knowledge, skills and experience in irrigation and in certain crop types and also access to 
information and markets. These factors seem to be limiting diversification in these particular 
locations. In 10 years, the change has been gradual and, even today, they are still making 
adjustments in both system management and production systems, in an attempt to reconcile the 
requirements with both domains: collective water management and control, and family 
decisions about the production system. 
 
5.5.3 Interplay between commoditization and non-commoditization in production 
 
Peasant agriculture is not isolated from the market, either in relation to the flow of inputs to 
produce, or in the final products (agricultural, livestock or transformation products). Several 
authors emphasize the unfavorable conditions under which farmers are integrated with the 
market. This is mainly due to issues of scale, quality standards established in specific product 
markets, farmers’ difficulties to access more productive technologies and because of trade 
barriers (intermediary traders) and unfair prices for peasant farm products (Ellis, 2000; Mayer, 
2002; van der Ploeg, 2008). 
 
This section discusses the degree of inter-relation between peasant families and the market, 
regarding their main crops. The different combinations of labor, inputs used in production, and 
traction (oxen or machinery) are analyzed as the main organized production factors/inputs. 
These three categories reveal the type of technology used and the balance between the use of 
factors acquired through market and non-market relations. In turn, this analysis is highly 
instructive to understand peasant strategies to reproduce their farm and production over time, 
identifying factors that favor or hinder such reproduction. 
 
Analyzing the use of “domestic inputs” (produced by the family) and the use of family labor 
shows that cases in Rumi Cancha and Sacabamba use few inputs of their own, but employ a 
higher proportion of family labor (see Figure 5.11).  
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Figure 5-11. Use of family labor and imputs  
(Source: Prepared by the author) 
 
Reviewing the technical itinerary in detail shows that, in those cases, the low ratio internal 
input use results from the purchase of seeds or seedlings and fertilizers to grow potatoes and 
onions. These are just the areas with the least access to markets for inputs and products because 
of their remote location, far from the main centers of commerce, and besides they are 
communities with relatively recent experience in irrigated crops. By contrast, cases in Punata, 
with greater market participation and linked to one of the most important centers for 
agricultural trade in Cochabamba (Punata Fair) show less dependence on external inputs for 
both extensive production of maize or alfalfa (cases 2 and 3 respectively) or intensive 
production of vegetables (onions in case 1). They have less possibility to meet their manpower 
requirements with family labor (or are organized in that way). 
 
Based on the above discussion, peasant families with greater experience in irrigated agriculture 
(for example, Punata’s cases), despite close relationships with markets (for agricultural 
products and some inputs), tend to both use more family labor and depend less on key (external) 
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inputs. This is an important feature of these cases, to attempt to depend less on markets and 
therefore reproduce their farming systems with more autonomy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-12. Organization of production process for main crops. Use of families’ own 
resources  
(Source: prepared by the author) 
 
Analyzing the three main components of inputs or factors used in production, the following 
aspects can be highlighted (see Figure 5.12): In general, in all cases, family labor is important 
on their own fields, whether in crops mainly for market such as early plantings of potatoes 
(Sacabamba) or onions (Rumi Cancha) or crops for subsistence (maize and others). Family 
labor utilization, considering all cases, is between 50 and 100%.  
 
The figure shows that more domestic inputs are used in Punata. In these cases, the Soto and 
Montes families had a strategy to ensure production and use of their own maize seeds for each 
growing season. The Ubaldo family also began some years ago, producing their own onion 
seedlings, because of the high cost and low quality of seedlings. Mr. Ubaldo mentions that, by 
producing their own seedlings, they will have greater security and control for potential diseases 
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and to control proper size and uniformity to use for their onion planting. In this case, the other 
50% of inputs is chemical fertilizers purchased for this crop, something that they cannot avoid 
at this time. It is noteworthy that in Punata's cases, the draft technology used to grow the "main 
crop" primarily hires oxen or a tractor. This is the case of Soto family during land preparation 
and maize sowing, or to prepare the plot (land leveling and furrowing) and the Ubaldo family 
to plant onions. Mr. Montes highlights his vocation of "Yuntero" (oxen driver), recognized 
even outside his community. Currently, one of his main sources of income is to provide tilling 
services for others and also for their own plots. 
 
The other cases, both Rumi Cancha and Sacabamba, show a high percentage using their own 
animal traction. What is not yet conclusive is whether this way of working the land is explained 
by soil characteristics (soil type and slope) and crop type (potato) or simply by preference and 
the intention to maximize the use of their own resources, as in the case of Sacabamba. In Rumi 
Cancha, this may be due to the transition to crops that are irrigated and the relatively low animal 
traction (oxen) requirements for more intensive vegetable production. 
 
All cases reveal family strategies to control and reproduce, cycle after cycle, one or more of 
these production factors, in various combinations, for these crops (and others) for sustained 
reproduction over time. Water is one of these factors, as a direct production factor in peasant 
farming and as a "binding" (and mobilizing) factor for other resources, thanks to the different 
production relations it generates and as a source of social cohesion. 
 
5.6 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has presented and discussed different family strategies that link water control and 
production. This last section will conclude regarding the inter-relationships of these individual 
water management and farm-productive strategies, as essential elements in reproducing peasant 
farms. In general, agriculture in the Andean region and particularly in the areas studied depends 
on irrigation water supply.  Rainfall irregularity, high seasonality, and low amount of water 
that falls every year would not allow reliable production or, in many cases, even allow peasant 
families to risk seasonal sowings as rainfed cultivation. In this context, they perform different 
activities or actions collectively to collect, convey and distribute water under certain rules. 
People perform other activities in the family domain, to handle water on their plots, prioritize 
use and application in different quantities for various crops, etc. In turn, water availability in 
the system and a family’s possibilities to access water through different strategies or to exercise 
their water rights are the starting point for the family to decide what crops to grow, when, and 
in what quantities. Moreover, off-farm work is essential, as a way to diversify and assure the 
family’s livelihood, and often as a means to invest in acquiring or creating new water rights, 
and to purchase of inputs or other production factors. 
 
The previous section discussed how peasant families move between two domains that are often 
contradictory in their operating logic, but ultimately, as part of their livelihood strategies, are 
combined in different proportions at different times: the market domain and the community 
and social networks domain. These are governed by different mechanisms, the former by 
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commoditized exchange relationships where money is the fundamental element of 
measurement. In the community and social networks domain, peasants’ actions are based on 
family (kinship) relations, social identity, and belonging to a community, or on their mutual 
need for cooperation. This is complementary to exchanging different products, supplies or 
resources. This exchange is not measured by money but rather by the “use value” or other 
subjective values rooted in peasant culture. In both domains, it is also possible to identify power 
relations that influence various interactions. The way in which a peasant farm is reproduced 
year after year, cycle after cycle, means combining different production cycles according to 
crop diversity or specialization and other productivie and off-farm family activities (Figure 
5.13).  
 
 
 
Figure 5-13. Commodity and non-commodity circuits in reproducing peasant farms 
(Source: prepared by the author) 
 
 
This research shows that peasant production is not isolated from but neatly entwined with 
markets, in highly diverse, sometimes strategic and at the same time subordinated ways. As 
illustrated in the different cases studied, the family domain features divergent degrees of market 
dependence, or rather different combinations of resource flows (agricultural production factors 
and inputs) through commoditized and non-commoditized circuits. This "degree of 
incorporation" (as proposed by van der Ploeg, 1990) differs for each factor or input. For 
 159 
 
example, in some cases, a certain crop is produced solely with family labor, while at the same 
all inputs (seeds, fertilizers) come from the market. In other cases, similar proportions of family 
labor and hired labor are used, while the seeds or seedlings (in the case of onions in Punata) 
are reproduced annually by the family, also using a combination of own animal traction and 
machinery hired for certain tasks. The same happens with the main products or subproducts 
derived from crops grown. In different proportions, the products are sold on the market, 
consumed by the family, or saved for a new production cycle. 
 
This also shows the importance of other extra-agricultural tasks, in which the family organizes 
its work for different purposes. The figure includes off-farm work and collective work within 
the community or the irrigation organization. Both types of activities or labor have a dominant 
impact on peasant farm reproduction, whether for cash income from selling labor (in 
commoditized circuits) or communal work and using social and family networks to mobilize 
different types of resources. When families sell their labor, they can access (buy) production 
inputs, hire labor, rent or purchase equipment or transportation facilities, and cover other family 
needs. As in the case of Rumi Cancha’s irrigation practices or the wells in Punata, these 
earnings have also been invested directly in creating new water rights. Mr. Roldán’s testimony 
very clearly reflects these family strategies: "We grow food for my family’s table and I work 
outside to bring money...” 
 
Moreover, there is the collective work or other activities that family members perform within 
their family networks or broader social networks through non-monetary exchange 
relationships. These relationships of reciprocity, share cropping, or other mechanisms, also 
enable them to organize their production or access different key resources, such as land, water, 
labor, and others. Here, water is both an input, an important production factor, and a mobilizing 
factor for other resources, “bridging” between collective and individual peasant strategies. The 
result of this dynamic in organizing labor in peasant agriculture under irrigation is a high degree 
of heterogeneity, manifested as various production styles, with varying degrees of market 
incorporation and therefore varying contribution to food production and other services in 
different locations. 
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Chapter 6 . Conclusions:  Local agrarian development patterns as a result 
of water and agroproductive control 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The Andean region’s diversity, beyond its physical characteristics or biodiversity, also extends 
to its people and culture. Andean diversity is also expressed through different ways of 
organizing, cultural expressions, and how people survive day-to-day. This intrinsic diversity 
and expression of social relations makes heterogeneity a characteristic of the region. This 
heterogeneity also enables different production styles, in which water is an essential element.  
 
The dynamics within peasant life, its collective scopes, its individual expressions and the 
families comprising this collectivity have been the focus of this study. Thereby, the research 
shows how water is a history- and context-defined key component in peasants’ life that requires 
collective action to manage it. Here, peasant families’ actions and strategies are a response that 
has been shaped by their biophysical context and the complex socio-political environment. 
These different contexts or environments have changed over time and are mostly uncertain. 
Context shapes strategy development, all with the same main goal: controlling the water for 
agro-livelihood production. The main question to answer in this study has been: How do 
collective action and individual strategies entwine in peasant irrigation to foster diverse 
patterns of irrigation management and production organization in response to the quest for 
autonomous water control?  
 
The cases studied, as a sample of the aforementioned heterogeneity, have made it possible to 
understand, from their different scales in size and complexity, how context- and history- 
particular interaction between biophysical and sociocultural conditions shape collective and 
individual dynamics, and how they result in different responses in terms of water management 
and use practices. 
 
The case of Punata, shows that the basis of the development of irrigated agriculture in the area 
has been grounded in collective action, the progressive development of organizational 
capacities, political alliances, mobilization of work force and generation of knowledge and own 
experiences around water control. This in turn has meant the creation of a diverse productive 
base, in response to the possibilities of accessing and controlling water, inputs and key factors 
in the production process. 
 
Communities in Punata face new challenges. Despite having developed a great experience in 
irrigation, the socio-political context around the control of water in the basin, partly 
exacerbated by the recently installed irrigation law, poses new restrictions and risks to the 
irrigators. The uses and customs and the agreements to access water are now, in many cases, 
subject to new conditions imposed by the highland communities who have control over the 
water sources that are located in their territories. This is: territorial claims based on a growing 
notion of “ownership” over the water sources, generate new situations of uncertainty about 
access to water for Punata irrigators, as in other valleys in Bolivia. 
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The case of Chiyara Khochi in Sacabamba, has served to illustrate the process of generating 
experience in water management, showing the organizational and operational adjustments that 
need to be implemented together with the (new) agricultural practices that are developed at the 
same time. That is, the co-evolution of collective and individual practices in the attempt to 
control water and the production process. This case also shows that productive changes can 
take a long time, because in addition to developing experience (practices) in water 
management, peasant families are testing new technologies and are inserted into new networks 
that allow or condition them to control and reproduce their productive system and therefore 
their sustenance. This also raises the need to progressively develop knowledge and new 
interactions with the market 
 
Finally, the case of Rumi Cancha, with the “atajado” systems, shows the importance of water 
managment at the individual level. Despite having individual control over water, this control 
is subject to rules and agreements that the community makes to enable the capture of water 
from communal or inter-family lands. This case allows us to see the key role of irrigation in 
boosting the family productive system and thus to modify priorities or the composition of their 
livelihoods. 
 
In this closing section, I summarize the findings that have been described and analyzed in the 
previous chapters. This chapter’s goal is to answer the main question and the sub questions that 
have been investigated and discussed in each chapter.  
 
This chapter organizes the discussion in concordance to the empirical chapters (chapters 3 to 
5). I start by exploring the irrigation sector’s institutional setup and development in Bolivia and 
its local manifestations. This is discussed starting from the notion of ‘uses and customs’ as the 
expressions of the local institutional arrangements. Then I explore the role that collective action 
plays in water control and its relationships with family-level organization.  
Finally, family strategies, their relationships with water control and production to overcome 
restrictions, and their degree of dependence on markets, institutions and the state are analyzed. 
I conclude with institutional development, irrigation policies and agrarian transformation in 
Bolivia.  
 
6.2 Uses and customs. Local institutional arrangements and practices and the 
quest for autonomy 
 
This section focuses on the relationship between “usos y costumbres” and peasant irrigation 
practices and their different implications for irrigation and agricultural policies, to answer the 
question: How have irrigation institutions developed from local practices, how do they conflict 
with official views and policies concerning irrigated agriculture; and how these mismatches in 
turn influence water control?  
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Diffrent from its neighboring countries, in Bolivia, the role, intervention and influence of the 
State in local water governance always has been extremely limited. Whenever the State did try 
to intervene and govern water affairs of the peasant and indigenous communities and territories, 
interventions have been directly related to programs and projects to invest in local irrigation 
infrastructure. But also here, the government’s vision has mostly been distant from local farmer 
institutions’ needs and practices. During recent years, the government’s efforts to regulate 
water access and particularly irrigation were aiming to consolidate peasant organizational 
capacity. Partly, this capacity has enabled them to access new decision-making opportunities 
and to obtain power at different state levels (Perreault, 2008). Hand-in-hand with peasant 
mobilizations, all these factors played a role in the recognition of peasants’ norms, rights, 
authorities and ways of life, in different spheres of society. It has also contributed to the rise of 
new leaders who can access power within their own organization as well as in the state 
apparatus.  
 
In fact, rather than the State-supported facilitation of inclusion and participatory water 
governance, in recent years, institutional development of the water sector in Bolivia has been 
influenced by the strong organizational capacity, alliance-building and social mobilization of 
the irrigators themselves; as a basis for local water control autonomy (self-management of their 
systems) and to claim strengthening of their role in formal water policies and governance. 
During the Morales government, this peasant dynamic has been intermingled, via political 
alliances, with the government's strategies to regulate the sector. Among the mechanisms from 
the government to achieve this control have been: the recognition or formalization of the “uses 
and customs” in the official normative framework; and the incorporation (co-optation) of local 
leaders in government structures - which partly has created a contradiction in the achievement 
of autonomy for irrigators as explained below: 
 
-An important consequence is that the mechanisms of representation have been weakened, not 
being accompanied by accountability mechanisms that relate these leaders to their bases. 
 
- The political alliances of (water) peasant organizations with the (technicist and infrastructure-
biased) government have resulted in a vicious circle, in which projects of poor quality or 
decontextualized design and intervention promote new cycles of demands towards the 
government -- demands that presumably can be addressed only with new intervention projects.  
 
- While formally claiming to support local indigenous and peasants’ norms and principles, the 
State’s ignorance of the very functioning of such local norms, rights and arrangements has 
generated deep contradictions. A fundamental local principle, which is the users’ creation of 
water rights and "hydraulic property" based on collective work investment for the construction 
of infrastructure, is a case in point. This peasant notion is the foundation for the construction 
of many of the uses and customs and local institutional arrangements that govern water 
management; the cornerstone for the self-management of the systems. In recent years, with the 
Morales government, irrigation investment policies have largely neglected this core water 
governance and rights principle, supplanting complex historical water-rights-building 
processes, rooted in the culture of each locality, by paternalistic interventions with a prominent 
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role for expert knowledge and government investment. These have altered local principles 
based on collective work, weakening the management capabilities of irrigation organizations. 
This in turn has created confusion among users and non-water users with respect to the 
mechanisms for acquiring and consolidating water rights – at individual (family) and collective 
(community) levels. 
 
Therefore, the new rise of peasants’ institutional power, especially after local water leaders’ 
inclusion in the state institutions and the formalization of local usos and costumbres, is 
ambiguous. In part, it has meant the distantiation of leaders from local reality and practices, 
clearly changing the dynamics of social interactions. Now for peasants, dealing with locally 
managed irrigation systems is not their only concern; they must deal with new structures such 
as bureaucracy, corruption, and formal laws. Thereby, the fact that usos y costumbres were 
officially recognized does not assure local water control autonomy; rather, it creates 
dependence on official laws and government.  
 
Without doubt, paradoxically, the growing visibility of usos y costumbres has played a crucial 
role because of their symbolic value. This value represents a social affirmation of culture; with 
the possibility for autonomously managing natural resources, especially water, beyond 
formality. This research has highlighted and clarified this dynamic, intriguing paradox;  it is 
crucial for comprehending Bolivian water governance, the more since most of these cultural 
resources have been forgotten by technical and legal experts, or were denied by the “people’s  
government”.  
 
The cases studied in the paper have manifested how usos y costumbres operate at different 
levels, dimensions and within different time frames of peasant water management. Expressions 
of usos y costumbres have been explored within daily practices, actual social relationships, 
highlighting and scrutinizing peasant communities’ relations with water and the environment. 
These relationships dynamically transform and adapt through different interactions with the 
market and governmental recognition, often resulting however in disputes over water 
territories, and conflicts of interest based on water and natural resource ownership.  As many 
Bolivian cases show, once informal rights and norms get formal recognition and thereby, 
“invisible” norms and agreements become “visible”, this triggers profound conflicts not just 
between the State and the water user collectives but also, and especially, among water user 
groups themselves.  
 
The examples presented in chapter 3 about the recognition of the uses and customs or the 
construction (formalization) of laws and norms from the practice and the needs of organizations 
also show that, regardless of where the initiative to create (formalized) norms originates, the 
results are similar. These “recognition policies and politics”, therefore, tend to create the 
opposite of the original goal, which was to support achieving local autonomy. Rather, they 
create conflicts that make it harder for local communities to control their own resources. In the 
cases of the national law on aggregates and the municipal ordinance that tried to regulate the 
use of groundwater in Punata, both initiatives started from the demands and problems that the 
communities faced daily. Under the assumption or image attributed to the state and its 
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institutions as protective entities, especially in conflictive situations around resources of 
common use, local organizations promoted the enactment of these norms without considering 
the State’s and their own limitations for enforcement. 
 
For the State, this recognition of uses and customs and all the irrigation institutional setup, has 
not meant reaching a minimum level of regulation of access or water (re) allocation between 
or within water sectors. On the contrary, as the case of Punata shows, this recognition (in 
particular, legally providing ‘eternal water rights’ to those who already control the water) has 
imposed new barriers to the State itself in irrigation intervention processes (infrastructure 
projects) and very limited possibilities for the National or the Departmental Irrigation Services 
to help in conflicts resolution.  
 
This new scenario, where peasant communities face territorial problems that go beyond their 
traditional working arenas, involves growing water disputes. As the research has made clear, 
increasingly, there are conflicts between those who have water flowing through their territories 
(claiming territorial ownership over water) versus those who actually use it (historic rights; 
hydraulic property rights; inheritance and purchase of water rights, etc.), adding also groups 
who had no water access at all but now claim for more equality and fairness. These issues force 
new organizations and social movements to form, to defend their territories or gain access to 
water. Water is the key factor creating movements and organizations.  
 
6.3 Seeking water control from collective action in water management 
 
Collective action within peasant communities in the Andes has different expressions, purposes 
and starting points; they change and adapt to new sociopolitical, economic and cultural 
environments. In this research, I have shown the collective strategies that peasant communities 
deploy to shape and secure their livelihoods. In Chapter 4, the main question to explore was: 
How do the various forms of collective action in peasant irrigation systems become manifest 
and how do they inter-relate with the different dimensions of water control?  
  
The historical processes in which peasant communities have formed in the Cochabamaba 
Valleys show the importance of social cohesion cores or nuclei which enable collective action. 
A clear evidence of these “social cohesion cores” has been peasant families’ control over their 
own work and their own land. These two factors drove a major social and political movement, 
which was used as the foundation for peasants to form agrarian unions and later to be 
recognized as peasant communities. After long struggles and historical change, water has 
proven to be the strongest social cohesion core; it continues building relationships and new 
forms of interactions in rural and peri-urban areas.  
 
Water is a social cohesion core, a vital element enabling peasant communities’ collective action 
and survival. It is also a central element in many economic, industrial activities and in 
ecosystem preservation. However, water is also a disputed element, which generates a lot of 
wealth and empowerment for some, while creating need and segregation for groups that have 
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limited access to it. All these differences lead to long, ongoing negotiation and conflicts, with 
new collective action emerging to manage water as well as these same conflicts.  
 
The case findings manifest how water access and control is one of the main factors building 
collective action. In peasant communities’ irrigation systems, community-level water control 
is strictly related to family-level water control. All these relations are clearly based on and 
directed at adapting peasants’ irrigation practices on their farms. Thereby, changes in irrigation 
practices can be seen in the crops produced, in organizational changes (such as the case of 
Sacabamba), in water distribution, in distribution rules, or in any other operational work. 
 
Collective water management is then the umbrella under which peasant families develop 
multiple strategies to ensure the reproduction of their livelihoods. Since it is this collective 
management that generates conditions of water availability for each family, mediated by 
agreements and rules established in the user group, and by the infrastructure socio-technically 
constructed. As a counterpart, it are the peasant families who sustain social organization, 
collective work and the sense of collectivity based on relationships of interdependence, social 
identity and other sociocultural or family ties. 
 
The interaction between these individual and collective areas, plus the multidimensionality of 
water management, shows that neither management nor irrigated agriculture in peasant systems 
can be fully pre-designed or detailed. Because of these changes, what is actually important is 
to identify the factors that jeopardize water control and family and organizational work. 
Therefore, the cases explored show the relevance of viewing irrigation technology as in 
constant change and adaptation. In this adaptation, one can see a close, reciprocal relationship 
between technologies used at plot levels and those in collective water practices; to cover plot-
level requirements, collective management and family-level water management practices will 
change continuously as mutually entwined. 
 
The cases studied show the progressive development and incidence of collective work, initially 
as a basis for the construction of infrastructure linked to state interventions and then as a basis 
for the (self) management of irrigation systems and their sustainability. In the systems or 
organizations that have already developed these experiences (for example Punata and recently 
Sacabamba), important steps have been taken towards broader areas of influence, for example 
in the management of their own intervention and coping projects (irrigation and development 
interventions); in definitions of public investments or in political negotiations of how the state 
instances are to be related to their irrigation institutions. 
 
Closely linked to the development and incidence of this collective action, is the organizational 
capacity of peasant families. The study of the different collective strategies that are developed 
in each locality, including the continuous adaptations that are implemented in the 
organizations, has allowed to identify certain "principles" of water organizational dynamics. 
These principles importantly relate to, for instance:  
First, how the daily needs of families regarding water access and control, translate into the 
forceful need to cooperate between families and create firm bonds of collaboration. 
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Second, how the flexibility in the structures and organizational mechanisms of water control 
collectives, are based on the progressive ability to identify internal needs and translate them 
into new tasks and innovative ways of organizing water(-related) livelihoods; organizational 
adaptations make that organizations are increasingly functional to the familes’ needs. The cases 
studied show that internal, practical and everyday-needs and their visibility within 
organizations are more relevant than the degree of formalization or the apparent rigidity 
(robustness) with which these organizations (re)present themselves. This flexibility, and the 
possibilities of adapting organizations, appears to be related also to the legitimacy and authority 
that these organizations assume in front of their members and towards external entities. 
Third, an important element, evident in amongst others the cases of Punata, is the constant 
scrutiny from actors within the organization, regarding differentiation and (un)balance in 
power relations. Members claim, and actively build, “checks and balances” to control, as much 
as possible, the workings of power within their collectives. 
Fourth, water user colectives and families constantly balance the technical water control 
dimensions with the organizational, normative and the political control dimensions, to enlarge 
opportunities for self-management. That relates to their ways of designing each detail of the 
water access, distribution and governance system. For instance, in Punata communities have 
figured out how, to reduce water losses (after dam water releases that flow through the river to 
reach their communities and fields), they must send well-defined, carefully negotiated, large 
flows from the dam intake structures. In the irrigation area, they could subdivide and use more 
manageable flows but this would extend the run time of the water, increasing the opportunities 
for stealing, leakages and percolation, and requiring even more people to watch the canals and 
to irrigate. Reduced flows in the river and on the fields imply more need for control along the 
river, surveillance in the irrigation zone, and irrigation labour-time. By technically sub-dividing 
the delivery flow, the operating and distributive levels in the system will also increase; this has 
direct organizational implications for the irrigation system and for organizing family labor. In 
each component of their system’s organization, the collective and the individual require a 
careful fine-tuning; just as there is a precise need to fine-tune the infrastructure, the 
organizational set-up, and the water norms and rights. 
 
These organizing principles have demonstrated, in the cases studied, the wide possibilities of 
continuously adapting organizations to internal and external socio-political contexts; strategic 
inputs in the search for autonomy that peasant families pursue through their organizations, in 
order to "free themselves" from dependence on the state, the market, or other institutional 
actors. Collective strategies in the different case studies are broad, such as organizational 
adaptations, creating supra organizations, social mobilization strategies inside and outside 
irrigation systems, and territorial defence strategies during water conflicts. These strategies in 
Bolivia are the foundation for gradual but sustained social empowerment within peasant 
communities. By no means does this mean that these interactions are harmonious; they 
commonly are difficult and based on hard-fought battles and, in some cases, have fragmented 
peasant movements.  
 
These strategies are also part of broader processes of scaling up organizational capacities and 
the participation of peasant organizations in decision-making and water policy spheres, within 
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their own organizations as well as in the structures of local governments and even at the 
national level. As the research has shown, the socio-technical development of water user 
systems and collectives, in many cases, has exceeded the organizational limits posed by single 
communities or peasant unions - and also the hydrosocial territorial boundaries in which these 
systems were developed -, making that hydrosocial territories and networks constantly 
reorganize, reshape and reinvent. 
 6.4 Water and agroproductive control on peasant farms 
 
In the Andes, water for peasant agriculture cannot be seen simply as any other production 
factor. Chapters 3 and 4 have shown the complexity of water management practices, its 
cultural, political and socio-economic embeddedness –besides technological and agro-physical 
challenges-, and the key role that collective work and shared action play. At the same time, in 
the family domain, important questions, such as what, how, how much and when to produce, 
must be answered. Indeed, all the answers to these questions depend on the individual family’s 
access to and control over resources, a fundamental one being water. But even if those answers 
and decisions depend directly on water accessibility, they are also crucialy related to the 
collective scope. This section, related to Chapter 5, answers the question: How do different 
peasant farming strategies of families relate to water control and control over production?  
 
The cases and findings show how the most important factor in agricultural production and 
livelihoods reproduction is family labor – the only factor that the family can actually control 
relatively well because they do the work. Agricultural practices and production are based on 
family labor and also assure water access, which, in its turn, connects to collective action within 
the community, as families necessarily must work together to guide water and realize all water-
system related operational actions. Therefore, family labor is the cornerstone in water control 
and agricultural production.  
 
The cases have shown how water control at the family domain is highly related to organizing 
family work in agricultural and water governance based cycles, determined by factors such as 
water access, participation in collective work as part of creating and maintaining water rights, 
and by establishing reciprocity relations between families to access water. Family work is 
organized with different rhythms or intensity; and depends on the availability of inputs and 
other production factors that influence agronomic, migration and hydrological cycles, as well 
as on the changing of lifestyles in the countryside. 
 
Sufficient and timely water access on plot level can only partly be secured by the individual 
families, even though they demand the water distribution and management system to operate 
in accordance with their particular needs. Therefore, smallholder farmers continuously balance 
between flexibilization of the water use system (to make it respond to their household 
production system’s water needs) and, conversely, flexibilizing their family’s production 
system (to make it respond to the technical and organizational possibilities and impossibilities 
given by the structures and contigencies of the water use system and the climate, ecology and 
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market context. Smallholder farmers operating in collective water use systems show to be 
experts in this iterative fine-tuning and two-sided flexibilization endeavor. 
 
One illustration is their staggered planting techniques, which is an important productive 
strategy for organizing work and scheduling production on peasant farms. While literature only 
or primarily explains this strategy as a response to marketing opportunities, the cases show 
that, in addition, staggered planting is deployed to balance and create complementarity between 
rainfal and irrigation. Next, it is strategized to somehow control weather factors such as frost 
and drought periods. Bolivian smallholders, forced by condition and history, are water security 
experts. In extremely harsh biophysical and climatological conditions, their aim is to have some 
control over uncertain water availability. Therefore, they sow or plant a crop on various plots, 
some weeks or months apart, and also are keen to develop multiple-cropping systems.  
 
Such strategic practices are not isolated elements (as on mono-culture capitalist farms) but are 
embedded in integrated multi-crop, multi-altitude, multi-water source, multi-scale and multi-
actor production systems. Relationships of reciprocity, share cropping, and other exchange 
mechanisms, enable them to diversify their production and organize access to different key 
resources, such as land, water, seeds, labor, and financial means. Here, water is both an 
important production factor and a mobilizing and connecting factor for other resources. Water 
bridges between individual and collective peasant strategies. Here, connecting the family and 
colective domains is a finetuned calibration practice. For instance, many families have their 
plots scattered among different locations all with different water availability and growing 
conditions. The art of irrigation entwines different strategies, combining a number of water 
sources (that may range from river water, reservoris, waste water to groundwater) at different 
times and in different places. 
 
Therefore, individual water rights, norms and control are deeply connected with collective 
work, responding to cultural norms that vary from place to place. Case-specific are also the 
contacts with different markets, institutions and the state; this contact with different agents 
changes dynamically and takes place in different moments and conditions. Creating or 
acquiring new water rights by “buying shares” in multiple systems such as dams and wells in 
Punata is one example of the different variations. Another example is community work to 
manage and keep water rights; sometimes families do not have enough workforce and they 
need to hire other workers. This happens more often during periods of state intervention to 
build or improve irrigation systems.  
 
Family-domain water control is also deeply related to their site-particular water management 
knowledge, artifacts and on-farm irrigation practices. Aside from these components, the cases 
bear witness to how access to information, market contacts and adaptability of artifacts in 
socioeconomic conditions and irrigation system development are fundamental for livelihoods’ 
technological innovations.  
 
In “controlling agro-production” we can conclude that access to capital assets, workforce, 
inputs, water and land are not connected only through market relationships, nor exclusively by 
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reciprocity relations. Even if the market plays a key role in access to these different factors and 
inputs, to avoid market dependence, peasants develop alternative production strategies that 
adapt to the diversity of water access and agro-production relations, combining market and 
non-market relations. The cases have shown how these relations find expression in crops and 
products that go to markets and equally, according to season-particular and family-specific 
strategies, also are grown for family self-supply. The studies performed in this research show 
all different types of combinations.  
 
Balancing market and non-market relations is part of the “room for maneuver” or “degrees of 
freedom” in which peasants organize production systems and other activities that are crucial to 
their livelihoods. This “room for maneuver” reflects their quest for autonomy, control over 
resources and production, in which families act with different dynamics to achieve their goals. 
Interactions between market and non-market spheres, and activities that enable peasant 
families’ livelihoods, again, are a result of the ways they manage to work under difficult 
highland conditions. If families would only depended on the market, unfavorable conditions 
easily arise beyond their control over their production. In summary, strategic balancing acts 
and interactions between market and non-market spheres enable these families’ production and 
farm development. This development is closely entwined with other livelihood strategies that 
include labour migration within Bolivia and internationally. Permanent or seasonal labour 
migration (by one or a few members of an extended family) has become common in the area. 
The remittances from migration have come to play an important role in the sustenance and 
reorganization of peasant families and their related livelihoods in the area. Remittances enable 
new investments in peasant production systems while also forming a buffer for periods of low 
incomes from agriculture.  
 
Peasant families’ life cycle plays an important role in defining their livelihoods, especially in 
organizing their work, and their intensification and diversification strategies over different time 
spans. This also affects the way families relate to the market. Examples such as the Ubaldo and 
Montes families in Punata show that older and larger families tend to diversify more while 
decreasing family labor-intensity and moving to less demanding physical activities. These 
activities also tend to generate less income, but provide more stable economic income, such as 
selling milk. The less demanding physical labor in Punata and, to a lesser degree, in 
Sacabamba, is also related to increasing demand for dairy products in nearby cities. Meanwhile, 
young families tend to work with and strategize multiple different activities, crops and plots. 
For example, horticulturists are directly and indirectly related to the growing demand for food 
on local and regional markets such as in Cochabamba, La Paz and Santa Cruz.  
 
The result of this dynamic in organizing water and labor in peasant agriculture is a high degree 
of heterogeneity, manifested as various production styles, with varying degrees of market 
incorporation and therefore varying contribution to food production 
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6.5 Conceptual contributions and considerations 
 
This study has focused on the peasant dynamics analyzed from the collective and individual 
domains and their interrelation with the biophysical, State- and NGO-institutional, and market- 
spheres. This approach has made it possible to identify the ways of interaction that are 
generated among these spaces and spheres of social action, and above all to understand the 
different responses or expressions of heterogeneity in the management of water and 
agroproductive resources.  
 
The conceptual emphasis on collective water management in the thesis research, points at the 
core of Bolivian smallholder water control (Beccar et al., 2001; Boelens and Vos, 2014; 
Bustamante, 2010; Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 1998). The conceptual framework has 
organized the multi-dimensional activities and tasks in which water organizations play different 
roles, which for analytical purposes were classified into technical, organizational and 
regulatory. In the analysis these dimensions were considered as intimately interrelated and 
therefore were treated simultaneously. The ‘context’ of these multi-dimensional water 
governance activities – provided by civil society institutions, the state, the market, culture and 
the agro-ecological and physical-technological environment – has been studied not as a given 
but as being continuously modified and readapted according to contextual changes and power 
relations (see also Gutiérrez, 2005; Hidalgo et al., 2017; Saldías et al., 2012). All cases 
investigated have made manifest how peasant irrigation systems in Bolivia are managed 
‘independently’ by users’ organizations (see also Rocha et al., 2015; Seemann, 2014, 2016). 
The basis for the creation and re-creation of these users’organizations that maintain peasant 
production is the mobilization and careful allocation of labour investments. At the collective 
level, this mobilization of labour is translated principally into an empowerment of peasant 
organizations and their ability to develop political leverage at broader scales (Hoogesteger and 
Verzijl, 2015; Perreault, 2008). Clear examples of these strategies are: the access to financing 
and support from the state and NGOs/funders for their projects (irrigation and others) via 
political alliances; the scaling up of their political leverage in broader socio-political domains; 
occupation of power spaces and legal and institutional shopping when defending their 
collective rights over water sources. At the same time it has offered these communities greater 
capacities to interact with their “peers” (other user organizations or peasant organizations) 
around disputes over water or other resources in a certain territory (Boelens et al., 2016; 
Seeman, 2016). In the process of organizational (re)creation, they develop and deploy their 
own rules and regulations; but these rules, rights and regulations change according to 
environmental changes, state interventions through infrastructural projects, changing 
relationships and agreements between irrigation systems that share the same source, new 
agreements within the system by modifying the water rights framework, or new water demands 
from internal or external parties. The thesis has examined how this, in turn, provokes changes 
in infrastructure operation, maintenance requirements, water flows, distribution rules, etcetara: 
a continuous calibration and adaptation of the irrigation system’s technical, organizational and 
normative components or dimensions (cf. Boelens and Vos, 2014; Gerbrandy and Hoogendam, 
1998; Gutiérrez, 2005; Hoogesteger, 2013b). In this way collective action through specific ties 
of dynamic cultural and place based identity provides the actual social, institutional and 
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material possibilities to control, manipulate and distribute water flows over time; something 
that would be impossible at family or individual level (Boelens and Vos, 2014). 
 
To understand this spatial-geographical, socio-economic, organizational-political and 
cultrural-symbolic configuration of water-based livelihoods, water use systems, and watershed 
organizations, the concept of hydrosocial territories (Boelens, 2016) has proven to be of strong 
conceptual importance. The cases show how family and community social networks are 
intermingled with water infrastructural networks, human-adapted hydrological cycles, and 
simultaneously, with economic structures, political strategies, cultural patterns and discursive 
frames, at different, interconnected scales – all being disputed and subject to continuous 
negotiation and power plays: they reveal the struggle over imagining and shaping hydro-social 
territories (Duarte-Abadía and Boelens, 2016; Hidalgo et al., 2018; Hommes and Boelens, 
2017, 2018; Hommes et al., 2016, 2018; Linton and Budds, 2014; Seemann, 2016). Because of 
these dynamics, different from those portrayals that picture Bolivian peasant systems and 
indigenous smallholder water cultures as ‘traditional’, ‘archaic’ or ‘centuries-old and static’, 
the findings confirm how constituting elements, linkages and boundaries of these complex 
hydro-social territories are not fixed; not in physical-geographical terms, much less in political-
administrative or socio-cultural terms. In time and socio-space, territorial contents, meanings, 
relationships and boundaries are re-defined continuously (cf. Harris, 2015; Hoogesteger and 
Verzijl, 2015; Mena-Vásconez et al., 2017).  
 
The families and water user collectives in the case studies, when building, defending and 
redefining their irrigation systems, are permanently on the move, to establish and transcend 
new geographical, political-administrative and hydrological boundaries (Barnes and Alatout, 
2012; Seemann, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2009). The hydro-territorial constructions, therefore, in 
many instances contest techno-political engineers’ systems and, at the same time, are deeply 
transdiciplinary and endogenous – though not necessarilly ‘equitable’: they are products of 
inhouse and external struggles, negotiations and conflicts (Perreault, 2008, 2014; Zwarteveen 
and Boelens, 2014; Hoogesteger, 2013b, 2013c; Roa-García, 2014). This conceptual focus on 
hydro-social territoriality also has allowed to examine how, in Bolivian water control, 
territorial arguments are increasingly important in defining usos y costumbres, as a foundation 
for defining water access and water rights, and in general, to establish control over water 
(Hoogendam and Boelens, 2019; Saldias et al, 2012, 2013; Seemann, 2016). This, in turn, has 
enabled seeing and conceptualizing how different territorial notions and material 
configurations intertwine and “overlap”, assuring that some have infrastructure and water 
access and others are excluded (see also Boelens, 2016; Hoogesteger et al., 2016). 
 
The focus on water rights and water organizational forms from a legal pluralism perspective 
(Benda-Beckmann et al. 1998; Boelens, 2015; Bustamante, 2010) has allowed the study to see 
and examine how Bolivian water users not only create water rights, organizing principles and 
water governance forms, but also, the dynamic and sometimes subtle ways in which they re-
create them, transform them to suit new eras and threats, or to generate new oportunities (cf 
Mayer 2002; Zoomers, 2013; Sanchis-Ibor, 2017). In this way, fundamental mistakes in 
litetrature, about traditional “usos y costumbres” as if fixed by history and culture, have been 
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dismanteld by the case evidences (see also Roth et al., 2005, 2015). Hereby, the analytical 
perspective of ongoing development of uses and customs also shows the importance of legal 
shopping (Benda-Beckmann, 1981) and institutional bricolage (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015), 
both core elements in everyday Bolivian irrigation governance. In other words, water norms, 
rules, practices and organizations are continuously recomposing. Even the engineers- and 
government-directed water works, organizations and normative repertoires were continuously 
“localized” in the case studies (cf. Long and van der Ploeg, 1989; Stuiver et al., 2004); they 
regain meaning in local contexts, because the different localities give their own meaning to the 
official institutional framework and engineers’designs (Boelens, 2015). 
 
Together, this makes that the thesis findings debunk the ‘participatory water management’ 
literature so common in Bolivia and around the world, and also challenge many of the 
‘empowerment approaches’ very popular in Latin America. The cases manifest how, often 
despite of external ‘participatory interventions, the local water user populations are often not 
only the drivers of water governance; they were already a ‘participant’ in struggles for irrigation 
water long before external intervention projects have come to the area to ‘develop’ irrigation 
systems (see also Gandarillas et al., 1993; Cleaver, 1999; Parfitt, 2004). In the eyes of many 
local water leaders, the claim by irrigation project engineers, government officials, or 
international development institutes, that their intervention projects actively aim to incorporate 
‘the locals’ in participatory projects, seems bizarre: the world upside down. In fact, it are the 
external intervention projects that, for a short, specific phase of the hydro-territorial life cycle, 
‘participate’ in the transformation of local water control realities (see also Gerbrandy and 
Hoogendam, 2002; Gelles, 2000; Boelens, 2014; Hoogesteger, 2013c). 
6.6 Conclusion: Heterogeneity and endogenous development patterns: collective 
action, family strategies and state interventions. 
 
This thesis shows how heterogeneity in irrigated peasant agriculture expresses through 
different types of work organization and in very diverse and dynamic production systems on 
farms and organizational diversity at different territorial scales. This heterogeneity is a result 
of many combinations of different social and agro-ecological features, complex interactions 
with the environment and cultures in each particular place. It also reflects interactions with 
markets and the state. Processes of technological and institutional intervention facilitated, 
promoted and sometimes even imposed by the state and other external agents such as NGOs 
usually disturb these peasant livelihoods and their forms of organization. In Bolivia, as in many 
other countries, irrigation policies and interventions have tended to focus on the modernization 
of infrastructure and technologies under the assumption of being the (only) central element that 
will guarantee greater (or better) availability and therefore access to water leading to higher 
incomes for peasant families by boosting agricultural production and through it the social and 
economic development. However, such interventions have by-and-large failed to recognize or 
have just taken for granted local institutions, their rules and coordination processes as well as 
the close relations these hold with peasant families and their production systems. In doing so 
most interventions have neglected: 
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- The close interrelation between the physical / technical, organizational and normative 
dimensions in the control of water and the non-neutral nature of technology in the control of 
people's behavior, in its prescriptive and normative character on how "practice should be 
carried out" but also in its physical-territorial influence and generation of collective work 
mobilization requirements to guarantee its "adequate" operation and maintenance (Winner 
1986, Pfaffenberger 1988, Boelens 2008, 2014, Meehan, 2013). 
 
- The need to adjust (as the cases of Punata and Chiyara Khochi have shown) the forms and 
organizational structures according to practical operational requirements for the distribution of 
water or for use at the plot level and also in the oposite direction: the need to adapt the irrigation 
practices to the conditions of infrastructure and management of the systems. 
 
However, the study also shows that despite these shortcomings water users and peasants are 
resilient, creative and adaptive in re-shaping their organizational arrangements, their collective 
and individual irrigation practices and their related production systems and livelihoods. 
Evaluating livelihoods and agriculture as a lifestyle as in this study, has opened important 
avenues to better understand the interactions and interrelatedness between these different 
elements that compose and sustain irrigated peasant agriculture in Bolivia. It shows for instance 
the imporatnce of recognizing the interplay peasant families have between the commoditized 
and non-comoditized spheres based on available labour and other productive resources. This 
allows rural families to reduce dependence on markets, and (external) institutions as a means 
to compensate for the lack or difficulties of mobilizing other factors of production. As such 
intensificatition/extensification, diversification/specialization or commodification/non-
commodification, represent strategies and productive responses that respond to the availability 
of family labour and social networks that enable families to access different factors of 
production (particularly water and land). In this sence the social and the natural are closely 
interconnected highlighting the importance of considering the socio-economic cycles of 
peasant families and collectives and its relationships with other technical and hydrologic cycles 
which ultimately define irrigated peasant agriculture. This does not mean that once certain style 
is conformed, it is definitive. On the contrary, these are highly dynamic, being able to change 
in relatively short terms according to the prevalent conditions.  
 
This thesis highlights the resilience and adaptiveness of the peasantry in Bolivia and shows that 
despite increased socio-economic pressures, increased and sometimes problematic state 
involvement and climatic variabilities this sector will find strategies to sustain itself. This will 
be done through the interplay between creative adaptation and use of organizations for 
collective action at different scales and the transformation of peasant/family strategies of 
agricultural (re)production. In this process, external interventions and relations with state and 
none state intervening actors will be inevitable especially when it concerns the construction of 
large hydraulic works. However peasant users are the ones that will make such interventions 
work through the mobilization and adaptation of their organizations and practices and through 
these guarantee the sustainability of a specific hydro-social territory that is sustained by the 
dynamic peasantry of the region.     
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Summary 
 
Irrigation research in Bolivia, and particularly in the Andean region, has focused mainly on 
watershed or irrigation system management. Few studies have scrutinized how peasant families 
develop and sustain the everyday management of water as a fundamental, integrated 
component of their individual productive strategies while simultaneously embedding these 
individual water control schemes and irrigation practices in the broader norms, rules and 
organizational forms of peasant communities’ collective work and subsistence endeavors.  
This thesis fills this gap by posing the following central research question: 
How do collective action and individual strategies entwine in peasant irrigation to 
foster diverse patterns of irrigation management and production organization in 
response to the quest for autonomous water control? 
 
This research question has been responded through the study of three sub-questions. The first 
sub-question seeks to understand the institutional framework of the irrigation sector and the 
respective water use and control systems, which in the Bolivian case strongly grounds in 
collective action and customary norms and practices, even though in recent years the state has 
tried to formalize and regulate the sector. The second sub-question focuses on understanding 
collective action and its implications for water control in its different dimensions. Finally, the 
third sub-question focuses on family production strategies and scrutinizes the link between 
mercantile and non-mercantile spheres of production. The analysis shows how these interact 
with the collective domain of water control. 
Chapter two presents the conceptual framework that was developed to analyze the 
interrelationships between the collective and the individual domains, as well as their link with 
the state, institutions and the market. The chapter identifies the object of study, which is defined 
as the peasant dynamics in irrigation systems. These are divided in two analytical categories. 
The first category constitutes collective action for irrigation management, which is analyzed 
based on the concept of socio-technical "water control". The second category corresponds to 
the concept of "peasant strategies" that, in the collective domain and especially in the individual 
(family) domain, serves as a lens to better understand the logic behind the decisions that peasant 
families make about what, when and how much to produce with the water they are able to 
access through individual and collective action. 
Chapter three analyzes the institutional development of irrigation in Bolivia, highlighting the 
role of peasant organizations in this process. It starts with the description and discussion of the 
different expressions of the so-called "uses and customs" in the study cases, illustrating the 
form and dynamics of water management and governance in the sector. In turn, these uses and 
customs demonstrate the different dimensions in water control and show the need to analyze 
these dimensions simultaneously. The chapter explains the risks and difficulties that 
accompany state attempts to formalize these customary norms in official legal frameworks and 
shows the resilience and adaptation strategies of existing customary practices that shape the 
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daily functioning of irrigation systems and peasant communities. “Usos y costumbres” include 
more than just rules, norms and agreements for the access to resources; they actively interrelate 
organizational practices, administrative arrangements and the mobilization of resources. In the 
irrigation systems’ water management and governance domains, these shape very specific 
operational aspects, such as water distribution rules and infrastructure’s operation and 
maintenance activities. I argue that the principles and practices that are framed as ‘uses and 
customs’ essentially constitute peasant strategies to achieve their autonomy from institutions 
and state norms, which seem to create greater uncertainty and lack of control in families and 
communities’ efforts to manage their resources and direct their livelihoods. 
Chapter four, first, analyzes the history of collective action in the region, showing how, 
gradually, after the struggles for land water became the binding factor within and among 
communities in the region. Then water control arrangements in different irrigation systems are 
examined, focusing on the interrelatedness of modes of individual and collective action, and 
their links to formal organizations, politics, infrastructure and water flows. This chapter shows 
that the changes and interactions in, and between these elements, constantly redefine "water 
control systems" in their different components and levels. This chapter highlights the 
importance and dynamism of collective action to both make these systems function internally 
and ensure that the small-farmer sector is visible vis-à-vis the State, donors and non-
governmental organizations. The latter have been important in financing the development of 
irrigation infrastructure and have commonly used this intervention to try to impose specific 
organizational forms and related norms. However, this chapter shows that “peasant principles” 
for managing their resources are deeply entrenched and resilient as they form the basis for the 
quest for autonomy in managing key resources and livelihoods.  
 
Chapter five focuses on peasant households and their production systems. It starts with a 
discussion of the different strategies that peasant households implement for materializing water 
access, and how this is done through diverse interactions with their own community or third 
organizations in the collective domain. These take place through locally institutionalized 
practices and social networks; by means of monetary transactions; or through a very creative 
combination of commodity and non-commodity strategies. A second important element 
discussed in this chapter is how peasant families organize labor as the basis for controlling the 
production process. Family labor, analyzed here as the working force but also as the knowledge 
and skills involved and deployed in the labor process, constitutes a key factor for resource 
control, and for the production and reproduction of the family farm. The chapter also 
demonstrates how peasant families strategically interact in and entwine very diverse spheres of 
operation: that of the market through commoditized interactions and with their own non-
monetarized rural activities and organizations – this takes place at different levels in both 
community based organizations and water-use based organizations. The chapter shows how 
families sustain their livelihoods through this interplay of market and non-market based 
exchanges that enable families to obtain sufficient control over their own production and 
thereby over the reproduction of their livelihoods. 
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The thesis findings question the ‘participatory water management’ literature that finds much 
resonance in Bolivia and around the world and they challenge many of the popular 
‘empowerment approaches’. The cases show that local water users are the most important 
actors in shaping local irrigation development, water governance and local production 
practices. Users, since long, have actively involved themselves as ‘participants’ in struggles 
for irrigation, long before external ‘participatory’ intervention projects have come to ‘develop’ 
irrigation systems. These peasant strategies and practices show that the common claim that is 
made by intervening external actors -- that their intervention projects aim to incorporate ‘the 
locals’ through participatory projects – is to be considered as the world upside down. From a 
local perspective, it is the external intervention projects that ‘participate’ for a short specific 
phase in the transformation of local water control realities and (re)production practices. 
 
The results highlight the dynamism and adaptive capacity of the peasantry in Bolivia. They 
show that, despite changing socio-economic pressures, increased and sometimes problematic 
state and third party external involvement, this sector actively shapes and deploys strategies to 
sustain itself. This is done through the interplay between creative adaptation at individual and 
family level as well as through collective action at community and supra-community level. 
These adaptations go hand in hand with the transformation of peasant family strategies 
regarding their agricultural (re)production. In this process, external interventions and relations 
with state and none state actors are not only inevitable but often also keenly strategized, 
especially when it concerns the construction of large hydraulic works. But also in cases where 
external interventions and support are mobilized, peasant water users commonly are the ones 
who make such interventions work for themselves, shaping their own projects whereby their 
organizations, principles and practices are tactically adapted, inserted and mobilized. Despite 
deeply adverse contexts, these strategic and rooted modes of operation and practice-based 
governance seek to guarantee the sustainability of the peasantry’s mode of life in the region, 
with families in charge of their own irrigation systems dynamically shaping their livelihood 
strategies. 
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Resumen 
 
La investigación de riego en Bolivia, y particularmente en la región andina, se ha centrado 
principalmente en la gestión de cuencas hidrográficas o de los sistemas de riego. Pocos estudios 
han analizado cómo las familias campesinas desarrollan y mantienen la gestión diaria del agua 
como un componente fundamental e integrado de sus estrategias productivas individuales al 
tiempo que incorporan estos esquemas individuales de control de agua y de las prácticas de 
riego en las normas, reglas y formas organizativas más amplias de trabajo colectivo y de los 
esfuerzos de subsistencia de las comunidades campesinas.  
Esta tesis llena este vacío al plantear la siguiente pregunta de investigación central: 
¿Cómo se unen la acción colectiva y las estrategias individuales en el riego 
campesino para fomentar diversos patrones de gestión del riego y organización de 
producción en respuesta a la búsqueda del control autónomo del agua? 
 
Esta pregunta de investigación ha sido respondida a través del estudio de tres subpreguntas. La 
primera subpregunta busca comprender el marco institucional del sector de riego y los 
respectivos sistemas de control y uso del agua, que en el caso boliviano se basan en la acción 
colectiva y en las normas y prácticas consuetudinarias, aunque en los últimos años el estado ha 
intentado formalizar y regular el sector. La segunda subpregunta se centra en comprender la 
acción colectiva y sus implicaciones para el control del agua en sus diferentes dimensiones. 
Finalmente, la tercera subpregunta se centra en las estrategias de producción familiar y examina 
el vínculo entre las esferas de producción mercantiles y no mercantiles. El análisis muestra 
cómo estos interactúan con el ámbito colectivo del control del agua. 
El capítulo dos presenta el marco conceptual que se desarrolló para analizar las interrelaciones 
entre los ámbitos colectivo e individual, así como su vínculo con el estado, las instituciones y 
el mercado. El capítulo identifica el objeto de estudio, que se define como la dinámica 
campesina en los sistemas de riego. Tratar esta dinámica ha llevado a utilizar dos categorías 
analíticas. La primera categoría constituye la acción colectiva para la gestión del riego, que se 
analiza en función del concepto de "control hídrico" desde una perspectiva socio-técnica. La 
segunda categoría corresponde al concepto de "estrategias campesinas" que, en el ámbito 
colectivo y especialmente en el ámbito individual (familiar), sirve como una lente para entender 
mejor la lógica detrás de las decisiones que toman las familias campesinas sobre qué, cuándo 
y cuánto producir con el agua que son capaces de acceder a través de la acción individual y 
colectiva. 
El capítulo tres analiza el desarrollo institucional del riego en Bolivia, destacando el papel de 
las organizaciones campesinas en este proceso. Comienza con la descripción y discusión de las 
diferentes expresiones de los llamados "usos y costumbres" en los casos de estudio, que ilustran 
la forma y dinámica de la gestión y la gobernanza del agua en el sector. A su vez, estos usos y 
costumbres demuestran las diferentes dimensiones en el control del agua y muestran la 
necesidad de analizar estas dimensiones simultáneamente. El capítulo explica los riesgos y 
dificultades que acompañan a los intentos estatales de formalizar estas normas consuetudinarias 
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en los marcos legales oficiales y muestra la reisiliencia y las estrategias de adaptación de las 
prácticas consuetudinarias existentes que dan forma al funcionamiento diario de los sistemas 
de riego y de las comunidades campesinas. Los “usos y costumbres” incluyen más que solo 
reglas, normas y acuerdos para el acceso a los recursos; interrelacionan activamente las 
prácticas organizativas, los arreglos administrativos y la movilización de recursos. En los 
ámbitos de la gestión y de la gobernanza del agua en los sistemas de riego, estos usos y 
costumbres dan forma a aspectos operativos muy específicos, como las reglas de distribución 
del agua y las actividades de operación y mantenimiento de la infraestructura. En este capitulo 
sostengo que los principios y las prácticas que se enmarcan como 'usos y costumbres' 
constituyen esencialmente estrategias campesinas para lograr su autonomía frente a las 
instituciones y las normas estatales, que parecen crear mayor incertidumbre y falta de control 
en los esfuerzos de las familias y las comunidades para administrar sus recursos y dirigir sus 
medios de vida. 
El capítulo cuatro, primero, analiza la historia de la acción colectiva en la región, mostrando 
cómo, gradualmente, después de las luchas por la tierra, el agua se convirtió en un factor 
vinculante dentro y entre las comunidades de la región. Luego se examinan los arreglos 
necesarios para el control hídrico en diferentes sistemas de riego, centrándose en la 
interrelación de los modos de acción individual y colectiva, y sus vínculos con organizaciones 
formales, la política, la infraestructura y los flujos de agua. Este capítulo muestra que los 
cambios e interacciones en, y entre estos elementos, redefinen constantemente los "sistemas de 
control de agua" en sus diferentes componentes y niveles. Este capítulo destaca la importancia 
y el dinamismo de la acción colectiva para que estos sistemas funcionen internamente y para 
que el sector de pequeños agricultores sea visible frente al Estado, a los donantes y a las 
organizaciones no gubernamentales. Estos últimos han sido importantes para financiar el 
desarrollo de la infraestructura de riego y comúnmente han utilizado estas intervenciones para 
tratar de imponer formas organizativas específicas y normas relacionadas. Sin embargo, este 
capítulo muestra que los "principios campesinos" para administrar sus recursos están 
profundamente arraigados y son resilientes, ya que forman la base para la búsqueda de 
autonomía en la gestión de recursos clave y de sus medios de vida. 
 
El capítulo cinco se centra en las familias campesinos y sus sistemas de producción. Comienza 
con una discusión de las diferentes estrategias que implementan los hogares campesinos para 
materializar el acceso al agua, y cómo esto se hace a través de diversas interacciones con su 
propia comunidad o con otras organizaciones en el ámbito colectivo. Estos se realizan a través 
de prácticas institucionalizadas localmente y redes sociales; por medio de transacciones 
monetarias; o a través de una combinación muy creativa de estrategias mercantilizadas y no 
mercantilizadas. Un segundo elemento importante discutido en este capítulo es cómo las 
familias campesinas organizan el trabajo como la base para controlar el proceso de producción. 
El trabajo familiar, analizado aquí como la fuerza laboral, pero también como el conocimiento 
y las habilidades involucradas y desplegadas en el proceso laboral, constituye un factor clave 
para el control de recursos, y para la producción y reproducción del predio camepsino. El 
capítulo también demuestra cómo las familias campesinas interactúan de manera estratégica y 
se entrelazan en esferas muy diversas de operaciones: la del mercado a través de interacciones 
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mercantilizadas y con sus propias actividades y organizaciones rurales no monetarizadas; esto 
ocurre en diferentes niveles tanto en organizaciones comunitarias como en organizaciones 
alrededor del agua. El capítulo muestra cómo las familias mantienen sus medios de vida a 
través de esta interacción de intercambios mercantiles y no mercantiles que les permiten a las 
familias obtener un control suficiente sobre su propia producción y, por lo tanto, sobre la 
reproducción de sus medios de vida. 
 
Los hallazgos de la tesis cuestionan la literatura sobre "gestión participativa del agua" que 
encuentra mucha resonancia en Bolivia y en todo el mundo y cuestionan muchos de los 
"enfoques de empoderamiento" populares. Los casos muestran que los usuarios locales del 
agua son los actores más importantes en la configuración del desarrollo del riego local, la 
gobernanza del agua y las prácticas de producción locales. Los usuarios, desde hace mucho 
tiempo, se han involucrado activamente como "participantes" en las luchas por el riego, mucho 
antes de que los proyectos de intervención "participativa" externa hayan venido a "desarrollar" 
los sistemas de riego. Estas estrategias y prácticas campesinas muestran que el reclamo común 
que hacen los actores externos intervinientes, que sus proyectos de intervención apuntan a 
incorporar a los "locales" a través de proyectos participativos, debe considerarse como el 
mundo al revés. Desde una perspectiva local, son los proyectos de intervención externa los que 
'participan' en una breve fase específica en la transformación de las realidades locales de control 
del agua y de las prácticas de (re) producción. 
 
Los resultados resaltan el dinamismo y la capacidad de adaptación del campesinado en Bolivia. 
Muestran que, a pesar de las presiones socioeconómicas cambiantes y el involucramiento 
creciente y muchas veces problemático del estado o de otros agentes externos, este sector 
moldea y despliega activamente estrategias para sostenerse. Esto se hace a través de la 
interacción entre la adaptación creativa a nivel individual y familiar, así como a través de la 
acción colectiva a nivel comunitario y supra-comunitario. Estas adaptaciones van de la mano 
con la transformación de las estrategias de las familias campesinas con respecto a la (re) 
producción agrícola. En este proceso, las intervenciones externas y las relaciones con el estado 
y con actores no estatales no solo son inevitables sino que a menudo también representan 
estrategias precisas, especialmente cuando se trata de la construcción de grandes obras 
hidráulicas. Pero también en los casos en que se movilizan las intervenciones y el apoyo 
externos, los usuarios de agua campesinos son los que comúnmente hacen que dichas 
intervenciones funcionen por sí mismas, configurando sus propios proyectos según los cuales 
sus organizaciones, principios y prácticas se adaptan, insertan y movilizan tácticamente. A 
pesar de los contextos profundamente adversos, estos modos de operación estratégicos y 
arraigados y la gobernanza basada en la práctica, buscan garantizar la sostenibilidad del modo 
de vida del campesinado en la región, con familias a cargo de sus propios sistemas de riego 
dando formas dinámicas a sus estrategias de subsistencia. 
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Propositions 
 
 
 
1. “Uses and customs” are localized expressions of water control that challenge the relationship of 
dependency and uncertainty created by state institutions in peasant irrigation systems.  
(this thesis) 
 
2. The capacity to construct collective and individual water access rights constitutes the starting point 
for peasant families to decide on their agro-productive systems. 
(this thesis) 
 
3. Transdisciplinary research requires creating collaborative spaces for knowledge generation that 
transcend barriers imposed by disciplinary boundaries, institutional powers and personal “egos”. 
 
4. The growing, uncritical policy attention to territorial claims based on “ownership notions” generates 
new uncertainties and conflicts among natural resources’ user groups. 
 
5. A “sandwich PhD” involves the increased risk of being trapped between the demands of one’s daily 
work and those of the PhD research. 
 
6. Combining the identities of a scholar and a peasant requires investigating the peasant 
way of life and skills as a researcher, and tapping into the researchers’ world and skills as a farmer. 
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